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President: Mr. BAFFOUR (Ghana)

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* GC(VI)/207.

The composition of delegations attending the session is given in document
GC(VI)/INF/56/Rev.2.

GENERAL DEBATE AND REPORT OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS FOR 1961-62 (GC(VI)/195,
204) (continued)

1. Mr. EMELYANOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) pointed out that, as the opening of the sixth session of the General Conference marked the Agency's fifth anniversary, the Conference should reassess what had so far been done, and utilize its past experience in planning for the future.
2. It was doubtless true that a certain amount of useful work had been done for Member States during those years: training, the holding of numerous conferences, the preparation and issue of instructions regarding the safe handling of radioactive materials and so forth.
3. However, things were moving extremely slowly in the Agency and it was not keeping pace with the problems facing it. Why?
4. In his view the stumbling block was that the leading countries of the West were not making an honest effort to carry out the aims, as set out in the Statute, for which the Agency had been set up.
5. It might seem obvious to everyone that its main task was to co-operate in promoting the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Yet the United States and the Western countries which supported it had been endeavouring all through the past five years to instil into everyone's mind the idea that the control functions were the main thing, although the Statute clearly intended that they should be secondary - as the Japanese proverb put it: "a ram's head hung out at the door but the trade was in dog-meat".
6. During the past years two attitudes towards the Agency's development had taken shape: the first, that it should in a real sense be made the scientific and technical headquarters for co-operative endeavour in the peaceful uses of atomic energy; the second, that it should be transformed into a worldwide controlling instrument.
7. As was well known, the idea of turning the Agency into a controlling body was being pushed in every possible way. A system of control had been adopted without there being any practical need for it and despite the opposition of a considerable number of Member States; but notwithstanding the assertions of those who held it to be urgently necessary to the Agency, it had found no application in two years. Over the past three years there had been only six cases in which the Agency had acted as an intermediary in the acquisition of fissionable materials and equipment; and in three of those the Board had already released the countries concerned from the application of safeguards.

8. The safeguards document itself stipulated that it should come up for a general review at the present session.^{1/} It was not on the agenda, however, because no safeguards had been applied and there was consequently nothing to review.
9. The Soviet delegation had pointed out that a system of safeguards was premature, a monstrous bureaucratic arrangement that would impede scientific activity.
10. In Norway, for instance, the NORA experimental reactor had been started up with some assistance from the Agency. Scientists were carrying out experiments on it, in the course of which various operations had to be performed, such as the removal of fuel elements which were then arranged in a particular way for the purposes of physics measurements. According to the document accepted and approved by the Agency, that could not be done until approval had been given by the Board. Instead of carrying out scientific experiments, therefore, the Norwegian scientists had been obliged to wait until the Board met and decided whether they should be given permission to do so or not.
11. The fact that about one-third of Member States had opposed safeguards in the debate, and that experience of attempting to apply them to Agency projects over a period of two years had shown them to be premature and impracticable, had not taught the United States anything.
12. In August 1962 the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of the United States Congress had debated the report of the Advisory Committee on United States Policy toward the Agency. During the discussion, the representative of the United States Atomic Energy Commission had said that the Commission considered the Agency's safeguards functions to be its most important activity. The representative of the State Department had declared that his Department regarded safeguards as the most important, indeed the sole, aspect of the Agency's future programme. It was not surprising that in February of the current year the Board, under pressure from the United States, had taken the senseless decision of putting four American research reactors under Agency control. The cost would be borne by the States represented at the present Conference, as the relevant expenses were met from the Agency's regular budget.

^{1/} INFCIRC/26, I.5.

13. Discussions regarding the United Arab Republic's request for help in organizing a regional centre for the training of specialists and radioisotope applications had gone on for two years. Although perfectly straightforward, a decision had been taken on that request only at the last meetings of the Board.

14. Co-operation was suffering no little as a result of the cold-war atmosphere that was being extended to the Agency. In April 1962 the well-known American atomic scientist Leo Szilard had published an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists under the title "Are we on the road to war?". In the article he attacked the cold-war policies of the United States. Significantly, Professor Szilard, by way of example, had selected the activities of the Agency. He had written: "Take the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, for instance. This organization has at present no function whatsoever, and if it is maintained in existence at all, it should be maintained as an exercise in co-operation among nations."^{2/}, and had gone on to say that since America had votes at its disposal it could gain victory in the meaningless battle of the cold war.

