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Vice-President: Mr. SEMENOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
later: Mr. WILKINSON (United States of America)

CONTENTS

<u>Item of the agenda**</u>	<u>Paragraphs</u>
6 General debate and annual report for 1985 (continued)	1 - 116
Statements by the delegates of:	
Belgium	1 - 17
Denmark	18 - 27
Kenya	28 - 33
Jordan	34 - 45
Namibia	46 - 73
Zaire	74 - 80
Greece	81 - 89
Korea	90 - 92
Thailand	93 - 98
Colombia	99 - 103
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance	104 - 116

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GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1985 (GC(XXX)/775) (continued)

1. Mr. de la BARRE d'ERQUELINNES (Belgium) said that his country was resolutely pursuing its nuclear power plant construction programme and gradually attaining its objective with regard to the share of nuclear power in total electricity production. The consumption of electricity in Belgium had been growing steadily since 1983 at an annual rate of 4.2%, and nuclear power plants had provided a remarkable 60% of the total electricity generated in 1985. The increased share of nuclear power was due largely to the commissioning in 1985 of two 1000-MW plants, Doel 4 and Tihange 3, which had raised the total installed capacity to 5135 MW(e). The forecasts for 1986 currently showed a further significant increase in nuclear power's share. With respect to future programmes, Belgium would participate in two French plants, Chooz B1 and B2, each with a power of 1430 MW, which were to come into service in 1992 and 1994, respectively, and in the longer term, the construction of a 1260-MW power reactor was planned for a time which would depend on future increases in demand for electricity.

2. Through its Nuclear Energy Research Centre at Mol and other institutions, Belgium was participating in several international programmes on fuel performance improvement, sodium-cooled fast reactors, fusion and so on.

3. In the fuel cycle, several important activities had been pursued. Between 1974 and the end of 1985, almost 4000 t of low-enriched uranium had been treated by the Dessel fabrication plant and made into pellets for more than 7500 assemblies delivered to Belgian and French power reactors. Various measures had needed to be applied in order to deal with that large output, which was now highly standardized in the form of 17 x 17 rod assemblies for 900-MW and 1300-MW pressurized-water reactors (PWRs). In addition, the new "advanced fuel assembly" would play an increasingly important role within the programme of fuel fabrication for Belgian and French reactors.

4. The Belgonucléaire mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant was one of only three facilities producing that type of fuel for the world market. The cumulative production up to the end of 1985 amounted to 8 t (344 assemblies) for thermal-neutron reactors and 6 t (91 assemblies) for fast reactors. In 1984, the French and Belgian companies COGEMA and Belgonucléaire had decided to co-ordinate their fabrication capacities by establishing a new

company called Commox. As a result, the production capacity of the Belgonucléaire plant was increasing regularly, and would soon reach the equivalent of 30 t per year of PWR-type fuel (17 x 17 rods), which was due in particular to a decision by Electricité de France for the industrial recycling of plutonium within its PWR system.

5. With regard to the resumption of spent fuel reprocessing activities, the Belgoprocess company was prepared to invest in adapting and extending the old Eurochemic plant. Part of the capacity was already reserved for Belgian electricity producers, but possibilities would remain for foreign customers to have their fuel reprocessed there. The decision whether to dismantle the plant or to continue activities, which was to have been taken at the end of 1985, had been deferred to allow for further negotiations with possible partners.

6. A country like Belgium could not embark on a nuclear power programme without having reliable techniques for waste treatment and disposal. Research in that field by the Mol Nuclear Energy Research Centre was being supported by the Belgian authorities, the nuclear industry, and the national body dealing with radioactive wastes and fissile materials, as well as by international bodies, in particular the European Community and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

7. In the field of radioisotope production, the National Radioisotopes Institute had continued its very diverse activities, which included the conditioning of radioisotopes from reactors and cyclotrons, the preparation of radiopharmaceuticals and of kits for biomedical analyses, and the development of industrial applications. The Institute was also working on food irradiation in the hope of contributing towards solving the world's nutrition problems.

8. Turning to the topical question of nuclear safety and radiation protection, he quoted his country's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tindemans, who had said during the recent United Nations General Assembly that the Chernobyl accident had raised great emotions in public opinion and had directly affected the life and health of the plant workers, contaminated the population of the area and caused negative effects over a large portion of the

European continent. In Mr. Tindemans's view, it seemed essential that international mechanisms should be established to respond to the serious concerns raised by the increasing use of nuclear power and to arrive at a common conception of safety. The work of the Agency and, on the regional level, of OECD and the European Communities had done much to strengthen knowledge of nuclear safety; nevertheless, the actual decisions regarding the design of a nuclear power plant must always remain the responsibility of national authorities. International co-operation must obviously be intensified: in the first stage, a common approach to evaluating the safety of nuclear facilities and the probability of serious accidents should be worked out. In that endeavour, the role assigned to the Agency was extremely important. Furthermore, Mr. Tindemans had cautioned, care must be taken to avoid a situation where each country would hold its own truth regarding acceptable levels of radioactivity in agricultural produce, water and soils. That attitude had already damaged the credibility of governments with their own populations. It was important to have joint standards and units of measurement for all countries world-wide. The Agency and the other competent organizations should work rapidly to find a solution to that question. The Chernobyl accident had also made it obvious that the process of distributing information must be improved. In that peculiarly important area, great efforts must be made on the national level (where adequate operational structures must be established), on the regional level, and on the international level (e.g. within the Agency) by establishing a centralized system for redistributing national data. In that connection, Mr. Tindemans had welcomed the prompt adoption of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. A particular difficulty had arisen over the question whether or not that convention should cover accidents caused by nuclear weapons or nuclear tests. An optional solution had been found which allowed the nuclear-weapon States to notify, on a voluntary basis, those accidents which were not covered by Article 1 of the convention. Most of those States had already announced that they would make a declaration of intent in that respect. Belgium attached the highest importance to that question and therefore thanked all the nuclear-weapon States for their declarations of intent, which alone could guarantee to the world's population that the

appropriate measures would be taken, whatever the nature of a nuclear accident causing radioactive fallout on their territory. Finally, Mr. Tindemans had stressed the need for international solidarity in the event of a nuclear disaster and had congratulated the Agency on its swift action in establishing an international Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

9. While on the subject of safety, it seemed worth recalling that all of Belgium's power reactors were Westinghouse PWRs. The Belgian authorities had consequently decided to adopt the regulations of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission as a guide for safety, and deviations from those regulations were accepted only after technical justification. Moreover, Belgian reactors had to be protected against aircraft crashes, gas explosions, serious fires and similar phenomena. Those requirements had led to a safety conception where the prevention and minimization of accident consequences were of primary importance, the notion of "defence in depth" being effectively applied from the very design of the reactors. In addition, all power programmes, whether nuclear or not, were obliged to undergo regular adaptation and re-evaluation at least every ten years.

