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## THIRTY-SECOND (1988) REGULAR SESSION

### RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Austria Center Vienna  
on Wednesday, 21 September 1988, at 10.50 a.m.

President: Mr. HALIM (Malaysia)  
later: Mr. Al NUWAISER (Saudi Arabia)

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[\*] GC(XXXII)/834.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document GC(XXXII)/INF/262/Rev.2.

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ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION  
(GC(XXXII)/834 and Add.1; GC(XXXII)/834, annotation to item 4(a))

1. The PRESIDENT announced that the General Committee had recommended that the General Conference include in its agenda all the items listed in the provisional agenda contained in document GC(XXXII)/834. With regard to the supplementary item proposed by the Islamic Republic of Iran set forth in document GC(XXXII)/834/Add.1, the General Committee recommended that it be included as a matter to be discussed under item 10, "Measures to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiological protection".

2. The General Committee recommended further that the items be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in document GC(XXXII)/834.

3. It also recommended that the order in which the items appeared in document GC(XXXII)/834 be retained, subject to the understanding that changes might have to be made in the course of business so as to make the best use of the available time.

4. The General Committee's recommendations were accepted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION  
(GC(XXXII)/834; annotation to item 4(b))

5. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had authorized him to inform the General Conference that it recommended fixing Friday, 23 September 1988, as the closing date of the thirty-second regular session and Monday, 25 September 1989, as the opening date of the thirty-third regular session of the General Conference, which would be held in Vienna.

6. The General Committee's recommendations were accepted.

REQUESTS FOR THE RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS (GC(XXXII)/INF/258, 261 and 264)

7. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee recommended that the General Conference should not accede to the request made by Panama that the last sentence in Article XIX.A of the Statute be invoked in order that Panama might be permitted to vote during the current session of the General Conference.

8. The General Committee's recommendation was accepted.

9. The PRESIDENT said that the General Committee had further recommended that the General Conference should accede to the request made by Lebanon that the last sentence in Article XIX.A of the Statute be invoked in order that Lebanon might be permitted to vote during the current session of the General Conference.

10. The General Committee's recommendation was accepted.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1987 (resumed) (GC(XXXII)/835)

11. Mr. MANZOLINI (Italy) expressed appreciation to the Director General for the comprehensive and detailed report he had submitted to the Conference, which constituted further evidence of his commitment to serving the international community.

12. Governments and public opinion were currently reviewing the prospects for nuclear energy, and the past year had seen - as a lesson learnt from the Chernobyl accident - widespread and increased awareness of the need for renewed commitment to, and closer international co-operation in, ensuring ever higher levels of safety in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, and in radioactive waste management.

13. Italy was convinced that the continued use of nuclear energy would be possible only with the parallel development of appropriate technical and legislative measures for preventing any possible accidents, and therefore supported the specific initiatives taken by the Agency to that end - particularly since Chernobyl.

14. Although compliance with the regulations regarding the construction and operation of plants was predominantly a government responsibility, the fundamental role that the adoption of internationally binding safety regulations would play in changing public opinion regarding nuclear energy should not be underestimated. He therefore welcomed the recent review of the five NUSS Codes of Practice, but felt it was now necessary to make a thorough study of mechanisms to ensure the widest possible acceptance by Member States of such a comprehensive set of regulations - for example, through a multilateral convention. In view of the international nature of the issues involved, priority should be given to increasing the degree of standardization

of the safety regulations and criteria adopted by different countries in the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

15. Also, an appropriate status should be given to the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group's report on Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants (INSAG-3).

16. His country hoped that such documents, together with the technical discussions that had taken place within the IAEA over the past two years - between plant designers, builders, operators, maintenance personnel and regulators - could contribute to the spreading of a "safety culture", among all operators, and thus to regaining the public's confidence in nuclear power.

17. The priority given by Italy to those issues did not mean that it did not fully support the other activities undertaken by the Agency in the aftermath of the Chernobyl and Goiania accidents. The operational safety review team (OSART), radiation protection advisory team (RAPAT) and analysis of safety-significant events team (ASSET) services were extremely valuable - as would be the Incident Reporting System (IRS) once an improvement along the lines of a long-standing Italian proposal had been implemented. It was also urgently necessary to agree upon a definition of the term "radiological significance" - used, for example, in the Early Notification Convention - since the present definition left an element of arbitrariness in determining when notification was required. The Agency should also continue and strengthen its activities in the fields of nuclear safety and radiation protection, including work relating to "inherently safe" reactors. Once properly developed, such a technology would not only find increasing application in the industrialized countries, but could also be made available to those Third World countries that had decided to take up the nuclear option. By its very nature, such a technology seemed particularly suited to gaining access to an extremely important energy source without prejudice to specific safety regulations.

18. Italy noted with satisfaction that the design work on the first stage of the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project had begun during 1988, since that scientifically extremely ambitious project also confirmed the potential which a genuine will to co-operate could offer to the international community.

19. Following an in-depth political debate and three referendums, the Italian Parliament had imposed a five-year moratorium on the construction of nuclear fission power plants. That period would be dedicated to promoting research - in both nuclear fission and nuclear fusion - on new generations of plants and reactors offering further improved safety conditions. The Italian Government had also drawn up a new National Energy Plan aimed at providing Italy with the energy required for its economic development while guaranteeing maximum protection of human health and the environment and bearing in mind the need to participate actively in the international development of nuclear technology, especially in the field of inherently safe reactors.

20. That document centred on five basic objectives: energy saving, environmental protection, development of national resources, diversification in the use of imported energy sources and geographical and political diversification of supply areas, and competitiveness of Italian industry. The prospects for reconsidering the use of nuclear fission energy for electricity generation in Italy depended on the availability of plants with innovative safety characteristics of two kinds: (i) Appropriate sites within the environment, so as to minimize the consequences of any possible accident; (ii) Plant design based on enhanced passive and inherent safety features.

21. Particular attention would be devoted to problems related to the conditioning and disposal of radioactive wastes stemming from previous electricity generation or produced by still expanding non-energy sectors such as health, agriculture, etc. Radiation protection would continue to be heavily promoted, both in non-energy applications, such as medical techniques for treating radiation exposure, and in the monitoring of environmental radioactivity.