15. From the Agency's very beginnings the Soviet Union had urged that it should have a scientific advisory committee. For long the Western countries had objected energetically, particularly the United Kingdom and the United States. Why should they be against bringing in scientists and engineers? The answer of course was that serious scientific and technical work in the Agency was not in their intentions.

16. After a long struggle, a Scientific Advisory Committee (SAC) had nevertheless been formed, but it was little used. The knowledge of the experts who were its members was used only now and then, and only in connection with isolated problems. He would quote a characteristic example. It had been necessary to determine which Latin American country - Argentina or Brazil - was most advanced in regard to atomic energy. The Committee had not asked for a solution, although that was precisely the sort of decision it should take.

17. Long-term planning was an item on the agenda of the present session of the General Conference.^{3/} The Soviet delegation welcomed such discussion,

^{2/} Volume XVIII, Number 4, p.26.

^{3/} GC(VI)/207, item 17.

having long considered a long-term plan to be necessary. He would give his views in full when the item was discussed, but meantime wished to comment on one aspect.

18. New, independent States had been set up during recent years in several parts of the world. The idea of planning the economy, first put forward and first carried out in the Soviet Union, was gradually gaining ground in other countries too. Some had five-year plans, others three-year, seven-year, ten-year plans, and so on. Those plans made provision for the utilization of atomic energy, and the Agency must take account of them in the many countries where they had been worked out; in preparing its programme of assistance, the Agency should consult representatives of those countries about the help they wished to receive from the Agency in carrying out their national plans.

19. Theoretically, the Agency could familiarize itself with national plans through the missions it sent to many countries. Unfortunately mission recommendations not only were out of touch with national plans but frequently even conflicted with them. Thus, the mission sent to Mexico had recommended that uranium mines should not be opened and that the construction of a metallic uranium and graphite plant should be stopped.

20. Such missions not only did nothing in association with people in the countries they visited: they did nothing for them. It was hard to justify the heavy expenditure on missions. Most of the material in mission reports could probably be obtained directly from the governments of the countries concerned, without sending an Agency mission for the purpose.

21. Missions must be more carefully prepared and visits to an excessively large number of countries would probably have to be excluded in favour of limiting activities to a more thorough study of those countries most in need of technical assistance. Great care should also be taken in the composition of missions, which should be made up of experts knowing the areas to be visited. The present composition of missions could hardly be considered satisfactory from that point of view. The mission's reports should give greater attention to explaining national plans for the development of atomic energy.

22. The Agency had been set up for purposes of co-operation. Practical achievements in atomic energy called for co-operative efforts.

23. He wished to give details of international co-operation brought about by the Soviet Union. It took various forms.

24. Under agreements with economically under-developed countries the Soviet Union was furnishing economic and technical assistance in connection with the construction of some 480 different undertakings, installations and other projects in 23 countries. Geological, geophysical and prospecting work for various useful minerals was being undertaken in order to develop the raw-material base in 12 under-developed countries.

25. Under bilateral agreements, the Soviet Union was co-operating at present with 14 countries under 30 international agreements and contracts.

26. It was endeavouring to help those countries to establish their own atomic centres, equipped with up-to-date instruments and apparatus, so that they would be able to do research and train their own expert personnel.

27. With the assistance of the Soviet Union 25 atomic installations, including 10 reactors, 7 particle accelerators and 8 physics and radiochemistry laboratories, had been constructed and put into operation in various parts of the world, and a large quantity of special fissionable materials had also been delivered.

28. Those activities had led to the establishment of atomic physics centres which were now successfully operating in Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the United Arab Republic, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic and the Chinese People's Republic. The Soviet Union had seconded some 600 highly qualified experts and scientific workers to those countries, in order to give assistance in the construction, erection and start-up of the atomic installations.

29. From 1955 to August 1962, it had trained for service in those centres over 1500 experts, drawn from countries having agreements with the Soviet Union on various aspects of atomic science and technology. Training of personnel was increasing year by year. Whereas in the whole of 1961 223 persons had been trained, in 1962 194 had received training during the first eight months alone. Some 140 short-term trainees were at present undergoing

instruction or would be accepted for that purpose by the end of 1962. Sixty students were undergoing long-term training in university physics, radio-chemistry and other departments giving courses in the uses of atomic energy, and another 25 would start work in September 1962.