10. The accident at Three Mile Island had shown that such events did not always follow the predicted scenarios, and after Three Mile Island the authorities had been obliged to take action with regard to all the Belgian reactors, in particular to improve the emergency procedures. In order to complete their continuous training, operators were instructed on compact simulators; in addition, large simulators including all protection levels had been requested. Two such large simulators were being designed and would be operational as of 1988. Meanwhile, the operators were being trained on large simulators in France, and strict qualification and requalification procedures for operators and technicians had been introduced as well. In 1979, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (INPO) had been established in order to observe the conditions under which nuclear power plants were operating and to collect and analyse incidents with a view to determining their initial causes. On INPO's initiative, an international symposium on human behaviour in the nuclear industry had been held in Lyons, France, only the previous week.

11. The Chernobyl accident had greatly affected the Agency's activities during the past month. The Agency had done excellent work: in particular, the report by the International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) to the Board of Governors had rigorously analysed the Chernobyl accident and its aftermath. That report, and the recommendations it contained, would need to be studied very carefully before all the points in it affecting future plans for the Agency and its nuclear safety programmes could be appreciated; however, some preliminary comments could be made at the present time. First, the Chernobyl accident had occurred in a particular type of reactor; the accident analysis could therefore not simply be transferred to other types of power plant with significantly different safety characteristics. Secondly, in reviewing the present international standards (NUSS), the experience of the past decade should not be neglected; rather, it was necessary to make those standards more precise and more comprehensive in the light of the new information received. Thirdly, with regard to the man-machine interface, the Agency should not lose sight of the work that had already been done in that field, both nationally and internationally. Fourthly, it would be advisable to review the level of knowledge in each of the fields chosen by the Agency for its attention in order to avoid duplication and repetition.

12. While recognizing that the Agency would henceforth be playing a further enhanced role in promoting the use of nuclear energy under optimum safety conditions, Belgium considered it feasible to achieve that without departing from the important principle of zero real growth in the Agency's budget. By redeploying the resources available to the Agency, for instance by stretching some less urgent or more routine activities over time, it should be possible to accommodate the new activities within the original budgetary provisions. The number of symposia and other meetings would have to be reduced in any case if the participation of experts of the highest standing and quality was to be secured, and the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) missions requested by industrially developed countries should be paid for entirely by those countries.

13. Finally, on the question of safety, he wished to associate himself entirely with the dual conviction expressed during the special session by the representative of the Commission of the European Communities, namely that the

continued use of atomic energy would be acceptable only under optimum conditions of safety and protection of health and the environment, and that the European Community would be exposed to serious economic and political risks if that source of energy were to become unavailable.

14. Recent events had underlined the Agency's essential role as an instrument for the exchange of experience, the elaboration of common regulations, the transfer of knowledge and technology, and the harmonization of activities. Nuclear development concerned all countries of the world. That was why his country was in favour of a revision of Article VI of the Statute as a whole, which would bring more equitable representation, within the Agency, of certain developing countries and of certain European countries which were very advanced in the nuclear field.

15. Turning to the system of international safeguards, he noted with satisfaction that the Agency had again detected no anomaly indicating the diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material for the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device. However, it was important to bear in mind both the political dimension and the voluntary nature of safeguards, the burden of which should be commensurate with that political dimension. In order to reduce the burden and to alleviate the constraints imposed on operators in Belgium, his country was co-operating with the Agency in perfecting the methods used for safeguards through its support programme and by other means, for example training courses for participants from developing countries. Moreover, Belgium was gratified to learn that the Soviet Union and China had joined other nuclear-weapon States which had accepted the principle of Agency safeguards being placed on certain of their civil nuclear facilities. That was of course only a symbolic gesture, but it constituted a step towards reducing the discrimination embodied in Article III, paragraph 1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). However, the ultimate aim must be to apply safeguards to all civil nuclear activities world-wide, including those in non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to NPT and in nuclear-weapon States; the Agency's safeguards system could not be fully effective unless that condition were fulfilled. For the nuclear-weapon States, accepting safeguards on all their civil nuclear facilities would have a certain exemplary value, and meanwhile they should bear a larger proportion

of safeguards costs. Finally, it was important to ensure that the same regulations for safeguards were applied to all commercial transactions, whatever the nuclear status of the countries involved.

16. Turning to the subject of technical co-operation, he said that the general slowing-down of nuclear energy programmes throughout the world was due to the crisis affecting the economies of many countries, both developed and developing. However, in spite of that serious handicap, bilateral and multilateral co-operation efforts had been continued on a broad basis, as the nuclear co-operation agreements signed in recent years and the exchanges of scientists and trainees organized by the Agency with individual States' support showed. Belgium had participated in such co-operation to the best of its abilities and would continue to do so.

17. The assistance offered to developing countries could easily be increased if the principle were accepted that those countries should be the main beneficiaries of the Agency's technical assistance. It was simply not fair that over 20% of the funds donated by States for technical assistance had in the past years been deployed for the benefit of countries which were not developing countries.

18. Mr. KOCH (Denmark) said that the vital importance of the Agency's work had been emphasized following the tragic accident at Chernobyl. In that connection, Denmark strongly supported efforts made to establish internationally acceptable and binding rules on safety at nuclear installations in all Member States. Such rules should cover siting, design, construction, operation, decommissioning and radioactive waste treatment, and should be subject to verification by international safety authorities.

19. He hoped that the forthcoming expert working group on nuclear safety would be successful in formulating additional measures to improve co-operation on nuclear safety and in identifying ways to refine nuclear safety standards to an even higher degree.

