It is a great pleasure for me to be in Egypt to address this meeting of distinguished representatives from the League of Arab States on the subject of Peace and Development: Nuclear Energy in the Service of Humanity. I speak today from the perspective of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which was established in 1957 as the vehicle for international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy. It is guided by three complementary and equally important strategic objectives. These are: to assist Member States, particularly developing countries, in the use of nuclear technology; to promote radiation and nuclear safety; and to ensure to the extent possible that pledges related to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy are kept.
As the only worldwide intergovernmental organization dedicated to nuclear science and technology, the Agency acts as an international focal point for technology sharing, the setting and application of standards and verification of non-proliferation undertakings. The reputation of the Agency - and therefore the value of the work that it does - depends on its scientific and technical competence and its objectivity. It is from this perspective I submit for your consideration four points concerning the role of nuclear energy in the modern world.
First, nuclear techniques are making an increasingly important contribution to development and human welfare. Everyone should be able to benefit from the many applications of this unique technology. This can be best achieved by strengthening international co-operation and building up national scientific, technical and nuclear infrastructure capacities.
Second, I firmly believe that the cause of peace is best served by following the path of non-proliferation and seeking the earliest possible total elimination of nuclear weapons. In my view, nuclear weapons do not contribute to security - they encourage dangerous arms races with incalculable consequences and are a diversion from development. The international community should redouble its efforts to ensure their early elimination.
Third, nuclear power generation has particular advantages in being one of very few mature technologies for meeting growing energy demand without contributing to global climate change. But at the national level, rigorous and objective comparative analysis is called for to ensure that the best energy mix is pursued.
Fourth, in all nuclear related activities, safety is of paramount importance. Only through constant attention to nuclear safety and a sustained safety record can nuclear energy play its intended role as an important source of energy.
I make my remarks today under four headings: technology transfer for development; the contribution of verification and safeguards to peace and security; the role of nuclear power; and the importance of nuclear safety.
I begin with the contribution of nuclear technology to development. In agriculture, water resource management, human health, environmental improvement and other areas, nuclear techniques are proving to be unique and highly effective tools for development. For example, in agriculture, nuclear techniques are being used in five Arab countries to promote sustainable agricultural production in salt affected barren lands using saline groundwater and salt-tolerant plants. Under a sub-regional project covering three countries, the IAEA is assisting to produce date palm trees with improved characteristics and resistance to the Bayoud disease.
Following the Agency's scientific and technical assistance to Libya in the late 1980s to successfully eradicate the new world screw worm, use of the sterile insect technique for the area wide eradication of agricultural pests has become an established environmentally friendly procedure for the control and eradication of harmful pests including the Mediterranean fruit fly, the melon fly and the tsetse fly. The Agency is presently supporting Ethiopia in a project to eradicate tsetse in the southern Rift Valley, an area of 25,000 square kilometres.
Freshwater scarcity is a problem that could affect two thirds of the world's population by the year 2025. The Agency is helping to meet this challenge through its isotope hydrology programme and through its work on nuclear desalination. In a Model Project involving nine North African countries, isotope techniques are proving particularly effective in the assessment and management of groundwater resources and in the investigation of water leakage in dams and reservoirs. And assistance is being provided to five Arab countries in the development of national capabilities for planning and implementing demonstration projects for sea water desalination processes, possibly using small and medium size nuclear reactors.
Nuclear techniques are becoming increasingly important in health and medicine. The Agency is assisting States in improving safety standards and effectiveness in radiotherapy practice and in the introduction of new clinical techniques for cancer diagnosis and treatment. Thyroid deficiency, which can lead to stunted growth and deformities, is a curable illness if detected immediately after birth. The IAEA is assisting health authorities in several countries in introducing neonatal screening programmes.
The IAEA is the principal vehicle for the multilateral transfer of nuclear technology. In fact, for the majority of the 128 Member States of the IAEA, access through the Agency to the benefits of nuclear science and technology is a primary motivation. The Agency's technical co-operation programme is funded essentially through voluntary contributions to the Technical Co-operation Fund by Member States. The size of the programme is modest - less than US $100 million per year - but as can be seen, the results have been outstanding and the potential for further development and application is immense.