30. It was maintained in some quarters that training of local staff in the developing countries was a sheer waste of time and money. The Soviet Union accorded prime importance to such training, however, and it was important to listen to what the representatives of the developing countries themselves said regarding its value. In that connection he referred to a statement by the prominent Indian scientist P.C. Mahalanobis, who had said that the training of scientific cadres in the developing countries was essential and that the aim of scientific assistance should be the provision, as soon as possible, of an adequate number of experts in every under-developed country.

31. Soviet co-operative activities were still expanding and developing. The design and construction of equipment for atomic centres in Iraq, Indonesia and Ghana was approaching completion. At the new atomic centre in the United Arab Republic there were now Soviet scientists who had come to make a long-term study of problems of contemporary physics under a general programme drawn up jointly by Arab and Soviet scientists.

32. The Soviet Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy had a co-operation agreement with the French Atomic Energy Commission under which three young French scientists were working in physics institutes in the Soviet Union and two Soviet scientists were working in France, where a third Soviet physicist would shortly arrive. A young French scientist, Mr. Coutant, was working with Soviet experts on one of the most important of contemporary problems - controlled nuclear fusion. That represented an entirely new stage of co-operation.

33. Soviet co-operation with other countries on the basis of bilateral agreements benefited all the participating countries. Moreover, such co-operation was increasing in scope and volume although the Agency, specially set up to take over all such questions, had now been in existence for five years. It was sad but true that life was passing the Agency by.

34. The Agency's scant success could not be explained by a shortage of funds or by the fact of its having the two budgets which the United Kingdom delegation proposed should be combined.

35. It was not a matter of funds at all. The fault lay in the fact that the Agency was departing from its statutory aims and devoting its main attention to questions which were of interest only to a small group of Western countries.

36. The Soviet Union was in favour of a long-term plan and believed it could be carried out at relatively little cost. The budget should be stabilized, and there was no need to go on increasing it.

37. The Agency's technical assistance programme was most unsatisfactory, and took no account of the needs and requirements of the developing countries; nor was the necessary effort made to dovetail it with the objectives aimed at in such countries' own national programmes. It was for that reason that the Agency was still unable to use the funds allocated for technical assistance in 1959. That situation could not be allowed to continue any longer.

38. The Soviet delegation considered that the Agency's main efforts should be directed not so much to meeting sporadic requests for individual items of equipment or for experts as to establishing in the developing countries installations designed for a specific purpose which would provide those countries with a basis for the further development of their work on atomic energy.

39. As the first practical step in that direction the Soviet delegation, jointly with the delegations of the Byelorussian SSR, Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the Ukrainian SSR, proposed the following programme for the provision of technical assistance:

- (a) The establishment in the developing countries of six medical centres which would use radioactive isotopes and irradiation for diagnosing and treating malignant tumours and diseases of the thyroid gland, the blood, the skin and other organs;
- (b) The equipment of six physics laboratories at higher educational institutions and scientific centres in the developing countries with the requisite instruments and apparatus, and also with sub-critical assemblies, for scientific research and the training of scientists in those countries in nuclear physics and technology; and
- (c) The provision to the developing countries, without charge, of 300 fellowships for the instruction and training of specialists in higher educational institutions and nuclear research centres.

40. The delegations of the socialist countries had submitted a draft resolution in which they proposed that the General Conference should approve such a programme and declared their readiness to assume responsibility for implementing, within two to three years, one third of the projects referred to in the programme in question.^{4/} The cost of the plant, equipment and fellowships to be supplied by the socialist countries was equivalent to 700 000 roubles.

41. The Soviet Government for its part was prepared to supply plant and equipment for two sub-critical assemblies, together with 7 tons of natural uranium for the assemblies against its contribution of 50 kg of uranium-235 to the Agency. In terms of money that would be equivalent to 350 000 roubles.

42. The present session of the General Conference was opening in a complex international situation characterized by the intensified struggle between the forces of peace and the aggressive circles who were pushing the world towards annihilating thermonuclear war. True to the Leninist principles of peaceful foreign policy, the Soviet Government was struggling untiringly for peaceful co-existence and international collaboration, and for the establishment of conditions in which war would be banned for ever from the affairs of mankind.

43. In its view, the most effective means of ensuring lasting peace would be general and complete disarmament under strict international control. At the 14th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the programme of general and complete disarmament^{5/} had not only met with a warm response among ordinary people throughout the world but had also won the support of a large number of Governments and eminent statesmen in all continents.