20. The Agency's work in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection was of importance both to countries with a nuclear power programme and to those not using nuclear power. His delegation was willing to accept

the budgetary increase for 1987 resulting from the strengthening of the nuclear safety programmes. In coming years, however, the Agency should pursue a policy of zero real growth.

21. Denmark agreed with the view that any country's energy policy should take account of its possible effects on the health and environment of other countries. In that regard, the siting of nuclear power plants, and particularly their distance from national borders or densely populated areas, was of major significance. In all such matters, there was a need for close co-operation between neighbouring States.

22. Turning to safeguards activities, he noted with satisfaction that they had continued unabated. In principle, all nuclear facilities without exception should be subject to Agency safeguards, but his Government had noted with grave concern that there were five non-nuclear-weapon States, not party either to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Tlatelolco Treaty, in which unsafeguarded facilities of safeguards significance were known to be in operation or under construction.

23. As to the financing of safeguards, Denmark held that all Member States should contribute, since safeguards were a collective responsibility of benefit to all countries.

24. Denmark accorded great importance to the Agency's technical assistance activities, and accepted the target of US \$34 million for voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1987, to which it had pledged its full share.

25. In the spring of 1985 the Danish Parliament had requested the Government to organize public energy planning on the precondition that nuclear power would not be used in Denmark. It was therefore necessary to find other means of meeting the electricity demand. Approximately 97% of Denmark's electricity generation was based on coal in dual-fired or triple-fired power plants. In order to save energy, combined heat and power was used as extensively as possible, while desulphurization equipment was being introduced in power plants to protect the environment. Increased importance was to be given to indigenous energy resources, including natural gas and biomass.

Denmark also intended to step up its work in the area of energy conservation and energy efficiency and to pay more attention to the possibilities of renewable energy resources.

26. In his statement during the special session, the Director General had mentioned Denmark's work with wind power. The 100 MW(e) which the electricity companies were planning to connect to the grid represented a significant increase in the use of wind power and a step toward a more complex energy mix. Although that initiative could not match the output of a nuclear power plant, it nevertheless contributed to the country's energy supply, and Denmark was confident that its experience in that field would turn out to its advantage when the world found itself once again confronted by a tight energy market.

27. In conclusion, it was clear that safety and environmental problems related to nuclear power would demand a major part of the Agency's efforts in the years to come. In that connection, he was confident that the Agency would continue to make a brilliant contribution to international co-operation.

28. Mr. OMWONY (Kenya) said that his Government intended to study carefully the two conventions on early notification and assistance adopted by the special session with a view to joining those Member States which had already signed them. The two conventions had been a result of the recent unfortunate incident at Chernobyl, and his delegation wished to take the present opportunity to extend its sympathy to the people who had been affected.

29. With regard to the proposed programme and budget, he welcomed the increase in funds for technical assistance to developing countries. Kenya had received valuable assistance from the Agency, notably in the areas of agriculture, health and science. It had programmes on animal reproductive behaviour and on the sterile-insect technique, and was particularly grateful to the Governments of Sweden and Belgium for their assistance with the tsetse-fly control programme. It had co-operated with the Agency in the fields of cancer treatment, nuclear medicine and radiation protection, and was now able to monitor more than 3000 radiological personnel. Moreover, the Kenyan Government had recently enacted into law the radiological standards which the Agency had assisted in formulating. The nuclear science laboratory also had

continued to receive assistance from the Agency and had been able to provide valuable manpower for Kenya's nuclear needs. Finally, there had also been successful collaboration with the Agency in the fields of industrial technology and nuclear instrumentation.

30. The Agency had always followed the recommendations made by the General Conference with regard to technology transfer in the nuclear field. In particular, seminars and training courses continued to be held in developing countries, and Kenya had been honoured to host seminars on analytical chemistry, radioisotopes and nuclear instrumentation.

31. The Agency could not carry out its excellent work unless Member States met their financial commitments. His country had always remitted its assessed contribution, and would continue to do so in subsequent years. With regard to the vexed question of representation on the Board of Governors and Article VI of the Statute, Kenya hoped that the African Group's proposal for a modest increase by one in the number of designated Members for the region would be put into effect, since there had been general agreement that the region was underrepresented.

32. Turning to the thorny issue of South Africa's nuclear capabilities, he said that developing nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes meant using them to improve human welfare. At the General Conference's request, the Agency had conducted negotiations with South Africa aimed at applying safeguards to that country's nuclear activities. However, the draft safeguards agreement which the Agency had presented to South Africa had not been accepted. Instead, that country's minority régime had diluted the Agency's draft to its own advantage, with the result that the Director General had now informed the Conference that he saw no useful purpose in pursuing the discussions with South Africa any further. Thus, South Africa had virtually refused to place its facilities under Agency safeguards, and it was difficult not to suspect that sinister motives might be behind that country's nuclear development. In the light of that refusal, therefore, he now called upon the Director General and Member States to make operative the full contents of General Conference resolution GC(XXIX)/RES/442.

33. The people of South Africa, black or white, had the same needs. His own country had experienced similar racial imbalance problems to those in South Africa, but had been able to overcome them, and so the people of Kenya could now work and enjoy life and the pursuit of happiness together. Under the policy of apartheid, however, the indigenous population of South Africa was being oppressed. That, in his country's view, was a misguided policy which could not bring peace to the world. Humanity must rise against racial barriers. There could be no human rights in South Africa without equality, there could be no equality without peace, and there could be no peace without love for human life. It was for those reasons that his delegation supported the draft resolution submitted by the African Group and urged all friendly nations also to support that resolution for the protection of humanity.

34. Mr. BADRAN (Jordan) said that the thirtieth regular session of the General Conference had followed the first special session, which had been held to discuss programmes that could be adopted to enhance international nuclear safety in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident. The special session had ended successfully with the signing of two conventions - on early notification and on assistance in the case of nuclear accidents.

35. The international community was following the present sessions with special interest and hope in view of the increasing importance of international nuclear safety and also in view of the adverse impact on public opinion of the accident, which had in fact led to a situation in which the acceptability of nuclear energy as a whole had become a matter of global controversy.