Unique in the UN system, the IAEA operates its own research and science laboratories to facilitate scientific and technical analysis and technology transfer programme delivery. Training for scientists from developing countries is an integral part of the activities of our laboratories.
The goal of the IAEA's technical co-operation strategy is to promote achievement of development priorities that participating countries have defined. But we need to be sure that nuclear technology is the most effective and appropriate technology to address a particular problem, that the recipient country has adequate infrastructure to absorb such technology and that the technology is transferred safely, efficiently and effectively. This is my first point: strengthening international co-operation, including with the IAEA, and building up national scientific, technical and nuclear infrastructure capacities is the best way to ensure access to the full benefits of nuclear technology for development.
My second point is that the hopes for a more secure world rest crucially on advancing the agenda for nuclear arms reduction and their eventual elimination. Effective verification is indispensable to the realisation of these hopes. I will divide my remarks under three headings: the broad outlook for nuclear disarmament, the strengthened IAEA safeguards system and the Agency's present activities in the Middle East.
The past decade has brought profound international changes but with respect to nuclear non-proliferation it is a mixed picture of global hopes; regional tensions. On the one hand, the NPT, with 187 signatories, has been extended indefinitely, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty already has 152 signatories, the declared nuclear weapon States have taken some major steps in nuclear arms reduction, other States have dismantled, abandoned or foreclosed their nuclear weapons option and Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) have been established in Africa and Southeast Asia, in addition to the existing ones in Latin America and the South Pacific.
In addition to a complete ban on nuclear testing, two actions have always been identified as being indispensable to nuclear arms reduction and nuclear disarmament: freezing the production of fissile materials for weapon purposes and gradually reducing the stockpiles of such materials. I am pleased to note that measures are being taken on both fronts.
I am particularly pleased that the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has at last turned its attention to a treaty to prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Also, progress is being made in consultations between Russia, the US and the IAEA to place under IAEA verification tons of nuclear material withdrawn from the military sector in the two countries.
On the other hand, in key areas of high tension including the Middle East and South Asia, regional accommodations have not yet been reached to enable the full application of the non-proliferation regime. Indeed, the nuclear weapon tests conducted last year by India and Pakistan sent two clear messages: the international community must accelerate its efforts towards nuclear arms reduction and disarmament; and it must focus increasingly on perceived and real regional instabilities and insecurities which are the driving forces behind the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Strengthened Safeguards System
The role of the IAEA, through its verification and safeguards system, is to provide the necessary assurance that States are complying with their nuclear non-proliferation and arms control commitments. Over 180 States have undertaken to accept comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
An effective verification system is indispensable to nuclear arms control. Since 1991, and as a result especially of the Agency's experience in Iraq, it has become clear that effective safeguards must provide assurance not only about the nuclear activities declared by a State, but also about the absence of any undeclared activities. To do this, the safeguards system needed to evolve beyond its focus on nuclear material accountancy to a system based on more qualitative assessments. This has entailed three major elements: more information, wider access and greater use of advanced verification technology.
In 1997 the IAEA Board of Governors approved a Model Additional Protocol which provides the necessary legal authority for implementing the new measures. I am encouraged that, to date, such Additional Protocols have been signed for 35 States and other Parties. I strongly believe that adherence should be global. Our goal is that by the year 2000 all States will have concluded an Additional Protocol.
The introduction of the strengthened safeguards system will raise substantially the level of assurance, but it must be recognized that, even with full implementation, nuclear material safeguards cannot provide 100% guarantees. Some uncertainty is inevitable in any country-wide technical system that aims to prove the negative, that is to prove the absence of concealable objects or activities.
For this reason, while safeguards are a key element, they must be supplemented by other mutually reinforcing non-proliferation components. These include export control and, most importantly, regional and global security arrangements which aim at removing the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy should not be perceived as an intrusion on national sovereignty but, on the contrary, as a prerequisite for a State to exercise its sovereign right to use nuclear energy and nuclear technology.
Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
This leads me to comment on the IAEA role with respect to application of safeguards to all nuclear activities in the Middle East and the establishment of a NWFZ in the region. Successive IAEA General Conference resolutions request the Director General of the IAEA to consult with the States of the Middle East "to facilitate the early application of full-scope Agency safeguards to all nuclear activities in the region as relevant to the preparation of model agreements, as a necessary step towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the region".
Consultations with States in the region have been ongoing since 1992. At the conceptual level a number of points have emerged, including: 1) that it would be desirable for Agency safeguards to apply to all nuclear activities in the Middle East; 2) that the establishment of a NWFZ with appropriate verification arrangements would be an important step in enhancing security and creating confidence; and 3) that a verification system for a NWFZ would most likely need to be comprehensive and intrusive to be able to deal with the legacy of conflict and distrust that exists in the region, and would most likely benefit from a system of mutual verification by the Parties in addition to global verification by the IAEA.
But, as I reported to the IAEA General Conference last September, opinions continue to differ on key issues of timing. Israel has reiterated its view that priority should be given to the establishment of comprehensive peace and security in the region which could later be followed by arms control and the establishment of the Middle East as a NWFZ, of which mutual verifications and safeguards would be an integral part. Other States of the Middle East express the view that the application of safeguards to all nuclear facilities in the region should not depend on the establishment of a NWFZ and/or the conclusion of a comprehensive peace. According to this view, the application of full scope IAEA safeguards to all of Israel's nuclear facilities through its accession to the NPT/1 would constitute a confidence building measure that would contribute to the establishment of a NWFZ and to the attainment of a peaceful settlement in the region.
Through consultations with the States in the region and, as requested, through events such as technical workshops, the Agency seeks to contribute to this process by familiarising government officials with safeguards concepts, tools, as well as with possible verification modalities that can apply in a future NWFZ in the Middle East. It is for the States of the region to agree on the scope, obligations and timing of the future NWFZ called for by international consensus. But once that agreement is reached, the Agency stands ready to assist in the development of a verification scheme that can credibly provide assurance that the agreed obligations are complied with. This is an important contribution we can make to the goal of establishing peace and security.
I turn now to the role of nuclear power. In 1998, some 437 nuclear reactors, operating in 31 countries, provided about 17% of global electricity supply and accounted for the avoidance of about 8% of carbon emissions which are a key factor in the phenomenon of climate change.
Energy demand in developing countries is projected to increase two to three fold in the next 30 years. Concern about the impact of greenhouse gas emissions on global climate change has also grown, leading the industrialized countries to agree, at the Kyoto Conference, to lower their greenhouse gas emissions. While the short term energy outlook is for continued high dependence on fossil fuels and greater greenhouse gas emissions, the challenge for both developed and developing countries is to make energy choices which will take account of global and national targets and timetables for reducing carbon dioxide emissions.
For many countries, nuclear power generation has particular advantages. It is a mature technology for meeting large scale power generation needs with minimal greenhouse gas emissions and air pollution. Nuclear power can offer national security advantages by reducing dependence on imported supplies of fossil fuel. And the use of nuclear reactors for co-generation applications such as water desalination and industrial heat can contribute to meeting national development goals.
These considerations would suggest that nuclear power, together with renewable sources, plus improved fossil fuel conversion and greater efficiency throughout the energy system, will continue to play a key role in energy strategies. In fact, the picture is rather mixed. In North America and Western Europe, the share of nuclear power in electricity generation is currently declining - in some cases on economic grounds and in other cases because of public concerns about safety and radioactive waste. Yet in fast developing economies in Asia, and in Eastern Europe, nuclear power is considered essential to meet large increases in energy demand.
The choice of nuclear power and of a particular energy mix is a national decision to be made in the light of national priorities and considerations. But each States' circumstances are different in terms of existing infrastructure, availability of other energy sources and the economics of various energy options. This brings me to my third point. In view of the importance of energy for development and the relatively large investments required to establish a nuclear power sector, rigorous analysis of all available energy options is called for to ensure the best choices.
