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Held at the Neue Hofburg, Vienna,  
on Tuesday, 30 September 1986, at 10.10 a.m.

Presidents: Mr. RAMANNA (India)  
later: Mr. BAEYENS (France)

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[\*\*] GC(XXX)/774.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document  
GC(XXX)/INF/238/Rev.4.

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ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE CONFERENCE

(a) ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA AND ALLOCATION OF ITEMS FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION  
(GC(XXX)/774)

1. The PRESIDENT informed the Conference that the General Committee, at its meeting the previous day, had authorized him to report on the outcome of its consideration of the agenda and the allocation of items for initial discussion. The General Committee recommended that the agenda consist of all the items on the provisional agenda set forth in document GC(XXX)/774.

2. The General Committee further recommended that those items be allocated for initial discussion as indicated in document GC(XXX)/774 and also recommended that the items be taken in the order in which they appeared, subject to the understanding that changes might have to be made in the course of business so as to make the best use of the available time.

3. The General Committee's recommendations were accepted.

(b) CLOSING DATE OF THE SESSION AND OPENING DATE OF THE NEXT SESSION

4. The PRESIDENT informed the Conference that the General Committee had authorized him to report that it recommended fixing Friday, 3 October 1986, as the closing date of the thirtieth regular session and Monday, 21 September 1987, as the opening date of the thirty-first regular session of the General Conference, to be held in Vienna.

5. The General Committee's recommendations were accepted.

GENERAL DEBATE AND ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1985 (GC(XXX)/775 and Corr.1) (resumed)

6. Mr. ZANGGER (Switzerland) said that the thirtieth regular session of the General Conference was a moment to look back on the principal stages through which the Agency's activities had passed. The first decade had been marked by the consolidation of membership of the Agency and the initiation of various statutory activities; the second decade had seen consolidation of the Agency's role in the application of safeguards to ensure the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, first and foremost the emergence of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the third decade had been marked by consolidation of the Agency's activities in the field of technical

assistance to developing countries, and as far as the fourth decade was concerned, it was clear that consolidation of its activities in technical co-operation and the standardization of nuclear safety in general and that of the nuclear power plants in particular would be matters of priority.

7. The special session of the General Conference had demonstrated that it was the express wish of governments to strengthen international co-operation in the main areas of nuclear safety and radiological protection, both on a multilateral and bilateral scale; to strengthen the Agency's role as a central pillar in that co-operation, and to work jointly towards the full implementation of its programmes in that regard. An encouraging event of the special session had been the signing of the conventions on early notification and mutual assistance in the case of nuclear accidents by 51 Member States of the Agency. His delegation and that of the Principality of Liechtenstein took pleasure in the fact that their Governments had also been able to sign them. Nevertheless, there was a great deal more to be done in order to put those conventions into effect as well as to improve nuclear safety and civil liability.

8. With regard to the attitude of the Swiss authorities to matters of safety in the construction and operation of nuclear power plants, to the rapid provision of information and mutual assistance, as well as to civil liability and the standardization of criteria for emergency action in radiological protection, he referred to the speech made by the Swiss Minister of Energy the week before. Nevertheless, his delegation wished to repeat what the Minister had said with regard to international solidarity, namely that Switzerland was aware of the scope of national sovereignty and respected it, but the international nature of problems involved in the production of nuclear energy and the possible consequences of accidents equally deserved to be respected. It was not acceptable that national sovereignty should stand in the way of essential international collaboration.

9. The new functions of the Agency in the wake of Chernobyl should not obscure the fact that the Agency continued to be a forum of vital importance in the search for an overall regime of co-operation in which nuclear supplies could be assured in a more predictable and long-term manner, with due regard

for the mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation. It was first and foremost for the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) to make a contribution along those lines. His Government could only regret that the deliberations on principles of international co-operation had still not arrived at specific conclusions. Commitments to non-proliferation, in connection with assurances of supply, would have to be based on a national undertaking binding at international level, as well as on the application of Agency safeguards. It was to be hoped that CAS would arrive at a solution before the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE). That solution would enable UNCPICPUNE to make greater efforts with regard to the technical aspects of utilizing nuclear energy, especially in the developing countries. He hoped that UNCPICPUNE would provide incentives that could enrich the work of the Agency.

10. With regard to the application of the Agency's safeguards, it was encouraging to see that progress was continuing in the nuclear-weapon countries. The situation, however, in States that were not members of NPT and possessed major facilities that were not safeguarded still remained a matter of concern and those countries were urged to accept safeguards on all their nuclear activities in order to consolidate international security.

11. During the last few months the nuclear scene in Switzerland had been almost completely dominated by the radioactive, technical and political impact of the Chernobyl accident. It would continue to be, moreover, for many years to come. Radiological measurements showed that the dose limit of 500 mrem per person had not been reached and in the case of the majority of the population doses had by and large remained below that value.

12. His country did not feel, on the basis of the initial results of evaluation of the reasons for the accident, that any special measures in the area of its nuclear facility safety were called for. Nevertheless, an improvement programme had been decided on by the Swiss Government and it related mainly to radiological protection, alarm and information systems and emergency action.

13. On the political plane, two opposition movements had come into existence and might well lead to the need for a referendum. One of them aimed at a moratorium of ten years on the construction of nuclear power plants, while the other called for the closing down of existing plants, without replacement, in the shortest possible time. And that despite the fact that electricity consumption had increased by more than 4% in 1985. During the deliberations which would shortly take place on that subject in parliament, the Swiss Government intended to make it quite clear that it stood in favour of nuclear energy and believed that to abandon the use of it too hastily could have serious consequences.

14. As far as safety activities in Switzerland were concerned, the five nuclear power plants had operated normally with availability factors between 81 and 88%. The limit values for releases of radioactive materials and exposure of personnel were still being observed with a large safety margin.

15. The Agency's NUSS programme, in which Switzerland took an active part, had been completed by the end of 1985. It was now a matter of applying it and examining the results. There would most likely have to be some amendments and additions in connection with the Chernobyl accident. Switzerland was ready to assist with any efforts aimed at improvement that might be needed.