36. Jordan considered nuclear safety to be a single integrated sphere of action with its own interlinked political, legal and technical parameters. International nuclear safety would therefore require measures related to technical and engineering procedures within the actual nuclear facility as well as a set of international conventions prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities and ensuring an adequate flow of safety-related information at reasonable cost.

37. The negotiated conventions on early notification and assistance in the case of a nuclear accident did not really represent an effective course of action to minimize incidents or eliminate the possibility of them as far as

accidents with transboundary consequences were concerned, but related more to procedures to be applied in accident management and control after the accidents had occurred. Hence they did not come up to the expectations of the international community.

38. His delegation believed that the following points were more important in terms of nuclear safety and should accordingly be brought to the attention of the Conference: there was need for, first, the preparation and signing of international conventions prohibiting military attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities; second, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, with the Middle East receiving top priority; third, the application of international safeguards to the nuclear facilities of Member States behaving aggressively towards their neighbours - the latter point affected, in particular, Israel and South Africa, each of which had become a threat to neighbouring peaceful nuclear facilities as a result of their military potential, and both of which had refused to place their reactors under safeguards; fourth, a commitment by governments directly or indirectly exporting nuclear equipment and technology to non-nuclear countries that they would facilitate the flow of safety-related information throughout the life of any project, provided the flow of information was not an economic burden; fifth, participation by developing countries in international safety programmes and opportunities for their nationals to be trained and gain experience not only in managing nuclear facilities during normal operation, but also during emergencies; and sixth, a legal mechanism offering compensation in the event of nuclear accidents, based on the Conventions of Paris (1962), Brussels (1965) and Vienna (1970).

39. It had been argued by some Member States that Geneva was the proper place for negotiating a convention prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities, and not Vienna. His delegation's view was that the Geneva talks concerned matters of disarmament (mainly nuclear) and that countries other than the Superpowers had no access to such talks, even if they had nuclear reactors; that the final result of those talks, if successful, would have a direct bearing only on nuclear armament and had nothing to do with peaceful nuclear reactors; that the total destruction of a nuclear reactor, irrespective of the way in which it was destroyed, would turn it into a highly dangerous radioactive source, which was tantamount in practice to a nuclear weapon. In

such an event, the safeguarded nuclear facility would be involved in an accident requiring assistance from the Agency and other States in conformity with the two conventions just agreed on.

40. It might be wondered, in that connection, whether the Agency would have refrained from providing assistance or advice if the Iraqi nuclear reactor had been in operation at the time when it had been bombarded and destroyed by Israeli military action, on the basis of the argument that such was a matter for the disarmament talks? It was true, however, that the Agency was not expected to intervene in the event of war. In any case, it was clear that the matter of prohibiting attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities directly involved the Agency and its Member States, especially in the wake of the new conventions.

41. The Director General's efforts to ensure a proper response to the General Conference resolutions calling for the nuclear facilities of Israel and South Africa to be placed under safeguards had not been successful. That fact was very much to be regretted. The Jordanian Government appealed to the General Conference to adopt the appropriate resolutions that would ensure that the nuclear facilities of those two States were subject to Agency safeguards, since the matter was one obviously related to international nuclear safety.

42. His delegation wished to voice its concern with regard to the question of amending Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, now in its tenth year. The purpose of the amendment was not to enlarge the membership of the Board of Governors, but rather to rectify an unfair situation in which two large geographical areas - Africa and the Middle East and South Asia - were unfairly underrepresented. The modest change accepted by those two areas was for one additional Member for Africa and two more for the Middle East and South Asia. The proposal to amend Article VI as a whole would serve no useful purpose; it would in fact add to the difficulties already encountered. Jordan appealed to the General Conference to accept the amendment of Article VI.A.2, rather than the whole of Article VI.

43. His country was quite satisfied with the Agency's technical co-operation programme and welcomed its expanded programme on nuclear safety. Technical assistance to developing countries had now started to show good results. During the seminar on that subject held during the present

Conference, Jordan had indicated the need to further develop the philosophy of technical assistance and the mechanisms by which it was applied with the object of improving the technological know-how and experience of the developing countries receiving it. It was hoped that programme would cover the training of staff, the improvement of regional co-operation and the creation of regional centres, in addition to a system for realistic evaluation and monitoring of projects so that they fitted into national nuclear plans on the basis of adequate finance and infrastructure in the recipient State.

44. His delegation approved the Agency's Annual Report and Accounts for 1985, as well as the programme and budget for 1987 and 1988, although it believed at the same time that the principle of zero growth could be a hindrance to its work and should therefore be discontinued.

45. The developing countries were expecting positive results from the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE), scheduled to take place in 1987. It was hoped it would result in the signing of a number of international agreements. His delegation believed that it was in the fields of power generation, industry, medicine, agriculture, geology and hydrology that nuclear technology could contribute the most to human progress. Progress of that kind could only be achieved through co-operation at all levels - bilateral, regional and international - and the Agency had in that respect a great deal of work ahead of it. The coming United Nations Conference would help to overcome some of the technical and legal obstacles standing in the way of progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

46. Mr. MESLOUB (United Nations Council for Namibia) said that the word "Namibia" summed up the image of a heroic fight against foreign domination and exploitation of humanity. The programme of action in the final document of the International Conference for the Immediate Independence of Namibia, held exactly two and a half months before, had opened with that affirmation by the international community.

47. The Conference, inaugurated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, had been attended by 121 governments as well as representatives from the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and many others. The document adopted in July had

further declared that the achievement of Namibia's independence had been frustrated by the intransigence of the apartheid régime as well as by the duplicity of certain members of the international community. Twenty years had passed since the United Nations had terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia, but in spite of that long lapse of time racist South Africa had persisted in its illegal occupation of the country in violation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

48. The Secretary-General of the United Nations had stated in his current report that the most urgent outstanding problem of decolonization was that of Namibia. A week and a half earlier the General Assembly had concluded a four-day special session on the Namibian question, requested by the United Nations Council for Namibia, which was deeply concerned at the inordinate delay in the attainment of independence for Namibia.

49. Being responsible for Namibia and also considering the evolution which had taken place with respect to Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter on non-self-governing territories, the Council was particularly disturbed by that delay in view of the fact that when, in 1966, the General Assembly had assumed responsibility for the territory, it was asserting the fundamental right of the people of Namibia to self-determination and independence.