22. Italy planned to intensify nuclear fusion research activities in the years ahead. Co-operation within Europe, particularly in the Joint European Torus (JET) and Next European Torus (NET) programmes and through the association between the Italian National Committee for Research and Development on Nuclear Energy and Alternative Energy Sources (ENEA) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), would continue with undiminished momentum. Italy's major plants using magnetic confinement would be completed: the FTU at ENEA's Frascati Centre by the end of 1988 and the RFX

at the National Research Council's Padua Laboratories by 1989. In addition, the ENEA-EURATOM Association had recently decided to complete the detailed design of IGNITOR, a compact high magnetic field tokamak that was to be located at EURATOM's Ispra establishment.

23. The Agency's responsibilities were steadily increasing, and therefore participation in the decisions taken by its policy-making organs, especially the Board of Governors, should be as broad as possible, since those decisions would be certain to have an ever greater impact on the energy policies of Member States.

24. Moreover, it was essential for the Agency to step up its efforts to conduct a dialogue with the public and press, which were becoming ever more sensitive to nuclear power issues. That would be in the interest of better transparency of the Agency's activities and would lend credibility to its role in ensuring that essential safety regulations were complied with.

25. With regard to the Board of Governors, the time had come to amend Article VI of the Statute in order to extend and improve representation within the Board. Italy, together with Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, had sponsored an amendment proposal aimed at allowing more countries to participate in adopting important decisions within the governing body of the Agency, while at the same time retaining the principle of equitable representation of all regional groups. Representation on the Board should reflect, in a more balanced way, the various aspects of nuclear progress, taking into account not only installed generating capacity, but also other significant criteria such as technological advancement; international co-operation including participation in Agency activities; development in non-energy areas; and, the ability to evaluate nuclear technology issues in an integrated view of future developments in the energy field. If a definite willingness to seek ways of extending and improving representation on the Board could be shown, that would inspire Italy to pursue its role in the non-proliferation sector, in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in plant safety, as well as encouraging it in its decisions regarding financial support to Agency activities.

26. Full support for the IAEA safeguards system was another aspect of Italy's policy in the nuclear field. He had noted with satisfaction that the Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for 1987 did not record any diversion of nuclear materials or equipment under safeguards. An overall, positive improvement in the level of monitoring activities could be discerned, and he welcomed the constant expansion of the safeguards regime to which the conclusion of further agreements with Nigeria and, more recently, with China and Panama bore witness.

27. At the same time, his delegation was concerned about the continued increase in safeguards expenditure. Even though the trend seemed formally justified by the geographical expansion of the system, it should be possible to contain costs by expanding national research and development activities aimed at improving the quality of safeguards and thereby, in the longer term, allowing savings on staff costs. Italy's contribution to that endeavour had consisted in supplying ad hoc funds and specialized personnel for a support programme on reprocessing plants. In the context of containing costs, his country appreciated the initiative aimed at broadening the areas of activity of regional offices, but all the same, a thorough revision of safeguards criteria and objectives seemed necessary.

28. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), now over 20 years old, still enjoyed Italy's full support, as it had constituted a milestone in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting effective co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technologies. He welcomed the recent accession to NPT of Trinidad and Tobago, and the announcement of a similar move by Saudi Arabia and hoped that other States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty would follow their example. However, the progress already achieved in reducing existing nuclear arsenals and any future progress that might be made in that direction, would undoubtedly constitute the best premise for an updated and constructive assessment of nuclear non-proliferation on the occasion of the Fourth NPT Review Conference in 1990.

29. Technical co-operation with developing countries deserved continued strong support, not merely out of a sense of solidarity, but also because, in the present world economic situation, the interrelations between different economic systems were so manifold and deep-rooted that a crisis could be overcome only through genuine co-operation at every level.



30. In that spirit, Italy had always played a major role in supporting the IAEA's development aid activities: Italian contributions had often been used to finance projects which, though approved by the Agency and considered to be of particular importance, could not otherwise have been implemented; research and development activities had also been conducted on nuclear technologies in sectors of special interest to developing countries, such as agriculture, medicine, hydrology and industry. Those contributions had, in recent years, brought Italy to the forefront among countries supporting the IAEA's technical assistance activities.

31. His country had also placed special emphasis on activities related to training and to science and technology transfer, which were fundamental in enabling developing countries to achieve self-sufficiency and progress. Italy was not only offering a large number of fellowships for that purpose, but, was also making substantial financial contributions to the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, amounting to 9 billion Italian lire per year through the period 1987-1990. In addition, the Italian Government had allocated a further US \$5 million to the Trieste Centre in 1988 so that it could carry out selected programmes for the updating of its activities, and had also contributed US \$3.85 million to the Third World Science Academy for 1988.

32. As for the management of the provision of technical assistance by the Agency, the new methods of project appraisal were very sound. They allowed corrective measures and modifications to be made, if necessary, to projects already under way and to those modelled on previous activities. Ongoing co-operation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other international organizations, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Labour Organisation (ILO) and United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), to improve the quality of programming and projects, on the basis of a specific evaluation of the recipient country's requirements was also extremely important.

33. In conclusion, he reaffirmed Italy's firm commitment to ever closer international co-operation in the nuclear sector, under improved safety conditions and with effective safeguards. The Agency should continue to perform its valuable role of providing guidance and co-ordination in that

sector. At the same time, it was essential for the IAEA to monitor the needs of the international scientific community and of those sectors of society which quite rightly followed with attention - and sometimes with concern - the development of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

34. Mr. Al NUWAISER (Saudi Arabia) shared the Director General's confidence in the future of nuclear energy and the major contribution which it would play in meeting the world's electricity needs as expressed in his opening statement. Despite the negative effects of the Chernobyl accident, the world had continued to develop nuclear power although fears aroused by the Chernobyl accident had slowed down that development. Whilst nuclear power presented dangers to health and threats to the environment, the use of fossil fuels for power generation also resulted in adverse consequences to the environment and climate, as had been pointed out by the World Commission on Environment and Development. Since the use of solar power, hydroelectric power and wind power could not meet the world's continuously increasing energy requirements, nuclear power constituted the most satisfactory long-term option.