16. The Director General had appealed to Member States in July of the present year to make an additional voluntary contribution of \$679 000 for the safety programme for 1986. Switzerland had responded to that appeal and had paid its share of the additional contribution requested. In the matter of the programme and budget for 1987, his delegation also approved the additional total envisaged for that purpose.

17. In the area of radioactive waste management, CEDRA (National Co-operative Society for Radioactive Waste Disposal) had undertaken geological studies at three sites with a view to building a final disposal repository for low- and medium-level wastes. By the end of 1985, the total outlay incurred by that Society had attained 250 million Swiss francs for the whole of its programme.

18. In research and development, mention should be made of reactor development, where work was in progress on high-temperature reactors (HTR) as well as on small heating reactors with an output between 10 and 50 MW(t). In the former case, parliament had approved Swiss participation, at the design stage, in the HTR-500 project in the Federal Republic of Germany; funds made available by Switzerland for a period of three years totalled 27 million francs, with those provided by private industry amounting to 20 million francs. That was equivalent to some 16 million francs a year, which was essentially a major effort on the part of Switzerland.

19. Three types of heating reactor were presently being studied in Switzerland - a miniature pressurized-water reactor, a small gas-cooled pebble reactor and a pool-type reactor known as "geyser" with a highly original design. In effect, the pool was designed in the form of a well 5 m in diameter and 50 m deep, in which the hydrostatic pressure of the water played the part of a pressure vessel.

20. Lastly, mention should be made of Swiss research and development in the area of nuclear fusion. A new tokamak with special geometry - oval rather than circular - was being designed for studying plasma. A test facility able to produce a magnetic field of 12 T was intended for a coil design study with a view to the next European torus project. The coil delivered by Switzerland for the LCT (Large Coil Task) had successfully passed the commissioning tests.

21. As far as technical assistance and co-operation were concerned, his country fully recognized the value of the Agency's work. It had paid its full share of the voluntary contributions for 1986 and had promised to pay a total of US \$377 400 for 1987, even though the growth rate of the target for voluntary contributions clearly exceeded that of UNDP.

22. In any case, in the technical assistance programme it was not volume that counted, but quality. The Agency's efforts to make efficient use of its resources and to improve evaluations were greatly appreciated, although further progress was still necessary. More effective management of the available funds for auxiliary expenditure could help to increase still further the project implementation rate.

23. In conclusion, his delegation wished to encourage the Agency and all its Member States to keep up their efforts to consolidate activities, more especially in nuclear safety, since it was in that area that international solidarity was a precondition for good relations between States.

24. Mr. BOZZA (Italy) noted that the Conference was taking place at a time of general reflection about the prospects of nuclear energy in view of the Chernobyl accident. There was an increasing awareness of the need to intensify research and to devote greater efforts to guaranteeing the safe peaceful development of the atom. A more effective and wider exploitation of nuclear energy would only be possible if safety conditions were improved. The conclusions of the special session of the Agency's General Conference had demonstrated that awareness. The responsibilities and tasks of the Agency were consequently becoming more important and the Agency therefore needed continuing or rather increasing support from Member States.

25. Under those circumstances it was essential to promote an even wider - indeed universal - participation in the Agency, and to improve the effectiveness of its most important organs particularly the Board of Governors. His delegation believed that the Board of Governors' effectiveness would be proportional to the support of Member States and to the quality of their participation in its activities. That was why the question of representation in the Board of Governors was so important for future developments in the field of nuclear energy.

26. His country had for a long time been convinced of the need to reconsider Article VI of the Agency's Statute and to review representation in the Board of Governors. It was of course important to protect the proven efficiency of the Board and to avoid upsetting its balanced mechanisms. The proposal introduced by his country together with Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, entailed a moderate enlargement of the Board to include 9 additional seats (4 designated and 5 elected), designed to promote a somewhat wider representation without disrupting existing equilibria. His delegation believed that such an amendment would lead to an improvement in the Board's operational capabilities, would facilitate the solution of certain regional difficulties and offered the only way to meet the justified aspirations of a

certain number of countries, including his own, and to promote a degree of desirable stability. His Government was fully prepared to contribute to the efforts that the Board of Governors, and through it the Agency itself, would be called to deploy to promote the safe exploitation of nuclear energy and wider technological development in that area. His country's contribution to those efforts was important in view of its achievements in research and technological know-how in many areas including safety. Furthermore, his country had always made a substantial financial contribution to the Agency's activities especially in the field of technical assistance.

27. His country had always done its utmost to promote the Agency's development activities. Many of those contributions had been made to finance special projects, particularly in the area of agriculture and medicine which, although approved by the Agency and judged to be of particular value, would not be implemented as a result of the lack of regular funding in 1984 and 1985. His country had again been the largest single contributor to extrabudgetary funds for technical co-operation. His country also provided finance for a major part of the activities of the Trieste International Centre for Theoretical Physics which was jointly managed by the Agency and UNESCO. In addition to a regular contribution of US \$3 million, equal to more than two thirds of the Centre's budget, his Government had granted an additional US \$4.5 million in 1985 and in 1986 in order to extend the Centre's activities with particular reference to the needs of national centres in developing countries.

28. His country actively supported the Agency's initiatives in the field of international nuclear trade particularly the activities of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS) aimed at setting up mechanisms for ensuring supplies and, at the same time, guaranteeing non-proliferation. The assurance of supply and the free access to scientific information and to new achievements in technological research constituted fundamental conditions for the wide and fair development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and for the gradual extension of the related economic benefits. His country also looked forward to participating in the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) to be held in 1987.



29. His Government attached great importance to the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system, which was an essential tool to ensure the credibility of the non-proliferation regime. That was why it was in favour, in principle, of the full-scope safeguards laid down by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, a generalization of full-scope safeguards had to take place with the awareness and consent of all States concerned. Furthermore, any unnecessary increase in financial burdens should be avoided at a time when the concern for safety was paramount. The desirable improvements of safeguards mechanisms should therefore be promoted by rationalizing the system and not by resorting to expensive new measures. That rationalization could be achieved by a more effective use of inspection personnel, a greater attention to the application of safeguards in sensitive plants and the development of integrated accounting techniques. His Government also believed that more equitable mechanisms for financing safeguards would have to be devised as soon as possible.