Since 1992, the Agency has developed the tools necessary for Member States to conduct their own objective comparative evaluations of all available energy options. Through sophisticated databases and methodologies, economic, environmental and risk analysis of all processes throughout the fuel cycle can be conducted. Over 30 countries are presently using these comprehensive analytic tools. Several international lending institutions such as the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development utilise data from these programmes before approving investment in electricity projects. I commend the use of these tools for any country considering introducing nuclear power as part of its national energy mix.
My final point is that constant attention to safety in all nuclear related activities is of paramount importance not only to the viability and success of every nuclear application but also to the future of nuclear power as a whole. Safety is a national responsibility. Since the Chernobyl accident, which demonstrated tragically that "an accident anywhere is an accident everywhere", governments have recognized, however, the benefits of making national responsibilities accountable to international safety standards and norms.
The contribution that the IAEA makes is through the development of a comprehensive nuclear safety regime consisting of binding international agreements, detailed safety standards and measures to provide for the application of those agreements and standards. In recent years, several important international conventions relating to physical protection, civil liability for nuclear damage, nuclear safety and the safety of waste and spent fuel management, have helped to fill gaps in the international nuclear safety regime. I would urge all States represented here to accelerate their legal processes to enable these conventions to be fully operational.
The Agency's Safety Standards Series publications represent international consensus on safety norms. The Agency is in the process of preparing or revising the entire corpus of safety standards - a total of some seventy documents - to ensure that they are comprehensive, scientifically accurate and up to date.
However, the key to what is known as 'safety culture' lies is in the actual application of these conventions and standards and in ensuring that national regulatory systems are fully in place. In this area, the Agency offers a wide range of services to assist Member States - various types of review missions, training, the fostering of scientific research, technical co-operation and information exchange. Promotion of education and training is also a major part of our activities. I would like to see more States taking full advantage of these services.
With respect to effective national systems of control, through a technical co-operation project the Agency is currently assisting 52 Member States to strengthen and improve their national regulatory infrastructures with regard to all aspects of safety and control over radioactive sources. The importance of such infrastructure has been highlighted by the serious problem of 'orphan' radiation sources. These are radiation sources that, for a variety of reasons, are not recorded in the inventories of national regulatory authorities. Serious cases of human exposure to such sources have been reported in Turkey and Georgia. The IAEA has responded very quickly to national requests for appropriate expert assistance, but prevention is always better than post facto radiological assistance.
An important aspect of nuclear safety concerns waste management. Through assessment of different technologies and information dissemination, the Agency assists Member States in adopting techniques to ensure that low and intermediate level radioactive wastes are dealt with in a proper and safe way without endangering the public or the environment. I commend increased regional co-operation in this regard. For example, progress is being made in a regional approach in Africa to clear the continent of spent radium needles used in medicine.
With respect to high level radioactive wastes, we are encouraging Member States to develop disposal plans and construct disposal facilities nationally or in co-operation with each other. I believe that the availability and practical demonstration of technical solutions for the safe and permanent disposal of high level wastes are prerequisites for public acceptance of the advantages of nuclear power. Only when available technical solutions for safe and permanent disposal of wastes have been demonstrated will the public accept the advantage of nuclear power of generating comparatively very small volumes of wastes.
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
The peaceful uses of nuclear energy are a factor for development and the improvement of human welfare in the modern world. A national capacity in nuclear science and technology is an asset in its own right and a contributor to broader technological development. The establishment of such capacity does not necessarily require nuclear power generation - many advanced countries utilise other nuclear facilities, such as research reactors and accelerators, to reap the benefits of nuclear technology.
But whatever choices nations make, I believe that three points are indispensable. First, peace and development are two sides of the same coin. They are interrelated in nature and can both benefit through strengthened international co-operation. Second, our aim should be to move towards nuclear disarmament - the world is best served by fewer not more nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon States. And third, attention to nuclear safety must be paramount. In my view the ability to sustain nuclear safety, including safety of waste, at a high level everywhere will be the determining factor in the future of nuclear energy. As the worldwide intergovernmental organization dedicated to nuclear science and technology, mandated to give due consideration to the needs of developing countries, the IAEA remains committed to assist its Member States to utilise nuclear energy for peace and development in the service of humanity.