



International Atomic Energy Agency

# GENERAL CONFERENCE

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21 September 1987

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Thirty-first regular session  
Item 9 of the provisional agenda  
(GC(XXXI)/799)

## MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION

### Report by the Board of Governors and the Director General

1. At its special session last year, the General Conference, in adopting resolution GC(SPL.I)/RES/2, decided that all statements and proposals made during the general debate and in the Committee of the Whole which related to international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety should be referred to the Board of Governors, requested the Board to pursue the discussion of those statements and proposals - including the proposals submitted by Mexico on behalf of the Group of 77 - by all interested Member States and requested the Board to submit to the General Conference, at the Conference's thirty-first regular session, a report on the implementation of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and on the implementation of resolution GC(SPL.I)/RES/2.

2. At its regular session last year, the General Conference, in adopting resolution GC(XXX)/RES/461, requested the Director General to report on the signature and ratification status of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; also, in a separate decision, the Conference requested the Director General to place on the provisional agenda

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for its thirty-first regular session an item entitled "Status and implementation of conventions for which the Agency is depositary: (a) Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; (b) Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident; and (c) Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency".

3. Lastly, again at its regular session last year, the General Conference asked the Director General to ensure that due priority was given to the work currently under way within the Secretariat in the area of intervention dose levels and to submit a report on that and related matters to the Board of Governors in February 1987.

4. This report from the Board of Governors and the Director General, submitted to the General Conference under the provisional agenda item "Measures to strengthen international co-operation in nuclear safety and radiological protection", has been prepared in response to the above-mentioned decisions and requests of the General Conference.

5. Annex 1 deals with the signature and ratification status and with the implementation of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency; Annex 2 deals with the implementation of resolution GC(SPL.I)/RES/2; Annex 3 deals with the signature and ratification status and with the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; and Annex 4 deals with the Board's discussions during the past year on intervention dose levels and related matters.

6. On 18 September the Board decided that the "GOV/...." and "GOV/INF/..." documents before it during its discussions on the matters covered in this report should be made available on request to delegations to the thirty-first session of the General Conference. In addition, it decided that the summary records of its discussions should be made available; accordingly, a collation of the summary records of the relevant Board discussions in December, February, June and September (which constitutes part of this report to the General Conference) has been prepared.

**ANNEX 1**

**Signature and ratification status and implementation of the  
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident  
and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a  
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency**

Signature and ratification status of the Conventions

1. The signature and ratification status of the Conventions as at 10 September 1987 is shown in Attachments 1 and 2 to this Annex.

Implementation of the Conventions

2. This subject was discussed by the Board, mainly under the heading "Functions of the Agency under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency", in February (on the basis of document GOV/INF/514), June (on the basis of documents GOV/2304 and GOV/INF/514 and 518) and September (on the basis of document GOV/2316 and 2316/Add.1).<sup>1/</sup>

3. In September, the Board took note of document GOV/2316 and the Addendum and authorized the Secretariat to arrange for a link between the Agency's Headquarters and the Vienna Regional Hub of the World Meteorological Organization's Global Telecommunication System.

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<sup>1/</sup> See paras 87-113 of GOV/OR.666, paras 53-126 of GOV/OR.675 (provisional version) and GOV/ORs 679 and 680 (provisional version).



CONVENTION ON EARLY NOTIFICATION OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by State

<u>State</u>	<u>Date of signature</u>	<u>Means and date of expression of consent to be bound</u>	<u>Entry into force</u>
Afghanistan*	26 Sept. 1986		
Australia*	26 Sept. 1986		
Austria	26 Sept. 1986		
Belgium	26 Sept. 1986		
Brazil	26 Sept. 1986		
Bulgaria*	26 Sept. 1986		
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic*	26 Sept. 1986	ratification* deposited: 26 Jan. 1987	26 Feb. 1987
Canada*	26 Sept. 1986		
Chile	26 Sept. 1986		
China*	26 Sept. 1986		
Costa Rica	26 Sept. 1986		
Côte d'Ivoire	26 Sept. 1986		
Cuba*	26 Sept. 1986		
Czechoslovakia*	26 Sept. 1986	signature, 26 Sept. 1986	27 Oct. 1986
Democratic People's Republic of Korea*	29 Sept. 1986		
Denmark	26 Sept. 1986	signature, 26 Sept. 1986	27 Oct. 1986
Egypt	26 Sept. 1986		
Finland	26 Sept. 1986	deposit of approval on 11 Dec. 1986	11 Jan. 1987
France*	26 Sept. 1986		
German Democratic Republic*	26 Sept. 1986	ratification* deposited: 29 Apr. 1987	30 May 1987
Germany, Federal Republic of*	26 Sept. 1986		
Greece*	26 Sept. 1986		
Guatemala	26 Sept. 1986		
Holy See	26 Sept. 1986		
Hungary*	26 Sept. 1986	ratification* deposited: 10 Mar. 1987	10 April 1987