30. With regard to the economic situation in his country, its gross domestic product had increased by 2.3% in real terms, as against 2.8% in 1984 and the rate of inflation had slowed from 10.3% to 7.3%. Industrial production had not repeated its performance of the previous year, and had grown by a mere 1.2% after the 2.9% growth in 1984. Unemployment had increased still further, to 10.6% of the labour force and the balance of trade recorded another deficit. The increase in the deficit had mainly been the result of trade in energy products, in which Italy's deficit had increased by 9.8%. Oil imports had amounted to 25 357 billion lire in 1985, as against 23 221 billion the previous year. As a result of the fall in oil prices and the depreciation of the dollar, the trade deficit had declined by 47% over the first four months of 1986 as compared with the same period in 1985, and the energy deficit by 31%. If, as was likely, that favourable situation lasted for the rest of 1986, it was also likely that his country's balance of payments, which had recorded large deficits over the past six years would register a surplus.

31. Provisional data indicated that his country's total primary energy requirement had increased by 1.5% and that net energy imports had decreased by 0.6% in 1985. His country's external energy dependence was 81.3%, and had

remained virtually unchanged over the past three years. There had been no significant change in the relative contribution made by the various individual sources to overall domestic energy consumption the previous year. The upward trend in natural gas consumption had continued (+2.6% from 1984), while for the first time since 1979 oil consumption had not fallen, remaining steady at about 85 Mtoe, although its percentage share had declined, from 59.4% to 58.6%. Primary electrical power production (hydroelectric, geothermal and nuclear) was 12 Mtoe.

32. The total request for electricity on the grid was 195.4 billion kWh, 2.8% higher than in 1984. The increased demand for electricity had been met by a rise in thermoelectric output (3.1% for oil, 8.5% for solid fuels) and by an increase in net imports, which amounted to 23.7 billion kWh the previous year. The rise in electricity imports had resulted from continuing favourable conditions abroad. Thus again, in 1985, the cost of imported electricity had been less than the marginal cost of electricity generated domestically by imported oil. The share of oil in electricity generation had increased slightly, from 40.7% in 1984 to 41.2% in 1985.

33. Nuclear power generation had increased by 11.9% in the first half of 1986 (from 4.34 billion kWh to 4.86 billion kWh) due to the good performance of the three nuclear plants in operation. In December 1985 the Italian Parliament had approved an updated version of the National Energy Plan, which confirmed the overall targets set by the original Plan of 1981. With regard to nuclear power, the updated Plan retained the objectives of commissioning plants to increase the nuclear capacity by 10 000 MW(e).

34. Work on the first of those plants, located in Piedmont, was beginning. For the siting of the remaining 8000 MW(e) of planned capacity, the Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning had confirmed the sites chosen in Lombardy and Apulia and had designated four other regions. With regard to the two experimental reactors, one, a 40 MW(e) heavy-water-moderated light-water-cooled reactor, had been completed and construction on the other, a facility for testing fast reactor fuel, had progressed further during the past year.

35. On 3 June 1986, the Italian Parliament had approved a resolution calling for a number of measures including an immediate check on the safety standards of the nuclear plants now on line or under construction and the convening of a National Energy Conference to be organized by the Government by the end of the year (probably in December 1986). A wide-ranging debate on the future of the National Energy Plan, and of the nuclear programme in particular, had been developing in his country and was having a strong impact on public opinion and political forces.

36. In conclusion, following the Chernobyl accident, public acceptance of nuclear energy should be strengthened by ensuring effective international co-operation, outstanding performance of nuclear plants, systematic information programmes, open dialogue with the public and a correct evaluation of the global significance of nuclear energy to the economy and society.

37. Mr. VISHNEVSKY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) said that the Agency had an important role to play in co-ordinating the joint efforts of States in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as had been generally acknowledged during the special session of the Conference held the previous week. His delegation welcomed the resolutions taken by that session because they reflected a broad support for the Soviet Union's proposal to establish an international regime of safe nuclear power development. The adoption of the two conventions on early notification and on assistance in the case of a nuclear accident constituted a first practical step towards such a regime.

38. His delegation had signed those important documents; however, it was pointless to strive for safe nuclear power without recognizing the dangers of preparing for nuclear war. That was why the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev, in a speech held on 15 January 1986, had put forward a proposal for the total world-wide abolition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. The Soviet Union's decision to prolong the unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions until 1 January 1987 was also directed towards that goal and demonstrated the honesty and seriousness of purpose of the Soviet programme for nuclear disarmament. The achievement of political agreement on that subject would undoubtedly also contribute towards strengthening the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

39. The Third NPT Review Conference had confirmed the vital role of NPT in that endeavour; in that connection, his delegation was gratified at the success of the Agency's safeguards activities, which were aimed at preserving peace and international security. At the same time, further improvements in the Agency's efforts to maintain non-proliferation and in the effectiveness of its safeguards system must be sought, particularly where the nuclear ambitions of those States which persistently refused to place their nuclear activities under international safeguards were concerned.

40. His delegation actively supported all Agency programmes directed towards the further broadening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, especially those relating to nuclear power and the fuel cycle, the International Nuclear Information System (INIS) and controlled nuclear fusion. A particularly important task was the expansion of the Agency's nuclear safety activities, and great significance was also attached to increased co-operation with developing countries: thus the Ukrainian authorities had decided to make a voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1987 amounting to US \$432 000 in national currency. While taking a positive view of the Agency's technical assistance, his authorities considered that keeping the effectiveness of that assistance under constant evaluation would undoubtedly lead to further improvements in that important activity.

41. Contemporary scientific and technical progress meant man's penetrating ever deeper into the secrets of matter with the help of accelerators, reactors and electronic devices of unprecedented scale and complexity. At the same time, the new technology made stringent demands on the training of highly qualified personnel.