35. His delegation welcomed the progress which had been achieved in the areas of radiation and radioactive waste management and the work done by the RAPAT and OSART missions. It also welcomed the revision of the NUSS Codes and the major contribution to the improvement of safety which had also been made by INSAG-3. Developing countries, such as his own, looked to industrialized countries to design advanced types of reactor which were completely safe and had the limited capacity suited to the needs of developing countries.

36. With regard to the technical assistance and co-operation programme, his delegation welcomed the increase in training facilities, the Agency's participation in the Amazon Basin project and the success of regional co-operation agreements. It was, however, a matter of concern to note that the share of technical assistance provided to the Middle East was decreasing. The Secretariat had accounted for that decrease by pointing out that the war in the region created obstacles to the provision of assistance, but had stressed that it was attempting to overcome those problems. His delegation hoped that the Secretariat would be successful in its efforts.

37. As far as the Agency's financial difficulties were concerned, his delegation urged Member States to pay their contributions to the Regular Budget promptly to avoid a recurrence of such difficulties. For its part, Saudi Arabia was making every effort to support international organizations and paid its contributions promptly.

38. His country was particularly concerned about the aggressive designs of Israel and South Africa. His delegation believed that the Agency should take a positive decision on those issues, since Israel, while calling for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, refused to accede to NPT and refused to accept Agency safeguards and South Africa adopted a similar position, claiming to be negotiating with the Agency, whereas in fact it was just playing for time.

39. Finally, his country was also alarmed at the dumping of nuclear waste in developing countries and urged Member States to consider the adoption of policies relating to the transfer of nuclear waste.

40. Mr. CASTILLO CONTOUX (Guatemala) said that despite its difficult economic situation, Guatemala remained ready to support activities involving nuclear energy and its applications, for it was convinced that such applications could accelerate its economic and social advancement. The most important development in the nuclear energy field in Guatemala was the construction, to be completed by mid-1989, of a building that would house the General Directorate for Nuclear Energy and contain a number of laboratories for calibration and dosimetry, radiochemistry, radiopharmacology and agricultural and industrial applications, as well as administrative facilities, a computer centre, a library and a greenhouse. In conformity with the directives given by the President of Guatemala, those facilities would be made available to other Central American States for activities of relevance to the region. Guatemala was also planning to use them to expand its participation in the ARCAL programme.

41. His country was grateful for having received a RAPAT mission in early 1988, for it attached high priority to radiation protection and fully intended to implement the mission's recommendations.

42. In respect of nuclear technology and its applications, the General Directorate for Nuclear Energy had made significant progress in the health, agricultural and industrial sectors. Promotional activities had induced a number of institutions, in close co-operation with the Department of Nuclear Energy, to use nuclear technology in the normal course of their activities or in applied research.

43. The ARCAL programme, which had achieved great success both in technical terms and as an instrument of regional integration and co-operation, had won Guatemala's full support. Guatemala had joined the programme in 1985 and the benefits it had derived had surpassed its own expectations. It would urge the Agency to continue to provide all possible support for the programme, and wished to express its gratitude to donor countries and the Secretariat.

44. Guatemala had hosted a successful workshop on implementation of ISO standards for qualification and certification of non-destructive testing personnel. In November 1988, it would hold a meeting of co-ordinators and researchers involved in the ARCAL project on radioimmunoassay of thyroid-related hormones, and a seminar was to be held the following year on the sterile-insect technique in control or eradication of fruit flies in Latin America.

45. Guatemala wished to thank the Agency for its valuable assistance, which had been essential to the development of nuclear technology use in Guatemala, and the Government of the United States for its extrabudgetary contribution to the implementation of projects on radiation protection and dosimetry equipment and eradication of the Mediterranean fruit fly, which were footnote-a/ projects - subject to receipt of additional funds.

46. Mr. ZANGGER (Switzerland) observed that 1988 was the 20th anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which, together with the Agency's safeguards system, was the cornerstone of the international nuclear regime ensuring international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing the risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons. He welcomed the entry into force of the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, which would enhance the credibility of the non-proliferation system by removing one category of nuclear weapons. He was

also happy to note the conclusion of the safeguards agreement with the People's Republic of China. All the five nuclear-weapon States had thus agreed to place their civil nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards.

47. Referring to the status of nuclear power in Switzerland, he pointed out that there were two contradictory trends: the sceptical, if not negative, attitude of a large part of the population to nuclear power, on the one hand, and a steady increase in electricity demand, on the other.

48. The scepticism was expressed in the two public initiatives against nuclear power, which were to be put to a popular vote in 1990 or 1991. The first sought a ten-year moratorium before authorizing any new power plant, while the second required the shutting down of all existing nuclear power plants at the end of their lifetime at the latest. Moreover, because of parliamentary pressure the Swiss Government was considering the termination of the Kaiseraugst nuclear power plant project. In those circumstances, the nuclear capacity was unlikely to be expanded in the near future.

49. However, electricity consumption continued to rise at an average rate of 4% per annum during the winter months. In view of the uncertain prospects for increase in the production of power and especially nuclear power, several long-term power supply contracts had to be concluded abroad.

50. Faced with that dilemma, the Swiss Government was keeping its nuclear option open and was asking the people to reject the initiatives. Abandonment of the Kaiseraugst project did not, however, mean giving up nuclear projects in future.

51. The existing nuclear programme was working very satisfactorily. The five reactors in operation accounted for about 40% of electricity production. The safety record was good and in 1987 the average reactor availability was again 84%.

52. As regards radioactive waste, his Government considered that the feasibility of safe ultimate storage of medium- and low-level waste had been proven. The safety of high-level waste had been proven in principle; however, it remained to be demonstrated that a large enough site could be found. Projects on repositories for interim storage were under way.

53. With a view to diversification of supply and international co-operation, agreements on co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with Australia and China had been ratified and were in force. A similar agreement with Canada had been signed.

54. In the interest of transboundary nuclear safety, Switzerland and France had agreed to intensify and place on a formal basis mutual exchange of information and to establish a joint commission for the purpose. A similar commission involving the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland was already in existence.