44. In the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament the Soviet Government was endeavouring to bring general and complete disarmament out of the realm of programmes and plans and make it a practical reality. It was only the negative attitude of the Western Powers that prevented the actual achievement of general and complete disarmament.

45. Some months previously, at the very start of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the Soviet Union had submitted a draft agreement on general and complete disarmament providing for a carefully thought-out system of measures which would enable general and complete disarmament to be rapidly achieved by successive stages and would ensure strict international control at every stage of the process.

^{4/} CC(VI)/COM.1/67/Rev.1.

^{5/} General Assembly Resolution 1378(XIV).

46. However, the representatives of the Western Powers, headed by the United States, had taken a different position in the Committee's discussions. The United States had submitted for the Committee's consideration a plan which would not lead to general and complete disarmament or remove the threat of nuclear war; a plan which, in that important matter, would thus fail to meet the wishes of millions of people.

47. The solution of the disarmament problem required the speedy conclusion of an agreement for the immediate cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. The Soviet Union proposed to the Western Powers the immediate conclusion of a treaty for the cessation of all nuclear tests in the atmosphere and outer space as well as below ground and under water. The means which States already had available for detecting nuclear explosions were perfectly adequate for the purpose of checking whether the provisions of such a treaty were being carried out by all States.

48. Unfortunately, the Western Powers were not in fact at present prepared to conclude an agreement to cease all testing of nuclear weapons on mutually acceptable terms.

49. Disarmament questions had a direct bearing on the success of the Agency's work. Not one single international organization within the United Nations family had had such experience of the pernicious effects of the armaments race as had the Agency, a situation recognized in its reply to the United Nations when that organization was engaged in a study of the economic and social consequences of disarmament.^{6/}

50. The Agency's reply also made mention of the fact that the freeing of resources at present expended on military purposes would give a powerful impetus to the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and would hasten the day when atomic energy would become economically profitable in large areas of the world. That reply, however, was only the beginning of the Agency's contribution to such work. The Soviet delegation considered that the Agency should devote greater study to the question and show from specific examples how complete and general disarmament would promote the development of nuclear power; that would assist in mobilizing public opinion to help in solving disarmament problems.

^{6/} See document E/3593/Add.1, page 332.

51. In conclusion, he recalled the words of the American professor, A. Valentine, who had stated that when a scientific discovery was made, the devil got hold of it right away, while the angels were still discussing the best way to use it. He called upon delegates to help wrest the use of atomic energy - a great discovery of the human mind - from the devil's hands so that it could be turned to the benefit of humanity.

52. Miss MEAGHER (Canada) said that although the Agency had not developed altogether along the lines originally foreseen, the Canadian Government did not underestimate the results so far achieved nor take a pessimistic view of the possibilities for useful work in the future. It was, however, desirable to plan with the utmost care to ensure that the Agency's programme was well-balanced and realistic, and to make the best use of available resources.

53. With regard to the Agency's programme of conferences, seminars and symposia, the Canadian Government had been pleased to play host to one meeting in 1962, the Symposium on Inelastic Scattering of Neutrons in Solids and Liquids, held under the joint auspices of the Agency and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). There was little doubt that such meetings gave scientists of all countries a valuable opportunity to exchange views and information. If, however, the most useful results were to be achieved and if scientists of the highest calibre were to continue to attend such meetings, it was essential that their numbers should be kept within reasonable limits and that subjects of study should be selected with great care. It was gratifying to note that the number of Agency conferences, seminars and symposia held each year had been stabilized at about twelve, which seemed a sensible figure.

54. One of the principal responsibilities of the Agency was to establish and administer safeguards. It was pleasing to note that during 1962 the Agency had carried out its first three safeguards inspections. The Canadian delegation, however, agreed with the Board that the experience so far gained by the Agency was insufficient to enable it to make a comprehensive review at the present time. The principles and procedures of safeguards should be kept under examination and when adequate experience had been gained it would be possible to undertake the review called for in the resolution adopted at

the fourth regular session.^{7/} With reference to the joint declaration made at that time by the Canadian and Japanese delegations, requesting the Agency to administer the safeguards provided for in the Agreement for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy between the two countries, the Canadian delegation was pleased to inform the Conference that negotiations to that end had recently made rapid progress and an agreement was expected soon.