42. His authorities remained convinced that peaceful nuclear energy would remain an indispensable part of scientific and technical progress in his country. Development plans for power generation in the Ukraine foresaw a major expansion of nuclear power, whose share in the country's power output already amounted to 15%. Unfortunately, as recent serious accidents involving advanced energy-packed technologies had shown, mankind sometimes had to pay a high price for scientific and technical progress. International experts had

recognized the great significance of the experience gained during the accident at the Chernobyl power plant by the Soviet specialists and passed on by them to the international community. That accident had shown how dangerous atomic energy could be when it escaped from human control. However, the consequences of that accident were as nothing compared with those which mankind would face in a nuclear war.

43. Mr. AMROLLAHI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that Islam did not recognize any national boundaries for gaining knowledge and had always encouraged the Moslems to pursue it, even to the farthest corners of the Earth. Of course, Moslems valued knowledge when it was complemented by virtue. The bombing of Hiroshima, and the present stockpiles of nuclear weapons were examples of knowledge without virtue.

44. In spite of all international conspiracies and propaganda, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not harbour expansionist ideas. On the contrary, war had been imposed upon the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Superpowers, for whom violence and expansionism were a means of survival.

45. That was demonstrated quite clearly by the fact that on the one hand the Superpowers were continuously expanding and upgrading their nuclear arsenals, involving frequent and often hazardous tests, while on the other hand discouraging and, indeed, forestalling any attempt by any other country which could be construed, directly or indirectly, as having any effect on the advancement of their peaceful nuclear activities.

46. Third World countries were thus discouraged from developing any serious scientific basis in the nuclear field and were prevented outright from establishing serious nuclear programmes, particularly related to power applications.

47. Some developing countries might feel that certain elaborate international organizations had been established to assist them in enhancing their scientific capabilities. If, however, they assessed the role of those organizations more closely they would find that their true function, under the tutelage of the Superpowers, was not to enhance but to regulate developing countries' scientific capabilities and to confine them within certain prescribed limits.

48. He emphasized that by progress in the nuclear field he was not referring to a capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. On the contrary, the Islamic Republic of Iran abhorred such weapons and the constant threat they posed to the human race. What he meant was that all developing countries should have access to the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy as an option in their economic and industrial development programmes. Nor should such an option be used as a tool in wielding political influence.

49. The independent and the truly non-aligned developing States were restrained within the confines of certain basic, and often outmoded, research activities in the nuclear field, and although that was not formally expressed as a statutory objective, in practice it was most fervently adhered to through the imposition of numerous obstacles and constraints such as licence agreements, transfer of technology limitations, proprietary rights and export licence requirements, all of which amounted to regulatory tools and obstacles designed to control the progress of science and technology in developing countries.

50. No such safeguarding system existed, of course, to control proliferation in the nuclear arsenals of the Superpowers and the other nuclear-weapon States.

51. The situation he had described was, of course, unsatisfactory and unacceptable to most independent States. If it persisted in its present form, and as those States began to awaken to the facts, it would no doubt lead to the gradual weakening and eventual collapse of the international organizations concerned.

52. While commending the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation programme and the improvement in the net expenditure rate for technical co-operation, he had been concerned to hear of certain difficulties involving a failure to observe the equal rights of Member States. That was totally unacceptable.

53. The Islamic Republic of Iran had followed with interest the activities of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), which could have a direct effect on the enhancement of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in developing countries. In that connection, the Islamic Republic of Iran had suffered

substantial direct and indirect damages since the United States had ceased to supply fuel for use in its research reactor. He had presented the details of that situation during the previous regular session but unfortunately the Agency's efforts to provide alternative sources of supply had so far remained fruitless.

54. In its statement to the special session of the General Conference, the Islamic Republic of Iran had avoided the inclusion of political issues in a technical subject. He noted with deep regret, however, that the Iraqi delegation had presented political statements totally irrelevant to the theme of the special session.

55. Iraq should accept the consequences of the war, which it had started and imposed on his country, and should not, therefore, blame the stagnation of its nuclear programme on the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the contrary, as the Islamic Republic of Iran had stated during the twenty-ninth regular session of the General Conference, Iraq had so far repeatedly attacked the Islamic Republic of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant, thereby preventing progress on that project.

56. Both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq had suffered tremendous human and economic losses as a result of the war. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programmes, in particular construction of the Bushehr power plant, had sustained far more damage than those of Iraq. Needless to say, the Islamic Republic of Iran was prepared to bear all consequences in order to bring that imposed war to a battlefield-dictated and just conclusion.

57. A further example of the type of obstacle to completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant was the impounding in the Federal Republic of Germany of certain components for the plant, under the pretext of export licence problems. In that way, the Islamic Republic of Iran's right to pursue the peaceful applications of nuclear power were being severely compromised. That attitude on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany, which was related to the Superpowers' desire to obstruct advances in the nuclear field by independent developing States, would surely damage its credibility as a nuclear equipment supplier, and he warned it of the serious consequences of breaching bilateral agreements.

58. His Government questioned the Agency's efforts on fulfilling one of its primary functions, namely, the safeguarding of nuclear materials and installations. Bearing in mind that substantial amounts were spent annually by the Agency on the implementation of safeguards, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not detect any tangible results in the form of a stagnation or decline in the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Agency exercised no particular control in the area of vertical proliferation.

59. Contrary to propaganda put out by the nuclear-weapon States, the real concern of people the world over was not the peaceful and limited nuclear installations of the developing countries but the horrifying arsenals of nuclear warheads continuously being stockpiled by the Superpowers.

60. The funds spent on inspecting a few voluntarily offered installations in the nuclear-weapon States were wasted and served no real purpose other than to divert public opinion. The Islamic Republic of Iran was therefore no longer prepared to support such superfluous programmes and urged other developing States to follow its example.

61. As reflected in the declaration of the Heads of State of the Non-Aligned Movement in Harare, the régimes that were active in the nuclear field but not committed to international regulations, namely, the racist régime of South Africa and the usurper régime of Israel, were potential threats to world safety.