50. In its advisory opinion of 1971, the International Court of Justice had also endorsed the action taken by the General Assembly, declaring at the same time that States were under an obligation to recognize the illegality of South Africa's continuing presence in the territory and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning Namibia. The case against South Africa's occupation of Namibia and for the accession of the people of that territory to independence therefore rested on unassailable legal grounds. It had been confirmed by three major organs of the United Nations, each acting independently - the General Assembly, the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

51. In the efforts of the United Nations during subsequent years, 1978 was an important point of reference. After several years of intransigence on the part of South Africa, five Western members of the Security Council presented a set of proposals to it, designed to engage South Africa in a process of

negotiation for its withdrawal from Namibia, thereby enabling the territory to accede to independence after free and fair elections. Those ideas were embodied in resolution 435 (1978), adopted by the Security Council on 29 September 1978.

52. The Council for Namibia, like the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), had been doubtful about South Africa's intention to negotiate in good faith. Nevertheless, the Security Council's initiative was supported and it was expected that the five countries would exert all necessary pressure to force South Africa's co-operation in implementing the resolution and that, should South Africa not do so, they would not stand in the way of punitive action by the Security Council.

53. In April 1981, the Security Council had met to consider the situation created by South Africa's continuing intransigence in respect of Security Council resolution 435 (1978). The Council had been asked to adopt a draft resolution imposing selective sanctions on South Africa for its defiance of resolution 435, but the draft resolution had been vetoed by three Western members of the Council. South Africa's persistent efforts to subvert negotiations aimed at implementation of resolution 435 and Western permissiveness regarding that intransigence had led to the convening of a special session of the General Assembly in September 1981. On that occasion the General Assembly had demanded the unconditional implementation of that resolution, it had also called upon all States to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

54. Through the remarkable endurance and diplomatic skill of the Secretary-General, all outstanding issues pertaining to the implementation of the United Nations plan had at last been resolved, yet efforts to bring about the implementation of resolution 435 had again foundered on an issue that had first been raised by the United States: that of the prior withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, i.e. the concept of linkage. That was the pretext now being used by South Africa for maintaining the status quo in Namibia. Both the General Assembly and the Security Council had resolutely rejected the linkage.

55. In the light of South Africa's demonstrated unwillingness to co-operate in the implementation of resolution 435, the debate on sanctions had grown in intensity over the years. The General Assembly, at the request of the United Nations Council for Namibia, had consistently called on the Security Council to impose mandatory sanctions against South Africa. There were two permanent members of the Security Council who had been preventing that body from responding. As recently as November 1985, those two States had used their vetoes to protect South Africa from the justified wrath of the international community expressed at that time merely in the form of a request for selective sanctions.

56. Meanwhile, pending the implementation of mandatory sanctions, the Assembly had urged States to cease all political, military, economic or other assistance which they had been extending to the Pretoria régime. Many States which had continued to maintain relations with South Africa had demonstrated their willingness to exert increased pressure through legislative and executive action, including in one case a total trade boycott of South Africa. The Council for Namibia sincerely appreciated those efforts.

57. However, while at the popular level there had been a categorical rejection on both sides of the Atlantic of the apartheid policies of the Pretoria régime, and while there had been enthusiastic support for sanctions at that level, South Africa's principal trading partners were still condemning apartheid while continuing to do business with the régime that practised it.

58. Prime Minister Botha's efforts in that direction had been unmistakably clear. In June 1983, he had installed the so-called "interim government" which was an ad hoc alliance of conflicting political groupings whose only common factor was their opposition to SWAPO. Their high rhetoric notwithstanding, after one year in office they had made no move to abolish Proclamation AGS, the South African edict which formed the basis for the segregation of the territory's ethnic groupings. The racist régime, which had established so-called Namibia information offices in France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, had aimed at legitimizing its puppet institutions in Namibia; yet it had been condemned by the Security Council and the international community, which had demanded the immediate closure of those offices.

59. To reinforce its position, the apartheid régime had also attempted to inject aspects of great power rivalry and elements of East-West confrontation into the Namibian independence struggle. The ideological dimension had been deployed to conceal the fundamental decolonization issue that was in reality involved. To bolster those pseudo-theories and misinformation use was made of ruthless force, internally within Namibia, and externally against independent States in the region of southern Africa. To hold down a population of 1.5 million, the racist régime had deployed over 100 000 troops in the territory. The militarization of Namibia had served not only to suppress the majority of people within the territory but also as a launching pad for acts of aggression, subversion and cross-border terrorism against neighbouring States. The South African régime had used Namibian territory to provide logistic and other support to dissident groups in Angola to destabilize that sovereign nation.

60. As a practical means of exercising its direct responsibility for the territory, the General Assembly had created the United Nations Council for Namibia to take over administration of the territory and prepare it for independence. The South African authorities had physically prevented the Council from entering the territory, but had not been able to impede political action in support of the struggle of the Namibian people.

61. Through an extensive information programme, people in North America and Western Europe in particular had been made more aware of the struggle being waged for the liberation of Namibia, of the effects of South Africa's continuing illegal occupation of the territory, and of the manner in which those governments which were still co-operating with the Pretoria régime had contributed to the prolongation of that illegal occupation.

62. In addition to mobilizing international pressure for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, the Council had financed and organized, through the United Nations Fund for Namibia, a large number of agricultural, health and educational projects for Namibian refugees which were carried out in close co-operation with SWAPO. The United Nations Institute for Namibia in Lusaka had continued to grow, had trained skilled manpower and conducted research into the policy-making and administrative needs of an independent Namibia.

The assistance programmes had directly served the needs of thousands of Namibians who had fled their country and were struggling to cope with the material and psychological hardships of exile and statelessness. In addition, those programmes also equipped the future leaders and administrators of Namibia with the skills they would need to build up an equitable and productive society after independence.

63. But all such efforts were essentially in support of those being exerted by the people of Namibia themselves under the leadership of SWAPO. Only recently a delegation of the Council had visited SWAPO settlements in Zambia following a similar visit to the camps in Angola the previous year. The community of action and purpose witnessed in those settlements personified the future society of a free Namibia. A systematic, synthesized development of all aspects of the human being - educational, vocational, cultural and spiritual - could be discerned in those settlements.