55. With regard to the question of long-term planning, it was worth noting that many of the Agency's activities had already demonstrated their usefulness. The guiding principle in future planning should be to ascertain whether a demonstrated need and demand for the Agency's services existed; hence the value of the proposed study of the long-term plan of work at all levels. The Canadian Government generally supported the joint report on long-term planning.^{8/} Two Canadian experts had participated in the work of the consultative group convened to define the part which the Agency might play in furthering the practical applications of nuclear power. Canada was ready, so far as possible, to provide experts and information for the Agency's studies on nuclear power, including work on international co-operation for developing nuclear power. The Agency's nuclear power studies should be closely related to actual and demonstrated needs, and that was true of the long-term plan as a whole.

56. The Canadian Government considered that the operational programme of the Agency should be financed from voluntary contributions. While recognizing the immense difficulty of administering the programme when the total of funds available fell far below the approved budget, it could not agree to the solution proposed by the United Kingdom.^{9/} It urged all Member States in a position to do so to make regular and reasonable contributions to the operational budget. Canada would again base its contribution to the operational programme on the scale of assessments for the regular budget.

57. Mr. BILLIG (Poland), commenting on the Agency's work, noted the part the Agency was playing in the training of personnel. In Poland, where large-scale work in nuclear energy had started comparatively recently, rapid progress

^{7/} GC(IV)/RES/71.

^{8/} GC(VI)/203.

^{9/} GC(VI)/205.

was being made in the intended direction, and that progress was based in the first place on the assistance and co-operation of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. However, Agency fellowships were of great importance to Poland and it was therefore not surprising that Poland was one of the countries which made maximum use of them. The Agency had shown understanding for that state of affairs and had acted so as to meet Polish requirements.

58. During recent years the nuclear research centres of Poland had been considerably consolidated and expanded, and were now beginning to interest scientists from abroad. However, as before, the Agency was not making full use of the fellowships offered by Poland. Poland was taking an active part in the scientific conferences and symposia organized by the Agency. Nevertheless, he felt it would be better for the Agency not to confine itself to its own conferences and symposia but to participate to a greater extent in similar functions organized by Member States on an international basis. As an example, reference might be made to the conference on nuclear geophysics held at Kraków in September 1962, in which prominent scientists and experts from the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries were participating.

59. It was difficult to reconcile oneself to the fact that scientists and technicians from the German Democratic Republic, with whom Poland worked in the closest co-operation in matters of nuclear technology, were unable to participate in the Agency's scientific conferences at which the results of joint research by scientists from Poland and the German Democratic Republic was discussed. His delegation would continue to call for a change in that state of affairs.

60. Credit was due to the Agency for its continued work in drafting international rules and regulations governing the transport of radioactive materials, waste disposal, liability for nuclear damage, and so on. The Agency had also to be congratulated on successes in its publishing activities.

61. As to safeguards, experience had demonstrated the artificiality and untimeliness of the safeguards system. At its last series of meetings the Board had itself withdrawn the safeguards previously applied to installations in Japan, Finland and Norway.

62. He considered that the failure to grant consultative status to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) constituted a flagrant act of political discrimination.

63. At the preceding session of the General Conference there had been a disagreement of principle on the choice of Director General. The Polish delegation had repeatedly stressed that the problem was not one of personalities but of principle - the principle being that the election of the Director General should be as nearly unanimous as possible and that the developing countries should be properly represented in the Agency's directing bodies. He hoped that the principles in defence of which his delegation had fought would be applied in the Agency's future practical work. During recent months a certain easing of tension on matters in dispute had been observable in the Agency's internal affairs, a circumstance which to some extent had been reflected in the work of the Board and had laid the basis for better co-operation and consequently more effective work by the organization.

64. Nevertheless, certain countries had not given up the habit of submitting proposals which were known in advance to be unacceptable to a large number of States. A specific example was the proposal to amend Article XIV of the Statute. The Polish Government strongly opposed any attempt to amend that article because it would stand in contradiction with the voluntary principle underlying the United Nations technical assistance system and would constitute a violation of national sovereignty. Adoption of the amendment in question could lead only to a weakening of effort in the provision of technical assistance to the developing countries within the framework of the international organizations. The aim should, of course, be to increase that assistance.

65. He also hoped that acceptance of the amendment to Article VI.A.3 of the Statute would represent the first of several changes whose purpose was to provide for just representation of the developing countries on the Board.