55. Considering the criticism of nuclear power at the national level, Switzerland attached great importance to close international co-operation since it could help in restoring public confidence in nuclear power and promote a less emotional approach. It went without saying that the Agency had a pivotal role in such international co-operation both as a forum and as an active institution.

56. Activities in the field of nuclear safety continued to be of crucial importance for international co-operation and for the Agency. Switzerland had therefore signed the Conventions on Early Notification and on Assistance and called upon those States which had not acceded to them to do so.

57. The Swiss Government was especially committed to promoting the implementation of the relevant provisions of those two Conventions. Trials of the system of communication between the points of contact had shown that it was essential to have clear procedures for measures to be taken. In that context, his Government laid great stress on the definition of the threshold for notifying other States and considered that the problem should be resolved in the near future by the Contracting Parties with the Agency's help.

58. The Agency had made a good start with the implementation of the Conventions. Emphasis should be placed on establishing a continuously-manned focal point within the Agency which would act rapidly. A well-developed emergency response system was essential for the operation of the Conventions and should have priority in financial matters. In the context of the Conventions, an important role belonged to the Global Telecommunication System of the World Meteorological Organization, to which he expressed his gratitude. While it was too early to make a final evaluation of the nuclear

safety measures decided upon within the Agency as a result of the Chernobyl accident, one could already say that the actions taken were appropriate. It would be desirable to review the status of activities in the early 1990s.

59. He had taken note with pleasure of the revision of the NUSS Codes, which, as well as the safety guides, should be continually updated, if necessary, in the light of scientific and technological developments.

60. In the matter of harmonization of nuclear civil liability, he especially welcomed the drafting of the Joint Protocol linking the Paris Convention and the Vienna Convention and hoped that the widening of the scope of application of those Conventions would attract more States to accede to the Vienna Convention. It was desirable, however, to revise certain provisions of the latter in order to reduce its differences from the Paris Convention, in particular those concerning the amounts of compensation. Moreover, Switzerland was willing to join in the efforts to arrive at a system of States' liability in case of nuclear accidents.

61. The Agency's safeguards activities continued to be essential to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In that connection, he welcomed the seminar which had just been held for the press. Publicizing those activities could not but be conducive to the transparency and credibility of safeguards.

62. In the recent years there had been a substantial growth in the Agency's activities in that area, owing chiefly to the continuous increase in the quantity of nuclear material and in the number of nuclear facilities. A permanent freeze in the safeguards expenditure would be harmful. However, Switzerland was open to any initiative with a view to rationalizing the application of safeguards so long as the latter's credibility was not affected.

63. Subject to the preceding comment about safeguards, the Swiss authorities upheld the principle of zero growth in the Regular Budget, which should be achieved chiefly by laying down strict priorities.

64. His delegation supported the Secretariat's efforts to overcome the financial difficulties, and was concerned at the delay in the payment of contributions by certain Member States. He hoped that the latter would meet their obligations in accordance with the financial regulations.

65. The manner in which the Agency had met the challenge of the recent years in the area of nuclear energy inspired confidence. Through the actions it had taken, it would be in a position to contribute to the credibility of nuclear energy. That was of particular importance at a time when the role of nuclear energy in the environmental debate deserved to be freshly evaluated. In that connection, Switzerland had noted with great interest the Director General's recent statements emphasizing the positive contribution of nuclear energy to the solution of environmental problems.

66. Mr. ALER (Sweden) noted that the international community was increasingly concerned by the worldwide threats to the environment which were manifest in all parts of the globe. The fears expressed by scientists and environmental experts during the last decades had been confirmed and determined actions by governments were imperative. For its part, the Agency should direct its efforts towards the implementation of the recommendations of the Brundtland Report.

67. Although half of Sweden's electricity production was based on nuclear power, the Swedish parliament had decided to phase out nuclear power by the year 2010. The majority of the Agency's Member States were in fact interested in nuclear applications other than power generation. His delegation welcomed the expansion of the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme in response to increased demand. In particular, studies of environmental problems, improvement of agricultural methods, medical applications and radiation protection ought to be given high priority. Such projects could be carried out efficiently only if the various programmes could be sustained in a predictable manner. The resources of the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund did not suffice to meet all urgent requests and in order to remedy the situation, an increased flow of extrabudgetary contributions was necessary. Sweden provided such support for the joint programmes of the Agency and the FAO and for the Trieste Centre.

68. In the field of safety, the reactor accidents at Harrisburg and Chernobyl had dramatically highlighted the need to create and maintain, through the Agency, an effective exchange of experience in the fields of nuclear safety and radiological protection. The ultimate responsibility for nuclear safety would have to remain with the national authorities and the



nuclear utilities themselves, but the Agency could provide assistance by means of the NUSS Codes and OSART missions. Unless radical improvements in reactor safety were made, the probability of a major accident remained unacceptably high. The basic principles for nuclear power plants established by INSAG could substantially reduce the probability of reactor accidents and their consequences and obviously such principles should guide the design and construction of any new nuclear power plants. However, more than 500 nuclear power reactors were already in operation or under construction and the fundamental safety characteristics of those plants should also be scrutinized in the light of accumulated experience. In Sweden it had been decided that nuclear power plants should be subjected to a thorough safety review every eight to ten years and an extensive back-fitting programme had been initiated, including the layout of the containment building at two units and the installation of ventilation filters at all power reactors in the country.

69. Another important area was the final disposal of high-level waste. His country believed that the Agency should establish basic principles in that area and that it was essential to establish internationally accepted guidelines in that area. In Sweden, the central intermediate storage facility for spent fuel, CLAB, had been in operation since 1985 and the central facility for final disposal of low- and medium-level radioactive wastes, SFR, had recently started operation. High priority should also be given to the Agency's work on Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection. In particular, the experience of the environmental effects resulting from the large-scale release of radioactivity following the Chernobyl accident should be systematically collected and analysed. The Swedish Radiation Protection Authority was participating actively in that endeavour.