<u>State</u>	<u>Date of signature</u>	<u>Means and date of expression of consent to be bound</u>	<u>Entry into force</u>
Iceland	26 Sept. 1986		
India*	29 Sept. 1986		
Indonesia*	26 Sept. 1986		
Iran, Islamic Republic of	26 Sept. 1986		
Iraq*	12 Aug. 1987		
Ireland*	26 Sept. 1986		
Israel	26 Sept. 1986		
Italy*	26 Sept. 1986		
Japan	6 March 1987	acceptance deposited: 9 June 1987	10 July 1987
Jordan	2 Oct. 1986		
Lebanon	26 Sept. 1986		
Liechtenstein	26 Sept. 1986		
Luxembourg	29 Sept. 1986		
Malaysia*	1 Sept. 1987	signature, 1 Sept. 1987	2 Oct. 1987
Mali	2 Oct. 1986		
Mexico	26 Sept. 1986		
Monaco	26 Sept. 1986		
Mongolia*	8 Jan. 1987	ratification* deposited: 11 June 1987	12 July 1987
Morocco	26 Sept. 1986		
Netherlands*	26 Sept. 1986		
New Zealand		accession deposited: 11 Mar. 1987	11 April 1987
Niger	26 Sept. 1986		
Nigeria	21 Jan. 1987		
Norway	26 Sept. 1986	signature, 26 Sept. 1986	27 Oct. 1986
Panama	26 Sept. 1986		
Paraguay	2 Oct. 1986		
Poland*	26 Sept. 1986		
Portugal	26 Sept. 1986		
Senegal	15 June 1987		
Sierra Leone	25 March 1987		
South Africa	10 Aug. 1987	ratification* deposited: 10 Aug. 1987	10 Sept. 1987
Spain	26 Sept. 1986		
Sudan	26 Sept. 1986		
Sweden	26 Sept. 1986	ratification deposited: 27 Feb. 1987	30 March 1987
Switzerland	26 Sept. 1986		
Syrian Arab Republic	2 July 1987		

<u>State</u>	<u>Date of signature</u>	<u>Means and date of expression of consent to be bound</u>	<u>Entry into force</u>
Tunisia	24 Feb. 1987		
Turkey*	26 Sept. 1986		
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic*	26 Sept. 1986	ratification* deposited: 26 Jan. 1987	26 Feb. 1987
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*	26 Sept. 1986	ratification* deposited: 23 Dec. 1986	24 Jan. 1987
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*	26 Sept. 1986		
United States of America*	26 Sept. 1986		
Yugoslavia	27 May 1987		
Zaire	30 Sept. 1986		
Zimbabwe	26 Sept. 1986		

10 September 1987

Status: 69 signatories, 1 accession,  
 15 parties

\* Indicates that a reservation/declaration was deposited upon or following signature/ratification (see INFCIRC/336/Add.1 and 335/Add.1-336/Add.2).





CONVENTION ON ASSISTANCE IN THE CASE OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT  
 OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY

Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession by State

<u>State</u>	<u>Date of signature</u>	<u>Means and date of expression of consent to be bound</u>	<u>Entry into force</u>
Afghanistan*	26 Sept. 1986		
Australia*	26 Sept. 1986		
Austria	26 Sept. 1986		
Belgium	26 Sept. 1986		
Brazil	26 Sept. 1986		
Bulgaria*	26 Sept. 1986		
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic*	26 Sept. 1986	ratification* deposited: 26 Jan. 1987	26 Feb. 1987
Canada*	26 Sept. 1986		
Chile	26 Sept. 1986		
China*	26 Sept. 1986		
Costa Rica	26 Sept. 1986		
Côte d'Ivoire	26 Sept. 1986		
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Germany, Federal Republic of*	26 Sept. 1986		
Greece*	26 Sept. 1986		
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<u>State</u>	<u>Date of signature</u>	<u>Means and date of expression of consent to be bound</u>	<u>Entry into force</u>
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India*	29 Sept. 1986		
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Iraq*	12 Aug. 1987		
Ireland*	26 Sept. 1986		
Israel	26 Sept. 1986		
Italy	26 Sept. 1986		
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Liechtenstein	26 Sept. 1986		
Malaysia*	1 Sept. 1987	signature, 1 Sept. 1987	2 Oct. 1987
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1987			
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Portugal	26 Sept. 1986		
Senegal	15 June 1987		
Sierra Leone	25 March 1987		
South Africa	10 Aug. 1987	ratification* deposited: 10 Aug. 1987	10 Sept. 1987
Spain	26 Sept. 1986		
Sudan	26 Sept. 1986		
Sweden	26 Sept. 1986		
Switzerland	26 Sept. 1986		
Syrian Arab Republic	2 July 1987		
Tunisia	24 Feb. 1987		

<u>State</u>	<u>Date of signature</u>	<u>Means and date of expression of consent to be bound</u>	<u>Entry into force</u>
Turkey*	26 Sept. 1986		
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic*	26 Sept. 1986	ratification* deposited: 26 Jan. 1987	26 Feb. 1987
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*	26 Sept. 1986	ratification* deposited: 23 Dec. 1986	26 Feb. 1987
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*	26 Sept. 1986		
United States of America*	26 Sept. 1986		
Zaire	30 Sept. 1986		
Zimbabwe	26 Sept. 1986		

10 September 1987  
Status: 67 signatories, 1 accession,  
11 parties

\* Indicates that a reservation/declaration was deposited upon or following signature/ratification (see INFCIRC/336/Add.1 and 335/Add.1-336/Add.2).



**ANNEX 2**

**Implementation of General Conference resolution  
GC(SPL.I)/RES/2**

1. A footnote to resolution GC(SPL.I)/RES/2 gives an indication of the proposals which were referred to the Board in order that it might pursue the discussion of them by all interested Member States. In October, immediately after the special and the regular session of the General Conference, the Board decided – in view of the importance of the subject of nuclear safety and radiological protection and the wide interest it had generated among Member States – that any interested Member State which was not a Board member could, if it so wished, participate in the deliberations of the Board on that subject. Several Member States availed themselves of the opportunity so provided and participated in the deliberations of the Board during its subsequent sessions.

2. Following a preliminary discussion during a special session in December, the Board agreed to revert to the proposals in February in the light of background material prepared by the Secretariat and provided by the sponsors of proposals.

3. In February, the Board discussed the proposals in the light of the background material made available and concluded its consideration of four of the topics involved – for the time being, at least. The Board's conclusions regarding these topics are contained in Appendices 1–4 to this Annex.

4. In June, only a few Board members had the opportunity to speak under the agenda sub-item "Proposals relating to international co-operation in the field of nuclear safety made at the special session of the General Conference", and the Board decided to continue its discussion in September.<sup>1/</sup>

5. Also in June, the Board completed -- for the time being -- its discussion on the question of liability for damage arising from a nuclear accident (see Appendix 5 to this Annex).

6. In September, the Board's discussion concentrated mainly on seven topics; its conclusions regarding these topics are contained in Appendices 6-10 to this Annex.

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<sup>1/</sup> See paras 132-158 of GOV/OR.678 (provisional version).

**Co-operation with other international organizations  
in safety-related matters\*)**

In February, the Board concluded that it would like the Secretariat to maintain and intensify such co-operation along the lines indicated in Attachment 1 to document GOV/INF/513.

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\*) See para. 3 of GOV/OR.670.





**Possibilities for establishing mandatory  
international safety standards\*)**

In February, in a discussion based on Attachment 2 to document GOV/INF/513, strong views were expressed against any attempt to prescribe obligatory standards; it should be left to Member States voluntarily to incorporate into their own national safety standards any safety principles and guidelines emerging from the Agency's work. Also, there was a widespread feeling that the analogy drawn in Attachment 2 to document GOV/INF/513 between Agency safeguards and a safety verification regime was not a valid one because of the basic difference between safeguards and safety functions. Consequently, the concept of obligatory international safety verification was not endorsed.

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\*) See para. 4 of GOV/OR.670.



**Vicinity co-operation\*)**

In February, the Board's discussion indicated that such co-operation was best pursued bilaterally or regionally, as referred to in the two Conventions adopted by the General Conference in September 1986. However, the Agency could play a useful role by collecting and disseminating information as outlined in sub-paragraph 4(a) of Attachment 1 to document GOV/INF/512.