66. Thus far, the results of the Agency's technical assistance activities had to be regarded as highly dubious, since that assistance had not been adapted to the basic trends of development in the countries in question.

67. Turning to long-term planning, he observed that many countries began their work on nuclear energy on a large scale by establishing centres equipped with reactors and accelerators. The result frequently was, however, that having set up major establishments they found themselves unable to use them properly or to carry out research with them. That was the type of problem to which attention should be paid during the years immediately ahead, and the countries in question should be helped in determining appropriate lines of research, in training personnel and in obtaining equipment. Such matters had received insufficient attention in the past. The use of isotopes, particularly in medicine and agriculture, could of course be of great practical significance for the developing countries, and the long-term plan should provide for a gradual and systematic intensification of work with isotopes. The fact remained, however, that the most important use of nuclear energy in both the developed and the developing countries was the production of nuclear power (including, in certain countries, power for marine propulsion) and it was likely that that problem would soon acquire great international significance. The Polish delegation considered that the Agency could and should play an important part in dealing with it. The experience accumulated by a number of countries was probably sufficient to justify convening, by 1964, a conference devoted to the specific purpose of considering the technical and economic prospects of nuclear power. Perhaps the Third Geneva Conference, in the preparation and organization of which the Agency had its part to play, should be devoted to that subject.

68. The Polish delegation had repeatedly emphasized and was now again pointing out that a correct delineation of the Agency's tasks and programmes of work was one of the vital factors in obtaining the resources needed to implement them.

69. Together with a number of friendly countries, Poland had come to the conclusion that, irrespective of the long-term plan, work which could be brought to completion within the next two or three years should be begun forthwith, without recourse to the Agency's normal budgetary resources.

70. The Soviet delegate had already discussed that subject. With the full authority of his own Government, he could state that Poland would take part in the work within the limits of its modest resources. As part of the amount

allocated for assistance purposes, Poland was prepared within the next two or three years to supply the countries concerned with apparatus and equipment for nuclear centres (e.g. neutron spectrometers and radiochemical apparatus) and also to provide a considerable number of fellowships.

71. Speaking of other forms of activity, he stressed the role which the Agency could and should play as an organizing and catalyzing force in scientific and technical work that was of great significance for all.

72. Definite progress had already been made in that regard, e.g. the work on nuclear data, the establishment of an expert committee on that subject, and the related NORA experiment. Such work should be expanded under Agency auspices; Poland could also take part thanks to two new zero-power reactors which would be put into construction in the near future.

73. His own and other delegations had repeatedly drawn the attention of the General Conference to the need for complete and universal disarmament as a fundamental condition for the Agency's development and the attainment of its aims.

74. Science could exploit atomic energy in either of two directions: for peaceful purposes, or for military purposes - with the prospect of destroying civilization and inflicting inestimable loss on mankind. To utilize to the full all the possibilities that atomic energy made available for the peaceful development of mankind, more positive international measures were required. Complete and universal disarmament, nuclear disarmament included, was undoubtedly one such measure. New resources - financial included - would be released for scientific research, greater international co-operation and, in particular, for the purpose of assisting the developing countries.

75. Under present conditions, nuclear disarmament depended on finding a solution to the problem of banning nuclear weapons tests; agreement there would not only improve international relations in regard to a matter of direct interest to all nations but constitute a great step towards general disarmament.

76. The neutral States in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament had put forward a compromise memorandum. The socialist countries had accepted it, and hoped the Western States, on their side, would make an effort to accept the proposals in the memorandum for ending nuclear weapons tests. The problem was vital: the Agency could and should do much to exploit the opportunities which were opening up.

77. The Agency could not stand aside, an idle witness of all that was taking place in regard to nuclear disarmament in another international body. The same applied obviously to its Member States.

78. The report to the Secretary General on the economic and social consequences of disarmament, which leading world scientists had helped to draw up, stated that complete universal disarmament would be of inestimable benefit to the whole of mankind. That statement was of course supported not only by their authority but by the resolution which ECOSOC had adopted on the subject.^{10/} The United Nations was thus opening up new prospects for co-operation within the framework provided by the Agency.

79. The ECOSOC resolution requested the Secretary General to continue to study, in close co-operation with regional economic commissions and other appropriate agencies concerned, the fundamental aspects of the economic and social consequences of disarmament.