70. With regard to safeguards, his country believed that it was the politically most significant task entrusted to the Agency and that full confidence in the reliability of Agency safeguards was the very basis for continued international co-operation in the nuclear field. The Third NPT Review Conference had recommended the continued pursuit of the principle of universal application of Agency safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in all States. Furthermore, it had recommended an evaluation of the possibility of extending the application of safeguards to additional civil

facilities in the nuclear-weapon States and consideration of the separation of the civil and military facilities in those States. The goal was an effective safeguards regime in both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Sweden welcomed the voluntary submission to Agency safeguards by the nuclear-weapon States of all or part of their peaceful nuclear activities and the recent agreement between the Agency and the People's Republic of China was therefore a matter of satisfaction to his country.

71. Nevertheless, the reluctance by Member States to provide the Agency's Department of Safeguards with adequate resources had limited the possibilities of pursuing the recommendations of the Third NPT Review Conference. His country had accepted, only with the greatest hesitation, the safeguards budget for 1989 and the programme for 1989 and 1990, the year when the next NPT Review Conference was expected to be held. Once again the only way to remedy the situation was through extrabudgetary contributions in areas where the Agency's integrity and objectivity would not be jeopardized. For its part, Sweden had established a five-year programme in support of the Agency's safeguards activities.

72. The world community had welcomed the agreement between the USSR and the United States on the elimination of land-based intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. Transfer to peaceful uses of the nuclear material removed from those nuclear warheads should be verified by subjecting it to Agency safeguards. Such verification should, in fact, be an integral part of a continuing process towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. In conclusion, his delegation hoped that the organizations within the United Nations system would show the necessary foresight and determination and take resolute action to secure a safe future for later generations.

73. Mr. MANIATOPOULOS (Commission of the European Communities) said that, in the Co-operation Agreement between the European Community and the IAEA, the Community undertook to act in close co-operation with the Agency in promoting the objectives of its Statute. He reassured the Conference that the Community would continue to give the Agency the fullest possible support, not only in the safeguards field but in all relevant activities.

74. The collaborative work in safeguards implementation and verification carried on by the Agency, the Community and the Community's member States under the agreements of 1973, 1976 and 1978, had continued during the past year to be a field where still greater resources, manpower and management skills were required. In 1987, the Agency had devoted just under 40% of its worldwide inspection effort to operations within the Community. For its part, the EURATOM safeguards inspectorate (during 1987) had carried out checks on stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and on major quantities of other nuclear material and heavy water held in about 700 nuclear installations in the Community - by any standards, a massive effort amounting to almost 6700 man-days of inspection.

75. It was the European Commission's responsibility to keep under constant review the scope for improvements in safeguards management practice. The European Commission's co-operative safeguards research and development programme consisted of many tasks which were implemented at the Community's Joint Research Centre. Major developments during the past year had included physical inventory exercise for highly enriched uranium materials, testing of automatic review stations for the analysis of optical surveillance data on film and video tape from nuclear installations, and the development of a computer system to match accountancy data from shipments and receipts. The latter developments had important implications for the reduction of manpower requirements.

76. While the Community's safeguarding system, as provided for under the 1957 Treaty of Rome, worked closely with that of the Agency, with which it was of course fully compatible, it nevertheless had some distinct and important features of its own. The NPT provided for the conclusion of agreements by non-nuclear-weapon States with the Agency individually, or together with other States. The Agency's safeguards system was thus based on contractual relationships between the Agency and the States concerned. The Community's safeguards system, on the other hand, was anchored in Community law and, inter alia, also dealt with obligations entered into by the Community with certain key nuclear supplier States. The Agency and Community had therefore organized a close collaboration between their two international safeguarding systems. Whether the Community should now be ready to assist the Agency

further by carrying out a somewhat greater proportion of that collaborative safeguards effort within Community frontiers itself was a possibility that could well merit investigation. Both the IAEA and the Commission would, of course, have to continue to satisfy themselves that their fundamental obligations were being fulfilled.

77. During the past year, there had been some very regrettable failures by certain nuclear operators in the Community at the technical and administrative level, involving the handling and transport of nuclear materials and waste. Some unfortunate, inaccurate and ill-informed allegations had appeared in certain media publications about the efficiency of safeguards activities and had aroused wide concern. The Commission appreciated the prompt and thorough action of the Agency in rebutting false allegations and misunderstandings. Following a considerable information effort both by the Agency and the Community, a Committee of Inquiry, set up by the European Parliament, had drawn up a series of conclusions followed by a resolution approved by the European Parliament at its plenary session in Strasbourg in July. Those events had highlighted the difficulty of explaining to the public at large the results of safeguards activities and the conclusions to be drawn from them. The Commission would be giving increasing attention to the whole issue of the public acceptability of nuclear energy.

78. It was widely known and documented that the European Community had decided to complete a single internal market by the end of 1992. In June 1988, the Commission had presented to the Community's Council of Ministers a communication, which had been published, on the single energy market. It identified the possible barriers to establishing such an energy market by the end of 1992, and presented a series of actions aimed at eliminating those obstacles progressively. The Community was already tackling the problems involved. The actions currently being planned would have positive consequences across the whole energy sector, including the nuclear energy field.

79. In 1987 some 32% of electricity generated in the European Community had been produced in nuclear power stations. In June, the Community's Council of Energy Ministers had examined a review, by the Commission, of the energy policies of Community member States, and the prospects for meeting the

Community's agreed 1995 energy objectives. Latest available projections had shown that the planned reduction in the production of electricity from hydrocarbons to less than 15% by 1995 should be achieved, and that the contribution of nuclear energy to electricity generation in 1995 could amount to 38%. Clearly, nuclear energy and solid fuels were the major options capable of responding adequately to the expected growth in electricity demand in the Community.

80. The problem of the public acceptability of nuclear energy was cause for substantial concern in many countries. The Commission regularly performed surveys (known as Eurobarometer studies) of public opinion in member States of the Community. The results of the autumn 1987 survey indicated that the negative effect of Chernobyl was slowly receding, which was encouraging. Nevertheless, half the people in the Community thought nuclear power stations presented unacceptable dangers, although a higher proportion regarded chemical factories as posing greater risks than nuclear plants.