64. In Cuanza Sul, in Angola, SWAPO administered a settlement providing shelter, food, education and vocational training for some 45 000 Namibian refugees. In Nyango, in Zambia, 5000-6000 Namibians had developed a similar community. Both Cuanza Sul and Nyango were equipped with schools, nurseries, day-care centres, clinics and hospitals. Both locations boasted agricultural and livestock projects providing a variety of foods for consumption by the two communities. Namibians were also engaged in weaving their own fabric and sewing clothes for the community.

65. The group of eminent persons participating in the Vienna International Conference had issued a special appeal at that conference, the conclusion of which he wished to quote:

"Our final remarks are addressed to the Namibian people who have made great sacrifices in their struggle against injustice and oppression. We appeal to them not to lose hope, but rather to summon new reserves of strength in the face of adversity. It would be comforting to believe that a good cause can triumph by dint of its inherent justice. That, however, would be illusory: history has shown that only sustained human effort can guarantee victory. If we redouble our determination, it cannot be long before the Namibian people finally win the freedom and independence for which they have struggled for over a century."

66. What the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group had concluded earlier in 1986 regarding the apartheid régime in South Africa was equally valid in respect of that régime's attitude to Namibia. It concluded that South Africa was "not yet prepared to negotiate fundamental change, nor to countenance the creation of general democratic structures, nor to face the prospects of the end of white domination and white power in the foreseeable future".

67. The final documents of the International Conference for the Immediate Independence of Namibia, held in Vienna from 7 to 11 July, the twenty-second regular session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the eighth conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, and the fourteenth special session of the General Assembly on the question of Namibia, had all reiterated the call that comprehensive mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter were the most effective peaceful measures to ensure the compliance of racist South Africa with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations on the question of Namibia.

68. The Council wished to see resolute action taken by the international community and appealed to the General Conference for the exertion of maximum pressure to force the Pretoria régime and its collaborators to cease their obstruction of progress towards Namibia's independence.

69. The United Nations Council for Namibia wished to take the opportunity of thanking the Agency and its Member States who had supported the efforts of the Council in the discharge of its responsibilities. The Council also wished to reiterate its call to the Agency and its Member States to take all necessary measures to strengthen the co-operation between the Agency and the people of Namibia. In that connection he wished to stress the importance of the Agency in promoting and developing technical assistance projects prior to independence, during the transition period, and after the independence of Namibia.

70. One of the main areas where the Agency should make an increased contribution was in training activities, which ought to be planned in a consolidated and comprehensive assistance programme, specifically designed to meet the needs of the Namibian people.

71. The Council commended the efforts made by the Agency to assist the Namibian people through the Council's Nationhood Programme. What the Agency had done marked only the beginning and it was hoped that the programme would be substantially enlarged to meet the growing demands. In so doing the Agency would act in full accordance with the objectives contained in Article II of its Statute.

72. Commending the efforts which the Director General had made over the last few years to increase the representation of developing countries in the Secretariat, his delegation wished to reiterate the interest of the United Nations Council for Namibia in seeing one or more Namibians recruited for employment by the Agency. At the moment the Council was reviewing potential candidates who would meet the requirements.

73. In conclusion, he repeated the request addressed by the General Assembly to all specialized agencies that a waiver of assessment be granted to Namibia during the period in which it was represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia. He also hoped that the draft resolution to be submitted to the General Conference by the African Group regarding the situation in South Africa would be unanimously adopted.

74. Mr. MWENDA (Zaire) said that the history of nuclear power now comprised two eras, i.e. pre Chernobyl and post-Chernobyl. It would henceforth be necessary to develop and market new, intrinsically safe types of reactor, incorporating passive safety measures on a huge scale. Indeed, in order to restore public confidence in nuclear power it had become essential to emphasize the qualitative aspect of nuclear safety, rather than remaining content with the quantitative aspects which were currently in fashion, in which connection he referred to probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). In other words, the philosophy of nuclear reactor construction based on "in-depth protection" should now give way to the notion of "inherent safety", which the public could better understand.

75. Whereas in the pre-Chernobyl era safety was not a determining factor in the economic cost of nuclear power, it had now risen considerably in significance. It was no longer a question of constructing power reactors

which were economical while being reasonably safe, but rather of constructing reactors which were safe while also reasonably economical. That was the only way to ensure a credible future for nuclear power.

76. His delegation hoped that the new spirit of international co-operation which had emerged since the accident would override that of confrontation which had characterized the Agency's debates on such matters as zero growth, the financing of technical assistance and the amendment of Article VI of the Statute. He appealed to all those concerned to take steps in that direction.

77. Turning to his country's nuclear activities, he said that they had, on the whole, progressed satisfactorily in the traditional areas of research involving the use of radioisotopes as tracers and radiation sources. That was largely thanks to technical assistance received from the Agency, and he thanked the Director General and the Secretariat for their help and understanding. Ore prospecting had suffered a halt in 1985, but it was hoped to recommence work in the near future.

78. In conclusion, he wished to make three suggestions. First, given that the two conventions adopted by the special session clearly made it necessary for Member States either to initiate or otherwise step up monitoring of their environments, the Agency should, within the framework of its technical assistance programme, accord high priority to requests related to radiological monitoring of the environment.

79. Second, the terms of reference of the small- and medium-sized reactor programme should be modified to include inherent safety aspects. It would thus become known as the "intrinsically safe small- and medium-sized reactor programme". That type of reactor represented the only chance of giving nuclear power a foothold in the majority of developing countries.

80. Third, it would be highly beneficial if African countries receiving technical assistance and also severely affected by the current economic crisis could be freed from the requirement that 8% of the total amount received by a Member State be reimbursed to the Agency in the form of a contribution to local expenses. While Zaire appreciated the reasonableness of that requirement, which had been formulated in more prosperous times, it was now highly desirable that the often embryonic nuclear programmes of African States should not be further handicapped.

81. Mr. CLADAKIS (Greece) said that the present session of the General Conference was taking place in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, which had been the most serious accident connected with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although the radiological impact of the accident in Greece was of relatively small significance owing to its distance from the reactor site, the economic and psychological impact on the Greek population could not be ignored. His Government was aware that, if such an accident were to happen within Greece or near its borders, the impact would be catastrophic for the country, which was relatively small. That indicated that the decision to exclude nuclear power from the Greek energy programme had been the right one.