62. As yet, neither of those régimes had accepted the full implementation of Agency safeguards, thereby blatantly disregarding a number of Agency resolutions.

63. He noted with interest that the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty had been concluded. The real issue, however, was the role played by such treaties in the face of the universal threat posed by the nuclear arsenals of the Superpowers. It would be interesting to know whether such treaties would prevent the Superpowers from deploying nuclear weapons when and where they saw fit. Obviously, unless the entire world was declared free from nuclear weapons and nuclear tests, no one would be entirely safe.



64. In order to achieve that ultimate goal, his delegation proposed that all the delegations from the Middle East and South Asia (MESA) formulate and conclude a "MESA Nuclear-Free Zone" treaty. He also urged other regions to do likewise.

65. In that respect, he stressed the importance of establishing an international safeguard authority for the true safeguarding of all nuclear installations, whether civil or military, and also the effective and central role that the developing countries could play in that respect through their full co-operation.

66. On the amendment of Article VI.A.2 of the Statute, he noted that the present Board membership of 35 represented about 31% of the total membership of 113. However, only 9 Members, or roughly a quarter of those 35, related to Africa and MESA, even though the share of those two regions in the total membership of the Agency would soon reach 40%. It was regrettable that that state of affairs remained unresolved and that no consensus had been reached over the previous decade. The Islamic Republic of Iran therefore wished to place its concern on record and to seek correction of the present situation, which undermined the credibility both of the Agency and of its resolutions.

67. He commended the Secretariat on the proposals relating to the documents on the Agency's 1987/88 programme and budget. However, his delegation opposed the policy of zero growth and its effects on the Agency's promotional activities, which were of benefit primarily to the developing countries. He noted with concern that the Secretariat had not considered the observations of the Group of 77 in that respect.

68. In conclusion, he hoped that the present General Conference would discharge its full responsibility in removing obstacles to the peaceful and safe application of nuclear energy, particularly in developing countries.

69. Mr. BRADY ROCHE (Chile) said that, during the past year, much attention had been paid in his country to nuclear safety and radiation protection, as already outlined in his delegation's statement to the special session the previous week.

70. In order to encourage uranium exploration by the private sector, the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission had prepared a national uranium map, showing favourable locations where uranium might be found, and had also established a new laboratory for geology and mining.

71. The programme for the application of isotopes and radiation was aimed at achieving a technological level which would allow the prompt and effective utilization of nuclear techniques for the overall development of the country. Special emphasis had recently been given to the area of food irradiation, which was expected to acquire great importance for exports in the near future, but work on nuclear energy applications in industry, hydrology, engineering, medicine and agriculture had also been continued.

72. In addition, his country's desire to bring regional efforts together into a joint endeavour had led to the organizing of various training courses and other co-ordinating activities in Latin America, including a regional seminar on experimental aspects of Mössbauer spectroscopy and a regional workshop on radiation protection. In the same spirit, the Chilean Nuclear Energy Commission had actively participated in the programmes of the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission and had hosted a regional course on the application of radioactive tracers in industrial and natural processes sponsored by that organization.

73. Turning to the agenda for the present regular session, he expressed his delegation's concern at the inclusion of topics, entirely political in nature, which had already been dealt with on previous occasions, but which were now being brought up again under different designations. Those topics drew attention away from other items more closely related to the fundamental objectives of the Agency, which were "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world". Such political wrangles, in conjunction with recent dramatic events and the arguments brandished by anti-nuclear groups, were detracting from the image of nuclear energy. For that reason, increased efforts must be made to restore public confidence in the benefits of nuclear energy. His authorities had recently intensified their public acceptance campaign in order to counteract negative publications which had appeared in connection with the unfortunate accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

74. Chile wished to make quite clear that it used nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and condemned the exploitation of the atom for other purposes; it therefore wholeheartedly supported the Agency's safeguards system. The NPT, however, as his country had frequently pointed out, was discriminatory in that it made no mention of vertical proliferation, but covered only horizontal proliferation. Moreover, NPT had led neither to any nuclear disarmament nor to the objective of technology transfer in the nuclear sphere.

75. With reference to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, he explained that his country had not signed that instrument because it believed that submitting essential nuclear materials to further controls would make them even less accessible for developing countries, whereas the nuclear materials which the great Powers used for military purposes remained outside the scope of the Convention, thus permitting continued vertical proliferation with the concomitant dangers to world peace and security. Such additional controls were not only difficult to accept, but would also undermine the confidence of Member States in the Agency's safeguards system.

76. On the other hand, he wished to inform the Conference that his country had decided to accept the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency.

77. Where the financing of technical assistance was concerned, Chile remained convinced that the best way of securing the necessary funds for that programme was to provide them under the Regular Budget. The present system evidently did not ensure that the established targets were met, since the shortfall currently amounted to nearly 40%. The Agency should seek a mechanism to prevent such financing shortfalls; it should also, in approving technical assistance projects in Member States, take into account the situation regarding pledges and actual payments to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund. Chile, although it was opposed to the present system of financing technical assistance, nevertheless pledged to contribute its share of the target for 1987.

78. With respect to the Agency's programme and budget for 1987 and 1988, his country congratulated the Secretariat on the balance reflected in document GC(XXX)/777 and expected that the expanded programme of nuclear safety

activities would receive wide support from Member States. Nuclear safety was a responsibility of all countries which could not be disregarded in any future nuclear activity without encountering great difficulties.

79. As to the financing of safeguards, which had been under discussion for years without any solution being found, his country still considered that the developing countries should contribute a reduced, or at least frozen, amount towards that activity, whereas the advanced nuclear supplier countries should bear the main burden of the Agency's safeguards system.

80. With regard to the staffing of the Secretariat, the Director General's efforts to increase the number of staff from developing countries were appreciated, but further efforts would be necessary. The expanded nuclear safety programme would offer an opportunity for the recruitment of new professionals from developing countries as of 1987.

81. On the question of amending part or all of Article VI of the Statute, very little progress had been made towards accommodating the interests and aspirations of the large number of developing countries which were increasingly availing themselves of the benefits of nuclear energy, as was proved by the fact that, according to the Agency itself, the present volume of the technical assistance programme was twenty times greater than at its inception.