81. During the past year, the Community had continued to take a number of actions directed towards dealing with the consequences of nuclear accidents. New regulations had been adopted laying down, inter alia, the procedure for determining maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination in foodstuffs and animal fodder in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency. The controls governing imports of agricultural products originating in non-Community countries following the Chernobyl accident had been extended for a further two years. The Community had decided to adhere to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, and to put into operation its own regional system for the early exchange of information. In addition, the European Community Council was considering a proposal that the Community should adhere to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

82. Following talks at the highest level, representatives of the world's four major programmes had reached agreement earlier that year on the co-ordination of their efforts, under the auspices of the Agency, to produce by 1990 a preliminary design for the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER), with the four collaborating parties providing equal contributions and having equal status. The Community attached great importance to that project.

83. The Commission would seek to provide further financial support for the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme. Community support for the programme was also to take a more active form through the setting up of regular laboratory refresher training courses at the Community's Joint Research Centre. The priority assigned by that programme to the training of personnel was, in the Commission's view, of particular value for developing countries.

84. Finally, with regard to the Joint IAEA/NEA Conference on the Paris and Vienna Conventions taking place on 21 September, he stressed that the Commission attached great importance to the successful outcome of that work.

85. Mr. CUEVAS CANCINO (Mexico) said that although many positive comments had been heard concerning the international situation and the Agency's development, there were still a few causes for concern. The United Nations General Assembly had held a special session on disarmament that year, but no progress had been made and the Assembly had been unable to produce a final act. The lack of understanding demonstrated by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States showed that the fatal tendency to increase levels of armament still persisted, and it would be unwise for the Agency to overlook that fact in view of the implications for its activities relating to the peaceful development of nuclear energy.

86. The significant progress made in the control of natural forces had led man to believe that he could advance beyond his former limitations. Unfortunately, the reverse process appeared to be occurring. Many years in the past, when the United Nations had been set up in an atmosphere of great optimism, there had been a feeling that national sovereignty would gradually wither away, and the idea of sovereignty had rarely been referred to - except in principle 7 of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, which had been widely viewed as a sign of retrograde conservatism. However, the opposite had in fact taken place, and even those agreements which were beneficial to humanity were now based on the concept of sovereignty. The linking of nuclear technology with that outdated concept was a dangerous move, like forcing a steam engine to travel at 200 km per hour, and would inevitably result in tragedy.

87. Positive elements in that general situation were the regional agreements on the establishment of nuclear-free zones. The Latin American

States had the Tlatelolco Treaty, and OPANAL had done extremely constructive work. The Rarotonga Treaty was a worthy successor to the Latin American Treaty, and together they ensured that a large area of the Pacific lived up to its name. Also very interesting was the draft resolution, submitted by Egypt in document GC(XXXII)/852, which opened up new perspectives for a region that had long been torn by wars.

88. After the first 30 years of its existence, the Agency should consider what further contributions it could make in its vital role of improving the living standards of the world's population. It should not, however, neglect the spiritual aspect, as an obsession with material progress would mean failing to achieve the great objectives for which it had been established.

89. The Agency, like other international organizations, was hampered by its archaic structure, particularly in the case of the Board of Governors. The regional groupings it had adopted were a poor reflection of reality, and there was insufficient representation of States that were advanced in nuclear technology or of the majority of Member States which required assistance from the Agency. The General Conference had before it an excellent report on Article VI of the Statute, but there were no signs that any of the proposed reforms would be implemented. The Board itself was out of touch with the realities of the nuclear age, and was failing to establish the Agency as a vital force for change.

90. The dangers inherent in the population increase, growing energy requirements and outdated attitudes were well known. Initial enthusiasm for nuclear energy had given way in many places to hesitation and disappointment, and although some delegations had spoken of the continued development of nuclear power in their countries, others had implied the likelihood of a very different course being followed. The Agency alone, and no other organization, could take the vigorous action required to counteract those tendencies, but only after a thorough review of its governing bodies - which must rise above their concern for administrative matters to become leaders in the struggle to ensure the future well-being of humanity. They must take bold initiatives on research into energy forms previously considered impossible, and on education activities aimed at allaying public concern, which was so often based on misconceptions.

91. The developing countries were convinced that the environment must be protected, and they were ready to proceed in a rational manner and to join efforts with other countries to do so. However, solutions to environmental problems must be fair, taking into account the differing viewpoints of the industrially developed world, with its high standard of living, and of the developing countries, the victims of poverty. Many solutions would require sacrifices to be made, but it would indeed be unfair for richer countries which had benefited from decades of growth without any sign of concern for its environmental impact then to impose on poorer countries standards which would condemn them to poverty. The developing countries should be speeding up the rate of development not cutting it down, and the Agency should contribute towards finding fair solutions whereby the developed world would accept that its past successes had put it in a position to make greater sacrifices now.

92. The peoples of the Third World required technical know-how if they were to benefit from the applications of nuclear energy. The Agency played an important role in filling that need through its symposia and seminars, OSART missions and direct assistance in the form of experts and equipment. Mexico was very appreciative of the Agency's assistance, and for that reason had joined the ARCAL programme in April 1988. Nevertheless, his Government considered the rate of development of technical co-operation too slow. Although the target for voluntary contributions had been increased, it was still insufficient: for instance, world consumption of sparkling wine each year amounted to a far higher sum than that provided for the development of peaceful nuclear applications.

93. The criticisms for poor administration levelled at international organizations in general had unfairly also been applied to the Agency, and the principle of zero growth had been imposed on it as a result. Although some countries, including Mexico, at present supported that principle because they were burdened by huge debt repayments, zero growth was in fact harmful to the Agency. Thus, that restriction had led members of the Group of 77 to oppose an increase in the safeguards budget - not because they were against safeguards as such, but because they were against expanding safeguards at the expense of technical assistance.



94. The Agency's contribution to ensuring safety in the use of nuclear energy, through its regulatory and standardizing activities, was of fundamental importance. It should continue its efforts towards the adoption of principles and standards that were legally binding. The political will and desire for dialogue and co-operation which had prevailed at the special session of the General Conference in 1986 must be maintained, so that the principles of international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy could be established and measures relating to nuclear safety and radiological protection strengthened. It would be unfortunate indeed if the Agency could not achieve any progress towards drawing up such instruments, and even worse for mankind if it became customary to adopt binding standards only after the damage was done.