82. It was of course true that nuclear power now accounted for 15% of the world's electricity generation, and its contribution to technological progress was unquestionable. The time had perhaps come to start to investigate safer alternatives to meet Greece's energy needs in greater detail.

83. Independently of the impact that the Chernobyl accident would have on the future of nuclear power, the safe operation of any existing nuclear power plant was of major concern to the population, even to those living outside the national borders of countries having such plants.

84. Countries that had decided not to have nuclear power - and, consequently, had not developed programmes to cope with accidents - believed that the establishment of a minimum permissible distance for nuclear power plants from their borders was an urgent requirement.

85. The Chernobyl accident underlined the need for increasing international co-operation on nuclear safety and on the mitigation of the consequences of accidents with power plants in operation. The role of the Agency in that connection should be expanded.

86. The Chernobyl accident, with its radiological impact, had to some extent contributed to an understanding being gained of the gravity of the consequences of a nuclear catastrophe. The continuous efforts of the Greek Government, both independently and within the framework of a movement of six States, with a view to nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and peace in general are well known.

87. The Agency's safeguards role was its most significant activity, and its contribution to non-proliferation was a substantial one. He welcomed Albania's initiative in concluding a safeguards agreement with the Agency and also the conclusion of the agreement with the Soviet Union, under which it would place some of its peaceful nuclear installations under Agency safeguards. The conclusion of a voluntary-offer safeguards agreement with the People's Republic of China, the fifth nuclear-weapon State to sign such an agreement, was also important. However, it was a matter of grave concern that two Member States, Israel and South Africa, had not yet placed all their nuclear activities under international safeguards.

88. Greece was both a donor and a recipient of technical assistance, and greatly appreciated the Agency's assistance with uranium exploration, research reactor safety and radiological protection, the development of radiopharmaceuticals and many other activities.

89. In conclusion, he stressed his Government's wish to continue to support the Agency. Thus, Greece had already pledged in full its assessed share of the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1986.

90. Mr. CHO (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) commended the Agency on its successful efforts in the past year to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy. His delegation attached particular importance to the Agency's technical co-operation activities, which had directly contributed to the solution of problems in the nuclear field in developing countries. The Agency's safeguards system, an effective tool in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, continued to make a positive contribution to man's struggle for peace. In view of the importance of that system, the Secretariat should make every effort to improve its effectiveness further. His delegation welcomed the statement in the Safeguards Implementation Report that in 1985 the Agency had not detected any anomaly which would indicate the diversion of a significant amount of safeguarded material.

91. The development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy could only take place under peaceful conditions. Having signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, his country was endeavouring to transform the Korean Peninsula into a peaceful, nuclear-free zone. A

statement to that effect had been made by his Government on 23 June 1986. Many national delegations, international organizations and eminent personalities that took part in an international conference on that subject held at the beginning of September in Pyongyang had actively supported his country's position and efforts in that direction.

92. In order to satisfy growing demand for electricity, his country was currently undertaking preparatory work for the construction of a nuclear power plant. Consideration was being given to technical co-operation with the Agency and bilateral co-operation with other countries in that connection.

93. Mr. CHUTHASMIT (Thailand) said that over the past year his Government and the Agency had enjoyed a good co-operative relationship. Thailand, which had been both contributor and recipient, had actively participated in many of the Agency's programmes through technical assistance projects, research contracts, seminars, meetings and study tours. He acknowledged with gratitude the recent decision by the Board of Governors to supply approximately 49 kg of enriched uranium for Thailand's research reactor from the special nuclear material donated by the United States of America.

94. With Agency assistance, nuclear techniques had been successfully applied in a number of sectors, including agriculture, health, industry and research. His Government had, furthermore, recently taken a major step toward the commercialization of food irradiation by authorizing the Office of Atomic Energy for Peace to construct a pilot-scale irradiation plant for food and agricultural products. The plant would have an initial loading of ^{60}Co at 100 kCi, and was due to be commissioned by early 1988. In the meantime, the Ministry of Health was, on the basis of the CODEX Alimentarius recommendations, revising rules and regulations to facilitate commercialization of food irradiation in the future. In addition, the Thai Atomic Energy Commission for Peace and the ASEAN (Association of the South East Asian Nations) Food Handling Bureau had jointly organized a successful workshop on food irradiation in November 1985.

95. Turning to the Chernobyl accident, he extended his country's heartfelt condolences to the Soviet people on their irreparable losses. The prompt and timely actions taken by the Agency following the accident were very much

appreciated, and he noted that nuclear power could only ensure health and prosperity to the world when it was used and controlled within the Agency's safety standards.

96. Another of the Agency's functions was to ensure that the assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision and control was not used in such a way as to further any military purpose. In that regard, the Agency had accomplished a great deal. Since the entry into force of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), not one State Party had been found to have used nuclear energy for other than peaceful purposes. As a peace-loving country and a State Party to the NPT, Thailand strongly supported all efforts by the Agency to increase the effectiveness of safeguards.

97. With regard to the financing of safeguards, which had been the subject of debate and discussion for many years, if the present General Conference was unable to reach a consensus on that matter then Thailand felt that the present arrangement should be maintained for a further three or four years. Regardless of who should shoulder the lion's share of its cost, everyone agreed that the safeguards system must continue to exist if the climate of international confidence was not to be seriously impaired.

98. In conclusion, Thailand would continue to value and support the Agency's purposes and would make every endeavour to assist it in putting them into practice. On behalf of his Government, he pledged a voluntary contribution of US \$30 600 to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund.

99. Mr. ORDUZ (Colombia) said that the Conference was meeting in a climate of renewed optimism following the success of the previous week's special session. The unfortunate accident at Chernobyl had brought home the fact that countries must help each other and that the exploitation of the atom was a matter which concerned all mankind and not just countries possessing nuclear facilities.

100. He was pleased to note that, in the Agency, attention was focused on the objective discussion of scientific and technical aspects of nuclear energy. His country had always defended the principle that the specialized international agencies should remain non-political in nature. Other fora existed where the international community could examine political issues.