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\*) See para. 5 of GOV/OR.670.



**Notification of all serious accidents\*)**

In February, the Board concluded that this question, the subject of the draft resolutions submitted in documents GC(SPL.I)/14 and GC(SPL.I)/16 at the special session of the General Conference, was essentially one to be dealt with by Member States, which would – no doubt – reflect on the discussion during the Board's February session and also on the discussion which had taken place in July 1986, during the preparation of the two Conventions adopted by the General Conference at its special session.

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\*) See para. 6 of GOV/OR.670.



THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL LIABILITY FOR  
DAMAGE ARISING FROM A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

1. The Board discussed this question in December on the basis of document GOV/INF/508 and requested the Secretariat to prepare a background paper which could be considered in February.<sup>1/</sup>
2. In February, the Board reverted to this question on the basis of document GOV/INF/509. The summing-up by the Chairman of the Board's discussion is set forth below (paras 68-71 of GOV/OR.667):

The CHAIRMAN said it emerged clearly from the observations made by Governors and the representatives of a number of Member States ..... that the question of liability for damage caused by a nuclear accident was a very important one which would have to be examined with the greatest care.

While document GOV/INF/509 was considered a useful approach to the examination of that complex question, in the course of the debate various opinions had been expressed on certain points dealt with in that document, notably on the question of international liability for nuclear damage based on the law of State responsibility. A number of Governors had cautioned the Board against rushing into a detailed study and against creating a working group on the subject. With regard to the Paris Convention [the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 1960] and the Vienna Convention [the Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963], the debate had shown that Members of the Board who were parties to one or other of those Conventions would like other Member States which were not yet parties to consider the possibility of acceding to them.

With a view to further discussion of the matter in the Board, he suggested that the Secretariat be requested to continue studying the question of broader adherence to the Paris and Vienna Conventions, the relationship between those two Conventions and the possibility of harmonizing them. The idea of intensifying efforts aimed at harmonizing the two Conventions had in fact received very broad support. The Secretariat should also consider whether it was necessary to devise a new instrument on State liability for nuclear damage. In that connection, however, since the questions involved were complex and

<sup>1/</sup> See para. 48 of GOV/OR.664.

related to problems of larger scope, it would be important to take full account of the work being done by the International Law Commission. The Secretariat should communicate the results of its studies in time for the Board's meetings in June, when the Board could decide what further action might be taken.

A number of speakers had also drawn attention to the forthcoming meetings of the Standing Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage under the Vienna Convention, and had stressed how important it was that States not party to that Convention should be invited to attend the meetings of the Committee as observers. The Director General had indicated that that would be possible.

3. In June, the Board continued its discussion on the basis of documents GOV/2305 and 2306. The Chairman's summing-up is set forth below (paras 36-37 of GOV/OR.676, provisional version).

The CHAIRMAN took it that the Board was in favour of continuing efforts<sup>2/</sup> to harmonize the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the field of Nuclear Energy and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and that it therefore approved the proposal contained in paragraph 13 of document GOV/2305 concerning the establishment of a joint IAEA/NEA working group of governmental representatives for that purpose.

With regard to the continuation of work within the Agency on issues related to international liability for damage arising from a nuclear accident, discussed in document GOV/2306, there had not been any consensus. Some Members had felt that it was too early for the Agency to deal with those problems by convening a working group as suggested in paragraph 5 of document GOV/2306. Other Members favoured the convening of such a working group and considered that efforts to harmonize the Paris and Vienna Conventions and efforts to clarify the issues involved in international liability for damage arising from a nuclear accident could be made simultaneously without prejudice to either endeavour. In the light of those divergent views, Members of the Board would no doubt like more time for further reflection before deciding on the convening of a working group. The Board could therefore return to that matter at a later date. In the meantime, the Director General could send document GOV/2306 to Member States so that the Secretariat would be aware of their views when the matter was studied again.

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<sup>2/</sup> The words "wished to give priority to efforts" were replaced by "was in favour of continuing efforts" in the light of a brief discussion after the Chairman had summed up (see paras 38-41, 43, 45 and 46 of GOV/OR.676, provisional version).



4. The Director General transmitted copies of document GOV/2306 to Member States on 7 July under cover of a letter (see Attachment) in which he requested that comments on the document reach the Secretariat by 1 November.