95. Mr. KOREF (Panama) wished, first of all, to express his appreciation of the valuable assistance which the Agency had provided his country in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He recalled the Agency's advice on using the country's hydroelectric potential for the following 50 years. During the preceding 13 years the Agency had given valuable help in the form of experts on the use of isotopes, for example in agriculture, in which area Panama had been enabled to obtain higher yields of rice and maize, by applying the necessary amounts of fertilizer and irrigation water, thanks to isotope techniques. Panamanian technicians had been trained in the use of those techniques in the field. Improved seeds obtained by mutation had increased production so that Panama from having been an importer had become an exporter of rice.

96. The co-operation between Agency scientists and the academics of the University of Panama had resulted in producing high-yield mutants of banana with resistance to fungus.

97. The Panamanian cattle breeders had achieved great success by the application of radioimmunoassay techniques in determining the best time of fertilization and in diagnosing and curing infections and other diseases in animals. They could determine and correct, where necessary, the quantities of hormones in animals.

98. One of the most important activities of the Agency was related to the eradication of harmful insects such as the tsetse fly and the Mediterranean

fruit fly. The latter caused enormous damage especially to citrus plantations in the Mediterranean area and in Mexico and Central America. The sterile-male technique had given excellent results, and he was proud to point out that some Panamanian scientists were participating in the campaign to prevent the Medfly from reaching Panama, which produced large quantities of orange for internal consumption and export in the form of juice.

99. The Agency was helping his country in the study of water resources both above and below the surface, in which area the use of radioisotopes yielded considerable data. Since the apparatus, chemicals and technology for hydrological investigation were not available domestically, the Agency made a vital contribution by supplying those and also by providing experts, by training local scientists and by providing the services of its laboratories to verify the results of analysis.

100. Modern medicine was inconceivable without isotopes, and the Agency's assistance in training physicians and in supplying the necessary equipment to hospitals in Panama had been of great help in combating many diseases. Particular mention should be made of eradication of endemic goitre, and of diagnosis and treatment of cancer, which had saved many Panamanian lives. Those nuclear techniques would have been hazardous without the use and regular calibration of dosimeters by the 50 laboratories approved by the Agency.

101. He was emphasizing in particular the Agency's assistance to his country in the peaceful uses of atomic energy not only because he wished to express his gratitude but also because it was necessary to dispel the widespread ignorance about those activities of the Agency; many people believed that the organization was concerned only with promoting nuclear power plants, which involved hazards for the environment and for health.

102. He appealed to delegates to publicize the information about the great help the Agency provided to developing countries and also to industrial countries in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants so as to prevent environmental contamination and accidents due to human error and equipment fault.

103. The misinformed public which said "No!" to nuclear power should of course be told of the Agency's other, very important activities, in the area of safeguards involving verification of the production and storage of

the main ingredient of nuclear weapons - at nuclear power plants. The plutonium, a by-product of nuclear power plants, was safeguarded under NPT by a large number of Agency inspectors, and the inspections were financed by the countries which owned those plants.

104. Mr. AAMODT (Norway) said that, subject to parliamentary approval, his delegation could support the proposal for the Agency's programme and budget for 1989 and 1990 as submitted by the Board. It could also agree to a target of US \$42 million for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund in 1989. Pending parliamentary approval, Norway would contribute US \$222 600 to the Fund. Furthermore, with a view to ensuring the continuous operation of the Agency, Norway was prepared to agree to an increase in the level of the Working Capital Fund for 1989 to US \$4 million.

105. The need to protect the environment and natural resources and to pursue development that was sustainable were questions of vital interest for the entire international community, and his country attached considerable importance to the contribution which the Agency could make in that area. The United Nations General Assembly had passed two resolutions (42/187 and 42/186) welcoming the reports entitled "Our Common Future" prepared by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), and "Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond", by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP); in those resolutions, it had called upon the governing bodies of the organs, organizations and programmes of the United Nations system "to review their policies, programmes, budgets and activities aimed at contributing to sustainable development" and "to consider the Environmental Perspective and take it into account in the development of their own medium-term plans and programmes as relevant to their own mandates."

106. The WCED report highlighted the extremely uneven global distribution of primary energy consumption, which in industrial countries with market economies was more than 80 times greater, for instance, than in sub-Saharan Africa. The report stated that if energy consumption were to become uniform world wide at current levels for industrial countries, then by 2025 a global population of 8.2 billion would require more than five times as much energy as that consumed in 1980.

107. The report, concluding that in the long run there could be no sustainable development unless environmental concerns were taken into account, emphasized the risks of increased reliance on fossil fuels: the greenhouse effect, air pollution and acidification of the environment. Those risks could be avoided by the use of nuclear fuel, which could provide an ample supply of energy for a growing humanity. However, nuclear energy had its own problems, such as reactor accidents, radioactive waste management and proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although means to minimize those problems did exist, there was a serious lack of confidence in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in several countries, which could be overcome only by excellent performance over an extended period within the whole nuclear industry. In particular, it was necessary to focus efforts on those issues which caused concern and to establish routines which could avoid accidents stemming from human and technical shortcomings. Accordingly, the UNEP report, in stating its goals for nuclear energy, had rightly recommended that international co-operation should aim at the creation of a regime for the safe production and use of nuclear energy, as well as the safe handling of radioactive waste, taking into account, through appropriate mechanisms including prior consultations, the interests and concerns of countries that had decided not to produce nuclear energy.

108. Throughout its existence, the Agency had been active in areas related to the effects of nuclear energy on the environment, such as nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste management, and through its technical assistance and co-operation programme, the Agency had promoted environmental considerations in developing countries. The Agency's programme was thus already very much in line with the goals of UNEP and WCED reports. Nevertheless, his delegation urged the Agency to pay even more attention to the environmental perspective in its future programmes.