101. His delegation respected and supported the statement made in support of nuclear science and technology by the delegation of Japan, the only country which had suffered the horrors of nuclear explosions.

102. Although Colombia had no nuclear power plants, it was not unfamiliar with the development of nuclear technology and, through the Institute of Nuclear Affairs, studied and kept abreast of progress in that field. Together with Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, his country had initiated an Andean regional programme and had requested Agency assistance in 1981 for the introduction of nuclear techniques. Those countries had met in Bogotá in 1983 to set up projects on radiation protection, nuclear instrumentation, the use of radioimmunoassay techniques in animal health and production, and research reactor utilization. Subsequently, with the participation of other South American States, the ARCAL programme had been established. He requested the countries most advanced in those areas to lend all possible support to that programme. His delegation expressed its gratitude to the Agency for the major role it had played in those efforts.

103. Finally, mention should be made of the International Physics Centre which was being set up in Colombia. The Centre, which was modelled on the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, would undoubtedly be of great benefit for all of Latin America. He urged the Agency and its Member States to give increasing financial and technical support for that initiative.

104. Mr. VYLKOV (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) said that a major step toward the further development of co-operation and economic integration among the CMEA member countries had been the adoption of a co-ordinated programme, lasting until the year 2000, aimed at scientific and technical progress in five priority areas, namely, electronics, integrated automation, nuclear power, new materials and technologies and biotechnology. The programme included scientific, technical and economic assistance by European CMEA member countries to Viet Nam, Cuba and Mongolia. The CMEA member countries were convinced that international co-operation must be directed only to peaceful ends and must be global in nature. The new programme fulfilled those peace-loving aims.

105. One of the main aims of the programme was the rapid development of nuclear power, which was now the most dynamically developing branch of the fuel-energy sector in the majority of CMEA member countries. Multilateral co-operation in that field had been considerably enhanced by a programme for co-operation on nuclear power stations and nuclear heat-supplying stations to the year 2000, and also by specialization and co-operation on equipment manufacture and the joint study of a range of problems relating to the fuel cycle and environmental protection. Successful co-operation was favoured by the fact that in the majority of CMEA member countries the development of nuclear power was based on WWER (water-cooled and -moderated) reactors of a uniform design with capacities of 440 and 1000 MW.

106. In 1985 a total of 26 WWER-440 units had been in operation in CMEA member countries, and by 1990 a further 20 units would be commissioned. Operating experience with those reactors had shown them to be more reliable and economical than plants using fossil fuels. The next stage of nuclear power development in CMEA member countries involved the wide scale construction of plants using WWER-1000 reactors. Such plants were under construction both in the Soviet Union and in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.

107. In 1984-1985 nuclear power plants with a combined capacity of 9900 MW had been commissioned in CMEA member countries. It had further been calculated that in a number of countries the share of electricity produced by nuclear power would by 1990 exceed 30%, while the total output of nuclear power plants in CMEA member countries would exceed 80 000 MW.

108. Nuclear power also had a strategic role to play in the production of heat energy, which now accounted for approximately 40% of fossil fuel consumption. It was planned to introduce in the near future nuclear power stations incorporating limited heat output and also single-purpose nuclear district heating plants of 500 and 300 MW(t).

109. On the basis of a joint programme for the rapid development of nuclear engineering, CMEA member countries had radically updated equipment production technologies, developed new materials and introduced improved quality control techniques, while production of over 140 items of main equipment for plants

with WWER-440 and WWER-1000 reactors was being carried out under a multilateral agreement on specialization, co-operative production and reciprocal deliveries. Thus, different CMEA member countries produced different parts and systems, with the Soviet Union producing practically all items of nuclear power plant equipment and exporting to member countries more than 50% of main equipment requirements. Practically every nuclear power plant now under construction in CMEA member countries stemmed from that agreement.

110. CMEA countries had considerably strengthened their joint research and development efforts aimed at improving reactor safety and reliability, formulating promising reactor designs and furthering controlled thermonuclear fusion. They had also co-operated on the development and introduction into the economies of CMEA member countries of different aspects of nuclear technology.

111. Particular attention was being paid by CMEA member countries to nuclear power plant safety. Computer techniques were foreseen for analysing accident sequences, while various member countries were studying hypothetical accidents and conducting research into burnout as applied to new types of fuel assembly. An experimental facility for modelling maximum possible accidents at nuclear power plants was now under construction.

112. A programme had been prepared for co-operation on in-core diagnosis, including noise analysis, acoustic monitoring and other non-destructive techniques for determining the condition of material in equipment.

113. With regard to environmental protection, CMEA member countries had developed a range of technologies for the processing and final disposal of radioactive wastes and for keeping radioactive releases into the atmosphere to a minimum.

114. Given the ever-increasing levels of international nuclear co-operation and trade, and also the risks inherent in the use of nuclear power, it was vital that comprehensive technical standards be set up and observed. In that respect the Agency had a major role to play. Using Agency material, CMEA member countries had jointly drawn up over 40 normative documents regulating the construction and operation of power plants incorporating WWER-440 and

WWER-1000 reactors. That work was continuing with a view to covering all possible aspects of the use of nuclear power establishments, particularly in relation to the manufacture and quality control of equipment, the modelling of accident sequences and activities to localize and eliminate their effects on the environment. In that connection, CMEA member countries were working on a detailed study of the effect of nuclear power plants on the major ecological systems, part of which involved scientific expeditions to study levels of radioactivity in the River Danube and the Baltic Sea. Work was also being done on checking dosimetry equipment, unifying dosimetric techniques and strengthening the administrative and legal bases for monitoring the safe operation of nuclear power plants.

115. In 1986 the CMEA member countries had proposed an increase in co-operation among all States on setting up an international regime for the safe development of nuclear power. In that regard, they advocated an enhanced role for the Agency, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and were ready to make their contribution. He noted that the two conventions recently adopted by the special session of the General Conference formed part of the legal basis for the above international regime.

116. Nuclear safety was inseparably linked with an end to material preparations for nuclear war. A major step in that direction would be to put an end to nuclear-weapon tests, while a radical solution to the problem would be the implementation of a programme for the full and general elimination of nuclear and other mass-annihilation weaponry by the end of the present century, as proposed by the Soviet Union in early 1986 and unanimously supported by the Warsaw Pact countries.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