80. That ECOSOC decision laid an obligation on the Agency as well to concern itself with the problem.

81. With other delegations, the Polish delegation would, as at the thirty-fourth session of ECOSOC^{11/}, in due course submit a draft resolution, and hoped it would be unanimously adopted.

82. The Agency's study of the vitally important problems in question would also make it possible to improve certain aspects of its long-term planning and any progress towards disarmament would enable it more effectively and more fully to reach its noble objectives.

83. Mr. BERGMANN (Israel) said Israel felt indebted to the Agency for the moral and material assistance provided during the past year.

84. The course in radiology at the Radioisotope Training Centre in Israel had been as successful as any first venture of its kind could be. For four months of intensive theoretical and practical work, it had brought together scientists from seventeen countries. The course might possibly have been too long or too comprehensive, but one could learn only from experience. It was hoped that, with the continued assistance and encouragement of the Agency, the course would be repeated after a reasonable lapse of time and become a regular feature.

^{10/} E/3671, Resolution 891(XXXIV).

^{11/} Draft resolution E/L.963 (see document E/SR.1220).

85. The Israeli Government believed it could best contribute by sharing its experience with countries that had similar problems, and was happy to report that, under the auspices of the Agency, scientists from many countries were visiting Israel and becoming acquainted with its plans and methods.

86. He had three projects to propose to the Agency which his Government was willing to carry out and finance. First, it would provide a number of grants for scientists interested in problems under investigation in Israel. Secondly, in order to provide training for the lower echelons of atomic energy establishments, a course would be arranged for technicians from countries interested in the sound planning of nuclear programmes. Thirdly, it would arrange a similar course for high-school teachers of physics, chemistry and biology. Agency assistance in the organization of those three projects would be much appreciated.

87. The co-operative efforts of Member States represented the first step by which common aims could be attained under Agency auspices. Unless that first step were taken the establishment of regional centres would be apt to stimulate the host country but stifle development in other countries in the region. The proposal to set up an international centre for theoretical physics would undoubtedly meet with enthusiastic approval from all Member States, but at the present stage it should serve as an inspiration rather than as a project ripe for conversion into bricks and mortar.

88. With respect to the exchange of scientific abstracts, Israel was already exchanging its publications with a number of countries, but appreciated the Agency's advice on how to utilize more fully the scientific information available in Member States.

89. Many problems affected Member States irrespective of their geographical location, e.g. the economics of nuclear power, to which the Agency devoted a commendable effort. Three other subjects deserved no less attention. The first was fall-out. It was a matter of satisfaction that the Agency was co-operating in that respect with the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and with the World Meteorological Organization. Only a co-ordinated survey of the whole surface of the globe could achieve the desired results and only the Agency could provide an authoritative lead. Secondly, chemical protection against radiation was

a problem which might become more urgent with the increasing use of radio-isotopes and the advent of nuclear power stations. Much work was being done, but could be made more effective if co-ordinated by the Agency. Thirdly, there was the question of insect control by ionizing radiation. Existing methods of chemical control were becoming less and less efficient and attention should be directed to insect sterilization by ionizing radiation. That was a worthwhile task for the scientific staff of the Agency and it was gratifying to know that a panel would meet shortly to discuss it.

90. Such panels should be constituted not on the basis of geographical distribution but on the basis of knowledge and experience.

91. Many new countries believed that their own work on atomic energy could begin only when they had a power reactor. The Agency must demonstrate that there were many tasks which could be performed much earlier with by-products from the reactors in advanced countries.

92. His delegation believed that long-term planning had become a factor of great importance so far as the problems facing the Agency were concerned, and was glad that attention had been drawn to the question of more realistic budgeting. It was the responsibility of Member States to ensure that the Agency became an organization excelling in scientific and technical matters rather than a political institution.

93. Mr. NBSHO (Albania) said that the peaceful use of atomic energy could make a great contribution to the further development of all sectors of the economy. It was for that reason that the establishment of the Agency had aroused the earnest hope that the use of atomic energy would effectively promote the progress and well-being of all mankind.

94. Since the Agency's inception its membership had increased from 66 to 77. It had published the results of a great deal of scientific research on questions of atomic science and technology, as well as holding a large number of important scientific meetings and doing useful work in the training of personnel, in particular for the developing countries.