**Letter from the Director General to  
Member States transmitting copies of document GOV/2306**

N5.55.31 Circ.

7 July 1987

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the discussion in the June 1987 session of the IAEA's Board of Governors on "The question of international liability for damage arising from a nuclear accident" and to the attached copy of Board document GOV/2306.

At its special session held in September 1986, the IAEA's General Conference - in resolution GC(SPL.I)/RES/2 - requested the Board to pursue the discussion by all interested Member States of a number of proposals, including a proposal concerning nuclear liability.

In response to that request, the Board embarked upon a discussion of the question of harmonizing the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage and of the more general question of international liability for damage arising from a nuclear accident (i.e. the question of State - as opposed to civil - liability).

At the end of its discussion in June, the Board endorsed a proposal to establish a joint IAEA/NEA (Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD) working group of governmental experts to carry forward work on harmonizing the Paris and Vienna Conventions. With regard to the matter of further work within the framework of the Agency on the issues involved in international liability for damage arising from a nuclear accident, however, the Chairman of the Board concluded that, given the divergent views expressed, there was no consensus in the Board. He stated that some members felt that it was premature for the Agency to begin active work on these issues by convening a working group as foreseen in paragraph 5 of the Note by the Director General in document GOV/2306, while some other members favoured the convening of such a working group and felt that efforts to harmonize the Paris and Vienna Conventions and efforts to clarify the issues involved in international liability for damage arising from a nuclear accident could be made simultaneously without prejudice to either.

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The Board decided that it would revert to the question of international liability for damage arising from a nuclear accident at a later date and requested the Director General to circulate document GOV/2306 to Member States for their comments, which will be placed before the Board when it reverts to this question.

In transmitting a copy of document GOV/2306 herewith, I accordingly invite your authorities' comments on it - to reach the IAEA Secretariat by 1 November 1987.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Hans Blix  
Director General

Attachment

## SHARING OF NUCLEAR-SAFETY-RELATED INFORMATION

1. In February, the Board discussed this topic on the basis of Attachment 2 to document GOV/INF/512 and Attachment 1 to document GOV/INF/516. In his summing-up, the Chairman stated that (paras 13 and 14 of GOV/OR.670)

...Board Members had ... referred to what the Agency had done to assist Member States. However, it had also been recognized that much more needed to be done to prevent accidents at nuclear facilities, in particular by intensifying the exchange of information which might reduce the probability of accidents. Resolving the problems faced by recipient countries in that area was admittedly not an easy matter, and an appeal had been made to the supplier countries to be more forthcoming than they had so far been. At the same time, the opinion was expressed that that matter was best left for bilateral, commercial negotiations between relevant entities in supplier and recipient States. The Chernobyl accident showed that radioactive releases did not respect boundaries - political, national or other - so that the matter must be considered from a wider perspective than the purely commercial one. A nuclear accident anywhere was a nuclear accident everywhere. While opinions differed as to how to proceed, there also seemed to be a general view that there was a need for closer international co-operation regarding the sharing of nuclear-safety-related information.

The Agency could play a role in serving as a channel for such information, although no definite guidelines could be formulated at the present stage on how that should be done. Some representatives felt that supplier and recipient States could come together in an effort to narrow the differences in perception that now existed, and in that connection consultations among Board Members might be useful. The Board could revert to that matter in June, when he hoped a convergence of views might be possible.

2. After further discussion in June and September, the Chairman concluded that the positions reflected in his February summing-up had been maintained. The need to enhance nuclear safety through the sharing of nuclear-safety-related information had been reiterated. At the same time, the complexity of the matter had been emphasized. It had again been recognized that the Agency could play a useful role in facilitating the sharing of nuclear-safety-related information, but no consensus had been reached on proposals regarding the sharing of such information.<sup>1/</sup>

<sup>1/</sup> See GOV/ORs 679 and 680, provisional versions.



**PROHIBITION OF ARMED ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR FACILITIES**  
and  
**PREVENTION OF TERRORIST ACTIONS**  
**AGAINST NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS**

1. In February, the Board discussed the topic "Prohibition of armed attacks on nuclear facilities" on the basis of Attachment 3 to document GOV/INF/512 and Attachment 2 to document GOV/INF/516 and the topic "Prevention of terrorist actions against nuclear facilities" on the basis of Attachment 4 to document GOV/INF/512. In his summing-up (paras 7--12 of GOV/OR.670) the Chairman

... noted that the discussion on the prohibition of armed attacks on nuclear facilities and the prevention of terrorist actions against nuclear installations had demonstrated a continuing deep concern to prevent massive releases of radioactive material from nuclear facilities as a result of any attacks on such facilities.