82. Mr. JAMALUDDIN (Malaysia) said that the present General Conference was being held only a few months after the Chernobyl accident. That event had invited unfavourable publicity and strengthened fears with regard to the use and development of nuclear energy. Public confidence in the usefulness of nuclear power, which had gradually been restored after the Three Mile Island accident six years before, had suffered another serious blow. For those States which were committed to the peaceful use of nuclear energy there was now an urgent need to overcome the fears and misconceptions existing among the public by providing adequate information, particularly efforts in the area of safety, and taking action to minimize the risks involved.

83. His country was greatly encouraged in that connection by the recent adoption of the convention on early notification and the convention on assistance in the event of nuclear accidents during the special session of the

the same time, all parties involved in project implementation understood the importance of and were interested in the project effectiveness. His delegation hoped therefore that in future the work of evaluation would be carried out in close collaboration with all interested parties, and that they would thereby give a permanent impetus to the Agency's technical assistance and co-operation activities.

71. The representative of BRAZIL pointed out with regard to the nuclear power training programme and the conclusions contained in the report GOV/INF/507 that his country was very interested in that programme which, even if liable to alteration, should nevertheless be pursued.

72. The representative of CANADA expressed his satisfaction that the evaluation had become a component part of the Agency's programming, and encouraged the Secretariat to develop further and improve its evaluation activities. In that connection, the country programme evaluations mentioned by the Deputy Director General for Technical Co-operation seemed a very good initiative. His delegation believed as a whole that the evaluation exercise should visibly affect the programming process. For that purpose it would be useful, for example, if in its annual evaluation report the Secretariat provided an account of the follow-up to recommendations of previous reports. Furthermore, Canada did not believe that the resources assigned to evaluation were adequate; there was therefore need to give serious consideration to raising the amount going into evaluation to the full 1% of the development budget fixed by the Board until the results of remedial measures had a more visible impact.

73. With regard to the annex to document GOV/INF/507, he said first of all that recommendation I brought out a salient point that called for a more careful planning effort. There was need to set priorities by establishing better linkage between the nuclear power programmes of recipient countries, and the place of those programmes in their overall energy development, on the one hand, and the demand for and provision of training, on the other.

74. Canada would not necessarily oppose the reconstitution of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear Power Training, but it was doubtful whether the problem

Malaysia tried always to keep abreast of the latest developments in nuclear power technology. It also considered that nuclear energy as applied to agriculture, food, medicine and industry was of particular benefit to the developing countries.

87. Malaysia supported the Agency's efforts in promoting such uses of nuclear energy through technical assistance, research contracts and regional co-operation activities. The seminar on technical co-operation to be held during the present General Conference would be helpful for effective implementation of technical assistance projects.

88. One of the most successful innovations introduced by the Agency in its attempts to promote the peaceful uses of the atom was the Regional Co-operative Agreement (RCA). Malaysia supported the further extension of that Agreement. However, there should be at the same time careful assessment of the expense involved in the transfer of technology and of the appropriateness of the technology concerned. Appropriate technology should take into account the particular nature of problems in each area.

89. Malaysia had entered into bilateral agreements with Australia in four particular areas of application as well as setting up a state system of nuclear materials accounting. The acquisition of technology was crucial not only for growth but for the capacity to grow. Efforts towards greater technological self-reliance had to be supported through international co-operation. How quickly and how best the technologies could be transferred was the question. In that connection, the UNDP/RCA project on industrial application of isotopes and radiation technology under the auspices of the Agency represented an important step forward. Malaysia had recently signed an agreement to extend that project for a further period of five years.

90. With respect to the activities of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), his country was concerned over the lack of progress made. If nuclear energy was to be a viable source of power, the supply of nuclear equipment and services on a predictable and long-term basis in accordance with mutually acceptable considerations of non-proliferation had to be guaranteed.

91. His Government wished to emphasize the importance of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) scheduled for 1987. It would provide an opportunity for Member States to devise ways of overcoming constraints in the development of nuclear power and the application of nuclear technology. All States should have unhindered access to nuclear technology, equipment and material on a non-discriminatory basis so as to develop national programmes for social and economic development in accordance with their priorities, interests and needs.

92. Malaysia deplored the racist policy pursued by the South African régime. It was regrettable that despite all the Director General's efforts pursuant to General Conference resolution GC(XXIX)/RES/442 on South Africa's nuclear capabilities, that country continued to refuse to place all its nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards. Furthermore, South Africa should stop the exploitation and sale of Namibian uranium resources.

93. In conclusion, his delegation wished to reaffirm its confidence in the part played by the Agency in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

94. Mr. HADDAD (Syrian Arab Republic) said that he was grateful to the Agency for complying with his Government's request that the question of the Israeli nuclear threat be included on the agenda of the General Conference. That request had been accompanied by a brief explanatory memorandum, which had already been distributed. Evidence to prove Israel's nuclear power potential would be circulated in an annex in due course to delegates but, in summary, the evidence demonstrated that ever since its creation, Israel had spared no effort to acquire nuclear weapons. It had stolen uranium and equipment for that purpose. In October 1974, the President of Israel, as reported by the Guardian newspaper, had indicated that his country had always had the intention of promoting its nuclear capability and that it would soon be in a position to realize that potential. According to international news agency reports in 1985 Israel had deployed nuclear warheads in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights and those reports had never been denied by Israel. Even if the warheads had not been deployed, but were still in storage, the fact remained that Israel posed a nuclear threat.

95. There was no doubt that Israel was an aggressor. It had seized even more territory than that which had been allotted to it by the United Nations in 1947 and had evicted the people of Palestine from their homes and villages, the majority of whom were still living in refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and elsewhere. In 1956, Israel had attacked Egypt, and in 1967 had invaded three Arab countries - Jordan, Egypt and Syria. Israel had also attacked Lebanon several times before invading it in 1982 and occupying half of its national territory.

