For over half a century, IAEA safeguards have served to effectively verify the peaceful use of nuclear material and activities. This year marks two notable anniversaries for safeguards: the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the first comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and the 25th anniversary of the entry into force of the first additional protocol (AP). These important anniversaries provide an opportunity to reflect on the evolution of the safeguards system and to consider its future direction.
The earliest safeguards system was ‘item-specific’, meaning that safeguards were only applied to the nuclear material, equipment and facilities that a State chose to submit to safeguards. A shift towards a comprehensive safeguards system occurred in 1967, when countries in Latin America and the Caribbean reached agreement on the first treaty outlawing nuclear weapons in a populated region of the world. This treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, opened a new chapter by requiring parties to accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear material and activities. Mexico was the first State to conclude an agreement pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
One year later, in 1968, the NPT opened for signature. Article III of the NPT requires each non-nuclear-weapon State to conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA covering “all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities”. To meet this requirement, CSAs were established. Finland was the first State to bring into force a CSA in connection with the NPT, in 1972.
During the early 1990s, the discovery of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iraq demonstrated that the IAEA safeguards system needed to be strengthened. The IAEA embarked in 1993 on Programme 93+2 to further strengthen safeguards implementation under CSAs and enhance the IAEA’s ability to verify not only the correctness but also the completeness of a State’s declaration of nuclear material subject to safeguards. This programme led to the adoption of the AP in 1997. An AP provides the IAEA with expanded rights of access to information and locations. Australia was the first State to bring into force an AP.
The IAEA started developing and implementing State-level safeguards approaches (SLAs) for individual States with a CSA in the early 2000s, gradually moving away from generic facility safeguards approaches. As part of efforts to allow the Agency to make full use of the flexibility provided by SLAs (within the scope of the relevant safeguards agreement), in 2011 the IAEA began to update and customize existing SLAs based on State-specific factors. In 2019, a project was launched to further improve SLAs through the definition of performance targets.
As we look to the future, the demand for IAEA safeguards is likely to continue to increase, and novel technologies will pose both opportunities and challenges. We must deploy modernized safeguards infrastructure and equipment, and further develop and align safeguards approaches, tools and methodologies. With the support of our Member States, I am confident that we will rise to meet the challenges we face and ensure that IAEA safeguards remain a key element in global non-proliferation efforts in the decades to come.