109. His delegation had been gratified to note that in 1987, as in previous years, the Secretariat had not detected any anomaly which could indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded nuclear material or the misuse of facilities or equipment subject to safeguards. His country had always been a strong supporter of non-proliferation and safeguards, and had ratified NPT in 1969. The first Agency safeguards inspection had taken place

in Norway, at the NORA reactor, in 1962. His country was prepared to waive the right of advance approval of designated inspectors for itself and to accept automatically those duly designated by the Board of Governors. Also, Norway welcomed Spain's accession to NPT in 1987 and the conclusion of an NPT safeguards agreement with Brunei Darussalam. On the other hand, it was a matter for regret that the number of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to NPT which had not concluded Agency safeguards agreements within the prescribed period of 18 months after ratification had increased from 46 at the end of 1986 to 52 at the end of 1987.

110. Norway had been a heavy water producer and exporter as early as 1934. In the 1950s, it had taken an active part in global international co-operation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and had supplied heavy water to a number of countries, including Israel. That country had received 20 tonnes in 1959 and 1 tonne early in 1970, in accordance with an agreement between the Governments of Israel and Norway under which the Government of Israel guaranteed that any heavy water supplied to Israel would be employed solely for the promotion and development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy and not for any military purposes, and that no such heavy water would be transferred without prior Norwegian consent. Despite that, Norway had approached Israel in 1986 with the aim of subjecting the heavy water to regular safeguards; talks on that matter still continued.

111. Nuclear exports from Norway, including those of heavy water, had been conducted in accordance with the provisions of NPT since its entry into force. In 1974 Norway, together with several other exporting countries, had sent a letter to the Director General (reproduced in document INFCIRC/209) specifying the procedures for exports of nuclear materials under NPT. Moreover, at the Second NPT Review Conference in 1980, Norway had stated that it would adhere strictly to the principle that sensitive nuclear material and technology should not be transferred or exported unless all nuclear activities in the recipient non-nuclear-weapon States were under IAEA safeguards. As a matter of principle, Norway would in future restrict her nuclear exports to countries that were parties to NPT or other similarly binding international commitments not to acquire nuclear explosive devices.

112. It had recently become known that a quantity of 15 tonnes of heavy water, sold from Norway in 1983 to a company in an NPT country, had not appeared in that country despite the receipt by Norway of an international import certificate and an end-use statement. Instead, the heavy water had gone via another NPT country to a destination probably outside the NPT area. That case was now under police investigation in Norway. An export to another NPT country in 1984 had been stopped when an investigation had indicated the probability of unauthorized re-export. Those experiences had led his country to adopt its current rigorous control of all intended exports of heavy water.

113. Mr. KOCH (Denmark) noted with interest that both the message from the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General's opening statement had emphasized the crucial role of Agency issues in the preservation of the natural environment and the provision of energy, and the vital importance of the questions dealt with in the WCED, or "Brundtland" Report. Denmark was deeply concerned about the negative environmental effects of further comprehensive industrial and technological development, and had strongly supported the two United Nations General Assembly resolutions on the Environmental Perspective and the WCED report.

114. The Danish Government was of the opinion that serious consideration should be given to the views and recommendations of the Brundtland Report in future energy planning. It placed great emphasis in its energy policy on increased energy efficiency, on energy production and end use, on people's awareness of the need to save energy and on the further development and use of new and renewable sources of energy. Denmark was one of the OECD countries with the lowest energy consumption per unit of gross national product.

115. With regard to the activities of the Agency, his Government had noted with appreciation the Secretariat's preliminary review of the Brundtland Report and the Environmental Perspective, which indicated the proportion of activities devoted to environmental questions. Those preliminary reviews were an important contribution to consideration of the future mix of the Agency's activities. The Agency clearly had an important role in the implementation of the two United Nations resolutions to which he had referred, and his delegation welcomed the draft resolution on the Agency's future activities in

that area that the Board of Governors had recommended by consensus, for adoption by the General Conference. His delegation sincerely hoped that the Conference would confirm the Agency's dedication to that important field by adopting the draft resolution.

116. Denmark had also noted with appreciation that an increasing number of States had acceded to the Conventions on Early Notification and on Emergency Assistance. While the establishment of multilateral agreements was a major development in the field of co-operation on nuclear safety, his Government wished to stress the importance of bilateral agreements to supplement them. His Government considered that the Director General should inform Member States once a year of the status of bilateral agreements to which Member States were parties.

117. Denmark attached great importance to the development of universally accepted nuclear safety standards and principles at the highest possible level. It welcomed the updating and strengthening of the five NUSS Codes to serve as a guide for States in formulating national nuclear safety requirements. His Government appreciated that it had not yet been possible to make those Codes legally binding internationally, but believed that Member States of the Agency should notify the Agency, the extent to which the relevant requirements of their national legislation and regulations were consistent with the revised Codes. In his delegation's view, the NUSS Codes would need to be further updated at a later stage, in the light of developments in nuclear science and technology.

118. Denmark had, from the outset, supported the work in INSAG on developing basic safety principles for nuclear power plants, and urged Member States to give careful consideration to the proposed safety principles contained in the INSAG report.

119. While noting with great appreciation that the number of States parties to NPT had increased to 137 by the end of 1987, his Government was gravely concerned to learn that 52 of the non-nuclear-weapon States party to NPT had failed to comply, within the prescribed time limit, with their obligations under Article II.4 of the Treaty regarding the conclusion of the relevant safeguards agreement with the Agency. His Government appreciated that the

Agency had developed a highly effective safeguards system, but stressed the need for it to be continuously expanded and improved. It considered that all nuclear facilities, without exception, should be subject to safeguards, and that all Member States should participate in the financing of safeguards, which were a collective responsibility and benefited all countries.

120. The Danish Government had noted with satisfaction the completion of a safeguards agreement pursuant to the voluntary offer by China to place some of its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. It was also pleased to note that during 1987 the number of safeguards agreements had increased by 2 to a total of 166 with 97 States.

121. His Government was pleased to see the Secretariat's conclusion that in 1987, as in previous years, nuclear material under Agency safeguards had remained in peaceful nuclear activities or had been otherwise adequately accounted for.

122. As always, Denmark attached great importance to the Agency's technical assistance activities. It accepted the target of US \$42 million for 1989 and had pledged its full share.

123. Lastly, he wished to express his country's great appreciation of the dedicated work performed by the Director General and his staff, and to assure them of its full support in their future work.

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.