96. Israel was an expansionist State. In 1948 it had annexed Palestinian land and in 1967 it had occupied and annexed Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian territory. Had it not been for the stand taken by the Soviet Union and the United States, Israel would not have withdrawn from Sinai in 1956.

97. Israel was an unethical State. There was evidence that Israel had been spying on its friend the United States of America. The Jonathan Pollard case had come to light in 1985 and in 1986 there had been mention in the Washington Post of the case of an Israeli who had stolen uranium from the United States. Israel was also a racist State. The United Nations had provided evidence of the racist practices against the Arab inhabitants of Palestine and had repeatedly condemned them.

98. Israel was a terrorist State. The former Prime Minister, Menahim Begin, and Prime Minister Shamir had a record of terrorism. In recent years Israeli terrorist acts had included a raid on the Baghdad reactor, the raid on Tunis, and more recently the interception of a Libyan airliner in international air space, forcing it to land at an Israeli military airport, where the passengers had been held captive for a long time. Terrorist acts had also been carried out by uniformed Israeli officials. The whole world was worried about the possibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and the dangers of such weapons falling into Israeli hands were obvious. Israel was now a party to the Star Wars programme and even without that programme Israel had acquired military superiority over Arab countries which the United States enabled it to maintain.



99. The Israeli nuclear threat extended beyond the Arab world to other countries especially in Europe where Jews had suffered during the Hitler period. Israel never forgot any act directed against it and was eager to take revenge. Israel had insulted both Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany and President Waldheim of Austria. It was to be hoped that Europe would take the necessary steps to eliminate the threat and danger posed by Israel. His country, together with other Arab States, planned to submit a draft resolution to deal with that threat.

100. The South African Government was a racist terrorist régime like Israel and steps should be taken to protect other African States from the nuclear threat posed by South Africa.

101. It was no secret that his country intended to set up nuclear reactors and in doing so it was keeping in close contact with the Agency. An agreement had been reached with the Soviet Union to build a research reactor with limited capacity and a contract had been signed for the study and selection of a site for a WWER-440 MW nuclear power plant.

102. The conclusions reached by the special session of the General Conference the previous week were very important. However, all conventions and treaties related to nuclear safety still lacked an essential element and in that respect the Soviet Union's moratorium on nuclear testing and its initiatives to halt the arms' race were very commendable.

103. Mr. COSTANTINI (Argentina) said that the most important event for his country's nuclear programme during the past year had probably been the clear and definite reaffirmation of the present Argentine Government's political will to continue the current development plan, while adapting it to national energy needs and the general economic situation, with a view to achieving self-sufficiency and the resulting freedom of decision. Those goals had been outlined by the Argentine President on the occasion of the thirty-sixth anniversary of the Argentine National Atomic Energy Commission, on which he had also laid the foundation-stone for a new Argentine atomic centre which would comprise a 22 MW reactor, a new radioisotope production plant and a cobalt-60 encapsulation facility.

104. In addition to increasing the production of radioisotopes by means of a new cyclotron, his country was also developing and building sophisticated equipment for nuclear medicine, an application of nuclear energy which was clearly oriented towards people's well-being and not towards increasing the power of the State.

105. The year 1986 had been a very active one for Argentina where international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was concerned. On the multilateral level, Argentina had maintained its full support for the Agency's technical co-operation programme, significantly increased the number of Argentine experts made available to the Agency and the number of fellows receiving training in Argentine facilities, and organized a number of training courses on various subjects relating to nuclear energy. In that connection, he wished to emphasize particularly his country's special support for the ARCAL programme and to urge the Agency to find means of contributing more substantially to the ten projects approved under the ARCAL programme, since financing was currently assured for only three of them. Similarly, he appealed to Member States that were habitually generous in their contributions to other Agency programmes to be so also with respect to the ARCAL programme.

106. As in previous years, he was again able to pledge a voluntary contribution to the Technical Assistance and Co-operation Fund for 1987, which would as usual be paid in Argentine currency.

107. Within the Organization of American States, his country had continued to support the Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission, whose fourteenth regular general meeting had been held in Buenos Aires in April. In addition, two training courses for participants from various Latin American countries had been held in Argentina, and there had been other multilateral activities organized by his country as well.

108. On the bilateral level, there had been co-operative efforts with many countries in almost all continents: Argentina was a party to 17 specific co-operation agreements, and a number of others were currently at an advanced stage of negotiation. The relations between his country and Algeria, Brazil,

India, Iran and Peru were particularly promising examples of genuine horizontal co-operation between developing countries for mutual benefit; in addition, fruitful co-operation had also been kept up with the Federal Republic of Germany and other European countries in specific areas.

109. Turning to the Agency's technical co-operation programme, he congratulated the Secretariat on its excellent work, but expressed his concern at the fact that the Department of Technical Co-operation appeared to have reached the saturation level with respect to its capacity for handling projects. That capacity must be increased as soon as possible, particularly in view of the demands which the ARCAL programme could be expected to bring. Moreover, the deleterious discriminatory attitude taken by several countries in making the provision of technical assistance through the Agency contingent upon adherence to a certain treaty had persisted during the past year. Imposing such conditions was expressly prohibited by the Agency's Statute. That was why he was reiterating his country's request that the Agency should refuse to sponsor any activity offered by Member States which did not respect the equal rights of all Member States and attempted to apply discriminatory policies, for whatever reason.

110. As for the other great responsibility of the Agency, the application of safeguards, he was gratified to note that Member States had again abided by their undertakings and that, consequently, the Agency was able once more to state that there had been no diversions of safeguarded material for non-peaceful purposes. However, in that connection he wished to reiterate his country's position that the new type of full-scope safeguards agreement which had recently been negotiated with a Member State should not be taken in any way to constitute a legal precedent for future safeguards negotiations, even though his country had not objected to that agreement out of respect for the sovereign right of any Member State to conclude whatever agreements it pleased.

