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**TELEX MESSAGES TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY
ORGANIZATION OF IRAN**

Addenda

Attached, for the information of Member States, is the text of a further telex (dated 26 November 1987) from the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to the Director General. The Director General's reply is also attached.

ATTACHMENT 1

TEXT OF A TELEX FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE ATOMIC
ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

With reference to your message No. 785034¹/, and considering the bulk of previous communications, we are deeply dismayed that the Agency has chosen to evade the issue of our concern by resorting to time-consuming and ineffective correspondence instead of rapid response and productive measures as befitting an emergency situation. It is our regrettable experience that the extremely mild reactions of the Agency to the past atrocities of the Iraqi regime, which border on tacit approval and can clearly be interpreted as such, have emboldened the said regime to scale up its attacks to unprecedented levels, as we witnessed on 17 November 1987. The results of these latest attacks are now well known and well documented for posterity, if nothing else.

The recent Iraqi atrocities make a mockery of the Agency's Statute and of all the relevant resolutions, thus undermining the credibility of this international forum. You can be sure, Sir, that this unfortunate state of affairs will not escape the attention of the non-aligned and impartial Member States and will be to the detriment of the Agency in the long run by rendering its entire apparatus and objectives questionable. It rightly makes the Agency's impartial Member States, particularly those of the developing world, wonder whether their investment and trust in the Agency are well placed if and when they find themselves in a predicament such as ours.

It is regrettable to note that, when an extraordinary situation arises, instead of making effective and timely responses such as

- issuing a statement condemning the military attack (in accordance with the Agency's resolutions),
- convening appropriate consultancy and advisory meetings, and
- dispatching teams of experts for on-site inspection and advice,

you choose to resort to hindering technicalities, look for obstacles, and point to the "small print" in order to evade the issue.

¹/ See Attachment 2 to INFCIRC/346/Add.2

The latest hindrance, to which you refer in your letter of 18 November 1987, is that:

"... our initial assessment indicates that the nature and small amount of nuclear material stored at the site of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant could not create a significant radiological hazard to the public."

Statements such as this defeat the entire objective of General Conference resolutions 407, 409 and 444. In your statement, a new "factor", concerned with the "nature" and the "amount" of the nuclear material, is introduced. Interpreted differently, one can conclude that, if the "nature" and the "amount" of the nuclear material in a nuclear installation meet certain constraints, then such an installation is considered beyond the scope of the Agency resolutions and thus open to military attack.

Alternatively, arguments such as those put forward by you prompt us to ask what types and amount of nuclear material will protect our power plant from further attack.

We have learned, Sir, through bitter experience that communicating on this issue will not prompt the Agency to endorse effective measures. The reasons why and the influences involved are subjects beyond the scope of the present statement, and we prefer not to elaborate here any further.

However, we feel duty-bound to present our viewpoint for the record and for the benefit of Member States which may have illusions about the apparatus of the Agency. For this reason we must request the circulation of this statement to all Member States.

Considering my high esteem for you personally, it is regrettable that this state of affairs has come about during your tenure.

ATTACHMENT 2

TEXT OF A TELEX FROM THE DIRECTOR GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE ATOMIC ENERGY ORGANIZATION OF IRAN

27 November 1987

Dear Mr. Amrollahi,

In reply to your cable of 26 November 1987, let me assure you that the IAEA seeks to be helpful to all its members in achieving the safe use of nuclear energy. An uncontrolled release of radioactivity or the risk thereof anywhere in the world, whether due to accidents or to acts of violence, is of immediate concern to the Agency and it is at all times ready to offer assistance needed to assess any such releases and to advise on action to contain and control their radiological consequences. In the past months, we have arranged several missions for such purposes. In line with the policy described above, I immediately replied to your cable of 17 November 1987 that the Agency is ready to send an expert mission on nuclear safety and radiation protection to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant. The Agency can also, as in 1985, render expert assistance to you in assessing whether damage to buildings under construction will impede further construction or endanger their eventual use.

While there is thus an unqualified readiness in the Agency to assist the Islamic Republic of Iran in these respects, it is not the function of the Agency - and certainly not of its chief officer - to judge in the case of controversy whether damage is the result of deliberate and perhaps illegal attacks or incidental to attacks on military targets. In either case, from the viewpoint of the Agency, damage inflicted on a peaceful nuclear facility which is in operation or merely under construction for such use is regrettable and a matter of serious concern.

As you and the expert staff of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran will be aware, the conclusion must be drawn from the information previously supplied by you to the Agency that the quantity and nature of the nuclear material stored at the site of the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant is such that it could not create a radiological hazard - nor would it normally require any on-site safeguards inspection.

It is against this background that we have enquired about the state of the material at Bushehr. The Agency remains ready to send experts to assist and to advise on radiological hazards and on damage to buildings. As you requested, I am circulating your message and this reply to Member States.