However, the discussion had also shown that opinion was sharply divided among Board Members as to the appropriate forum for dealing with the prohibition of armed attacks. Some delegations felt that the question should be left to the Committee on Disarmament, in Geneva, and that the Agency was neither competent nor equipped to deal with it as the matter was one of security rather than safety. Some other delegations, however, believed that the Agency was a proper forum for dealing with that question, especially as it had still not been resolved in Geneva and technical issues were involved.

At the same time, a number of delegations, regardless of whether they considered the Agency to be a proper forum, agreed that the Agency could make a contribution by carrying out technical studies, which might provide useful input to work on developing a convention and act as a catalyst stimulating interest in early action on the part of Member States. It had been recognized by some of those delegations that for such studies information would be needed from Member States, particularly with regard to the possible radiological consequences of an armed attack. Those delegations hoped that Member States in a position to do so would co-operate with the Secretariat by providing the necessary inputs, so that the Board had sufficient material for a meaningful discussion in June.

Other delegations felt that the Agency could only undertake studies on the consequences of massive releases of radiation arising from severe accidents and not on specific consequences of armed attacks.

With regard to the prevention of terrorist actions against nuclear installations, it was felt that the physical protection of nuclear installations and nuclear material was a national responsibility of States, but that international co-operation in that area could be useful. It was noted that the Agency already had some experience in that area - through its work on the formulation of recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material (issued in 1977 in document INFCIRC/225/Rev.1) and its involvement in the drafting of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In that connection, a number of delegations felt that the Agency's recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material could usefully be reviewed.

It was suggested that the possibility of making the Convention on Physical Protection more comprehensive could usefully be explored.

2. After further discussion in June and September on the topic "Prohibition of armed attacks on nuclear facilities", the Chairman concluded that the positions as reflected in his February summing-up had been maintained. At the same time, it had been suggested that the Agency could provide technical information which might help in the drafting of a suitable convention on the prohibition of armed attacks on nuclear facilities; that, it had been stated, would not conflict with related efforts in other United Nations fora.

3. In the discussion during the Board's September session on the topic "Prevention of terrorist actions against nuclear installations", the suggestion, made in February, that the possibility of making the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material more comprehensive be explored, possibly by convening a group of experts, was reiterated. Also, a suggestion was made that a group of experts be convened to review the Agency's physical protection guidelines (INFCIRC/225/Rev.1).

4. However, the discussion on the topic "Prohibition of armed attacks on nuclear facilities" and the topic "Prevention of terrorist actions against nuclear installations" was inconclusive.<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> See GOV/ORs 679 and 680, provisional versions.



**ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE FUND  
TO HELP DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN CASES OF NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS**

1. In February, the Board discussed this topic on the basis of Attachment 5 to document GOV/INF/512. The Chairman's summing-up is set forth below (para.15 of GOV/OR.670):

With regard to the establishment of a nuclear emergency assistance fund to help developing countries in cases of nuclear accidents, although there was a feeling that such a step might be desirable, perhaps it was necessary to study further the various financial and administrative aspects involved. For that purpose, he suggested that the Secretariat and interested countries prepare papers giving more concrete ideas as to how such a fund might be set up and operated.

2. After further discussion at the Board's June session, for which document GOV/INF/520 had been prepared on this topic, and at its September session,<sup>1/</sup> the Chairman summed up as follows:

It had been emphasized that the fund as envisaged was intended to enable the Agency to provide emergency assistance immediately – before other emergency assistance mechanisms could come into play. The Secretariat was requested to study the matter in the light of that understanding of the nature of the fund and other views expressed and also to examine alternative mechanisms for providing such assistance.

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<sup>1/</sup> See GOV/ORs 679 and 680, provisional versions.



**FORMULATION OF BASIC SAFETY PRINCIPLES  
FOR EXISTING AND FUTURE REACTOR TYPES  
and  
REVIEW AND REVISION OF NUSS DOCUMENTS**

1. In February, the Board discussed these topics on the basis of Attachments 3 and 4 to document GOV/INF/513. The Chairman, in his summing-up, stated as follows (para. 4 of GOV/OR.670):

The Board clearly felt that the Agency's NUSS documents should be reviewed and, as necessary, updated, and it looked forward to being informed about the outcome of INSAG's current work on basic safety principles for existing and future reactor types.