111. With regard to the work of the Committee on Assurances of Supply (CAS), his delegation had already pointed out during the Board meetings in February<sup>[1]</sup> that if no widely acceptable compromise was found within a short

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[1] See document GOV/OR.645, para. 40.

time - not necessarily one which fully satisfied all the aspirations of all participants, but one which constituted a "lowest common denominator" for mutual understanding - then the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (UNCPICPUNE) would begin under a cloud and, instead of offering a unique opportunity for encouraging harmony and dissipating distrust, would become yet another forum for the mutual recriminations with which everyone was by now familiar. He therefore urged the States participating in CAS to make renewed efforts at being flexible and showing a spirit of compromise; if that were not possible, it would be well to stop harbouring false hopes with regard to the results of UNCPICPUNE.

112. The Agency's work in the field of radiation protection and nuclear safety was deserving of the highest praise; in particular, the Secretariat had reacted to the unfortunate accident at Chernobyl with remarkable promptitude and efficiency. He would not go into that subject on the present occasion, since it had already been discussed extensively during the recent special session, but it was clearly time for many developed Member States to start paying more attention to the Agency's work in that field and to implement the Agency's standards and recommendations in their national regulations. In that context, Argentina approved without reservation the expanded programme for nuclear safety and radiation protection and would support it in every way possible.

113. In conclusion, he congratulated the Director General and the Secretariat on their dedicated efforts to overcome the often almost insoluble difficulties which arose in their daily work. His Government promised to lend the Agency all its support in those endeavours and to participate in the Agency's activities with the same enthusiasm as in previous years.

114. Mr. STEMPEL PARIS (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America) said that the coming century would constitute a significant challenge for the destiny of the inhabitants of the globe, for it was not possible or acceptable to prevent certain peoples from gaining the benefits of the peaceful use of atomic energy at the price of creating such an obvious imbalance with its incalculable consequences.

115. When the parties negotiating the Tlatelolco Treaty had agreed on Agency safeguards on all the nuclear activities of Member States as the main basis for ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international security, they had been well aware of the risks that the improper use of such technology could bring not only for their own peoples, but for the other countries in the world. A number of nuclear accidents at the facilities of certain States with advanced technology in that field had made it clear that there was still a long way to go in man's development of that new potential in order to master it and eliminate its risks to human survival, should it ever go out of control.

116. Latin America sought to offer its peoples the benefit of that new technology. The countries most advanced in the field had changed the landscape of a zone free from nuclear activities to one where there were different levels of development in the harnessing of nuclear energy and that fact clearly determined the need for the IAEA and OPANAL (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America) to consider various procedures for inclusion in safeguards agreements.

117. The establishment of denuclearized zones as a collateral disarmament measure was a new step towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and although their objective was the same as far as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was concerned, the approach was different with respect to the safeguards system and to its scope in terms of experimentation with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

118. Within Latin America there was already one country that had mastered the technique of enriching uranium by gas diffusion which, as all knew, was a jealously guarded secret. The future plans of that country - Argentina - included acquisition of the engineering skill necessary for building nuclear power stations as an integral part in acquiring the technology of the entire fuel cycle. As a consequence of that, a new concept had been introduced into the formulation of the safeguards agreement which would need to be negotiated and the result of which other Latin American States with a nuclear potential were awaiting before fully acceding to the Tlatelolco Treaty.

119. The Argentine representative to the ninth regular session of the General Conference of OPANAL had stated the year before that, in 1979, his country had entered into negotiations with the IAEA for the purpose of finalizing the text of the safeguards agreement due to be signed when the Tlatelolco Treaty had been ratified, but had stressed the fact that the IAEA had not devised a safeguards system appropriate to and in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Tlatelolco Treaty, and that it had incorrectly placed the agreements devolving from the Latin American instrument on the same footing as the "discriminatory obligations" of NPT; in so doing he had stressed his country's desire to reach an agreement that did not restrict peaceful nuclear developments but did not at the same time leave open the possibility that States from outside the continent might set up nuclear weapons on its territory; as a result agreement had not yet been possible.

120. The safeguards agreement, which had been under negotiation between the Argentine Republic and the Agency since 1979, was still being examined in detail by the Director General in a search for various ways in which the process might be completed. Despite the difficulties, OPANAL was confident that the political will to draft an agreement of that kind still prevailed. He believed that among the objections and reservations expressed by the Argentine Government with regard to ratification of the Tlatelolco Treaty that point was the one that should be first resolved.

121. OPANAL had no doubt at all as to the Argentine intention to use the new nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, in keeping with the Agency international safeguards system, the objectives of which were the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

122. Agency safeguards had passed through various phases, which was an indication of their adaptability to the new situations emerging; as far as the Tlatelolco Treaty was concerned, an important phase had been the fact of the first agreement with a State that did not have nuclear activities and was

not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty - Panama - which suggested that new political and technological factors might have to be considered when concluding different types of agreements.

123. The Tlatelolco Treaty provided for other fields of activity than keeping the zone free from nuclear weapons, but for that purpose the zone would have to be completely integrated with the States most advanced in nuclear technology. His organization had always been ready for a dialogue to overcome difficulties; the resolutions of the OPANAL General Conference had so far been adopted unanimously by consensus despite the regulations existing in that connection, which made it possible to adopt them by a two-thirds majority of the States present and voting.

124. The accidents that had occurred at nuclear facilities, especially the case of Chernobyl, had made it clear that national nuclear development programmes were closely bound up with international security. The concept of inviolable sovereignty had in that sense ceased to exist. Latin America was not in a position to wait for the announcement that a test explosion had been carried out or that an accident had occurred at some nuclear facility within the zone delineated by the Tlatelolco Treaty; hence it was encouraging that the steps necessary not only to prevent accidents at future facilities, but also in existing ones, were being taken. Argentine and Brazil had signed a co-operation agreement along those lines.

125. It would soon be twenty years since the Tlatelolco Treaty had been opened for signature. It was fervently hoped that all nuclear States would have by then ratified Protocol I, which guaranteed that in territories which were de jure or de facto under their jurisdiction the status of denuclearization would be applied; that States which had still not done so should sign and/or ratify and/or waive Article 28, so that the instrument could fully enter into force and be evidence to the world that the political will of Latin America and the Caribbean was devoted to peace.

The meeting rose at 1.5 p.m.