2. After further discussion at its June session, for which document GOV/INF/519 ("Review, revision and adoption of NUSS documents") had been prepared, and at its September session, the Board took note of the information contained in document GOV/INF/519 and of the latest forecast by the Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy and Safety regarding the review and revision of NUSS documents. Support was expressed for the current work on reviewing and updating those documents. It was emphasized that the Agency's nuclear safety standards documents were guidelines for use in the elaboration of national regulations - they were not obligatory. At the same time, the view was expressed that Member States would find it possible voluntarily to incorporate the Nuclear Safety Standards into their relevant national standards.

3. The Board also took note of information provided by the Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy and Safety about developments since February in INSAG's work on basic safety principles and about INSAG's schedule of future work.<sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> See GOV/ORs 679, 680 and 684, provisional versions.



**INFORMATION ON REGULATORY PRACTICES IN MEMBER STATES**

1. In February, the Board discussed this topic on the basis of Attachment 5 to document GOV/INF/513. The Chairman, in his summing-up (para. 3 of GOV/OR.670),

assumed that the Board looked forward to being informed of the results of the exercise described in Attachment 5 to document GOV/INF/513.

2. In May, a text entitled "International review of national nuclear regulatory organizations" was circulated in document GOV/INF/522 at the request of the Resident Representative of Ireland.

3. After further discussion in June and September, the Board took note of information provided by the Deputy Director General for Nuclear Energy and Safety on developments in the exercise described in Attachment 5 to document GOV/INF/513. With regard to document GOV/INF/522, while there was understanding for the ideas behind the proposals made in it, reservations were expressed on various grounds and the proposals were not supported. However, further consultations are envisaged. <sup>1/</sup>

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<sup>1/</sup> See GOV/ORs 679, 680 and 684, provisional versions.



ANNEX 3

**SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION STATUS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE  
CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL\***

Signature and ratification status of the Convention

1. The signature and ratification status of the Convention as at 11 September 1987 is shown in the Attachment to this Annex.

Implementation of the Convention

2. In June, following a discussion on the basis of document GOV/INF/521 ("Functions of the Agency under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material"), the Board took note of the information provided by the Secretariat in that document.

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\*) See paras 130 and 131 of GOV/OR.678 (provisional version).





**CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL**  
**(Opened for signature at Vienna and New York on 3 March 1980)**

**Signatures and ratifications**

<u>State/Organization</u>	<u>Signed</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Ratified</u>
1. USA	3 March 1980	New York, Vienna	<u>13 December 1982</u>
2. Austria	3 March 1980	Vienna	
3. Greece	3 March 1980	Vienna	
4. Dominican Republic	3 March 1980	New York	
5. Guatemala	12 March 1980	Vienna	<u>23 April 1985</u>
6. Panama	18 March 1980	Vienna	
7. Haiti	9 April 1980	New York	
8. Philippines	19 May 1980	Vienna	<u>22 September 1981</u>
9. German Democratic Rep.	21 May 1980	Vienna	<u>5 February 1981</u>
10. Paraguay	21 May 1980	New York	<u>6 February 1985</u>
11. USSR	22 May 1980	Vienna	<u>25 May 1983</u>
12. Italy(*)	13 June 1980	Vienna	
13. Luxembourg(*)	13 June 1980	Vienna	
14. Netherlands(*)	13 June 1980	Vienna	
15. United Kingdom(*)	13 June 1980	Vienna	
16. Belgium(*)	13 June 1980	Vienna	
17. Denmark(*)	13 June 1980	Vienna	
18. Fed. Rep. of Germany(*)	13 June 1980	Vienna	
19. France(*)	13 June 1980	Vienna	
20. Ireland(*)	13 June 1980	Vienna	
21. EURATOM	13 June 1980	Vienna	
22. Hungary	17 June 1980	Vienna	<u>4 May 1984</u>
23. Sweden	2 July 1980	Vienna	<u>1 August 1980</u>
24. Yugoslavia	15 July 1980	Vienna	<u>14 May 1986</u>
25. Morocco	25 July 1980	New York	
26. Poland	6 August 1980	Vienna	<u>5 October 1983</u>
27. Canada	23 September 1980	Vienna	<u>21 March 1986</u>
28. Romania	15 January 1981	Vienna	
29. Brazil	15 May 1981	Vienna	<u>17 October 1985</u>
30. South Africa	18 May 1981	Vienna	

(\*) Signed as EURATOM member State.

Note: The Convention entered into force on 8 February 1987, i.e. on the thirtieth day following the deposit of the twenty-first instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval with the Director General pursuant to Article 19, paragraph 1.

<u>State/Organization</u>	<u>Signed</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Ratified</u>
31. Bulgaria	23 June 1981	Vienna	<u>10 April 1984</u>
32. Finland	25 June 1981	Vienna	
33. Czechoslovakia	14 September 1981	Vienna	<u>23 April 1982</u>
34. Korea, Republic of	29 December 1981	Vienna	<u>7 April 1982</u>
35. Norway	26 January 1983	Vienna	<u>15 August 1985</u>
36. Israel	17 June 1983	Vienna	
37. Turkey	23 August 1983	Vienna	<u>27 February 1985</u>
38. Australia	22 February 1984	Vienna	
39. Portugal	19 September 1984	Vienna	
40. Niger	7 January 1985	Vienna	
41. Liechtenstein	13 January 1986	Vienna	<u>25 November 1986</u>
42. Mongolia	23 January 1986	New York	<u>28 May 1986</u>
43. Argentina	28 February 1986	Vienna	
44. Spain(*)	7 April 1986	Vienna	
45. Ecuador	26 June 1986	New York	
46. Indonesia	3 July 1986	Vienna	<u>5 November 1986</u>
47. Switzerland	9 January 1987	Vienna	<u>9 January 1987</u>

ANNEX 4

INTERVENTION DOSE LEVELS AND RELATED MATTERS

1. In February, the Board discussed this topic on the basis of document GOV/INF/511. The Chairman's summing-up is set forth below (para. 45 of GOV/OR.670):

The CHAIRMAN said he had been assured by the Director General that the Secretariat would take note of the valuable comments and observations made by Governors. If necessary, the Board would revert to the question of intervention dose levels at an appropriate time in the future. In the meantime, he assumed that the Board wished to take note of the report submitted by the Secretariat in document GOV/INF/511, and that it encouraged the Secretariat to continue its work, where appropriate in close co-operation with other interested organizations.

2. In May, the Secretariat informed the Board of the following (paras 18 and 19 of Annex 1 to GOV/INF/518):

As indicated in paragraphs 12 and 14 of the Annex to document GOV/INF/511 ("Report on intervention dose levels and related matters"), an Agency advisory group (headed by the Chairman of the International Commission on Radiological Protection) which met during the week of 2-6 February was requested to consider whether the expression "radiological safety significance" - used in Article 1.1 of the Convention on Early Notification - could be defined quantitatively in terms of an intervention dose level or derived intervention level and, if so, to advise the Agency on the wording of such a definition.

The text of the advisory group's statement on this matter, which the group adopted unanimously, is set out below:

"The Advisory Group, on radiological protection grounds, is of the opinion that a projected dose equivalent of a 1 mSv in a year, being the sum of external exposure and that committed from intakes of radionuclides in that year as a result of an accident, should be considered of radiological safety significance for the purpose of the Convention.

"The Advisory Group recognizes that there also may be situations where accidental releases may occur where large populations may be exposed to low levels of dose perhaps over extended periods of time. In this case it recommends that further consideration be given to the definition of radiological safety significance.

"The Advisory Group also notes that Member States will need to use appropriate models to relate releases to dose."

3. During the Board's discussion in June of the "Functions of the Agency under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency", a number of comments relating to this topic were made (see paras 53-126 of GOV/OR.675, provisional version).

4. In August, the Secretariat circulated, in document INFCIRC/344, a review of the present status of the application of intervention dose levels and derived intervention levels in the event of a major nuclear accident.<sup>1/</sup> Also in August, the Secretariat issued document GOV/INF/526 setting forth -- inter alia -- the Agency's technical approach to the development of international guidance on intervention levels for accident situations. There were, in September, technical comments from several Board members on these documents.

5. In September, reservations were expressed regarding several aspects of the above-mentioned advisory group statement (see para. 2), including the concept of adopting a quantitative definition of the term "radiological safety significance" (see GOV/ORs 679, 680 and 684, provisional versions).

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<sup>1/</sup> The information presented in INFCIRC/344 was to a large extent an update of information presented in GOV/INF/511.