95. It must be recognized, however, that the Agency had not fulfilled the hopes that had been placed in it. Instead of promoting the peaceful use of atomic energy the Agency was daily becoming more and more in the nature of a

blind tool to serve the interests of the Western Powers, headed by the United States; it was being transformed into a political instrument whose purpose was to prepare and unleash a nuclear war. Over the past five years Member States had had occasion to witness the stubborn attempts of the Western Powers, with the United States at their head, to occupy the key positions in the Agency. Representatives of the Western Powers and their allies at present held 61% of all positions in the Agency, including 70% of all leading positions. Representatives of the United States alone occupied as many posts as the representatives of all socialist countries taken together. All delegations recalled the bitter struggle at the previous session when the Western Powers, at the behest of the United States, had used every means available, including open blackmail and intimidation, to elect their candidate as Director General.

96. Overt political discrimination was occurring. There was no other way of explaining the fact that the Agency's Members included countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany and South Korea, while countries such as the German Democratic Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were not Members. It was also difficult to explain the fact that social organizations such as the International Federation of Christian Trade Unions and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions enjoyed consultative status with the Agency, but such status was withheld from WFTU, which embraced millions and millions of workers who were directly interested in the peaceful use of atomic energy. Finally, the place lawfully belonging to the Chinese People's Republic was still occupied by a long-since bankrupt clique which represented only the interests of its American masters. It was unthinkable to leave outside the Agency the lawful representatives of an immense nation such as the great Chinese nation which included a quarter of the world's population.

97. Under pressure from the United States and other Western Powers, its allies in the North Atlantic military bloc, the Agency had never moved to meet popular demand and had never supported the peace-seeking proposals which the Soviet Union and other countries had repeatedly put forward with a view to prohibiting nuclear weapons tests. In addition, under pressure from the United States and at its bidding, the Agency had become increasingly involved in activities which had no bearing whatever on the peaceful use of atomic energy but, on the contrary, served to enable the United States and its allies to

establish a system of strict control over the raw material sources of other countries and to exploit those sources in the interests of the Pentagon's intelligence services.

98. Most countries of Africa and Asia and of the Middle and Far East were increasingly disturbed by the arbitrary way in which the United States and its allies behaved in the Agency. That had been particularly evident the previous year, when the United States had refused to give the post of Director General of the Agency to an Indonesian candidate. Further proof was provided by the failure to use the 5000 kg of uranium which the Agency had long had available for meeting the needs of the developing countries, and by the recommendations which the Western Powers had presented at the fourth session of the General Conference for establishing safety and safeguards procedures to operate at the various stages of technical assistance projects undertaken by the Agency.

99. The Agency had important work to do in training personnel in the use of radioisotopes in agriculture and so forth. It could only succeed in that work if it returned to the role laid down for it in its Statute and remained true to the principles proclaimed in the United Nations Charter, and if the United States and its allies abandoned their dictatorial policy and arbitrary course of action.

100. The Albanian delegation was prepared to make its utmost contribution towards achieving those ends. It would support any proposal designed to make atomic energy serve the social advancement of all mankind.

101. Mr. SHIN (Republic of Korea) paid tribute to the work of the Director General and to the Board, which had developed a vast programme that took special account of the interests of the developing countries. The Agency had some remarkable achievements to its credit.

102. Apart from work connected with a Triga Mark II reactor, which had gone into operation on 30 March 1962, his country's activities were being concentrated for the moment on radioisotope applications in agriculture and medicine. The Atomic Energy Research Institute had set up a Division of Nuclear Medicine which would apply radioisotopes in the treatment of cancer, thyroid disturbances, and so on. The medical schools had established radioisotope clinics which were being subsidized by the Office of Atomic Energy.

103. A Division of Agricultural Research was to be set up by the Institute in 1963. As the economy was mostly agricultural, it had been decided that the application of radioisotopes in agriculture should be one of the most important objectives of the atomic energy programme - a decision in full conformity with the five-year plan for economic development.

104. However, the effective use of radioisotopes in agriculture called for a high standard of technical skill, and the country was therefore very dependent upon technical advice and assistance. The services of the expert on nuclear instrumentation who had been sent to Korea had been highly appreciated. The success of such assistance depended entirely upon its being provided where and when needed, particularly in countries which were just building up their research establishments. Hitherto, expert services and equipment had usually been provided together - an arrangement which often did not suit the recipient countries and should therefore be reconsidered. He also suggested that more funds be appropriated for training programmes in the coming years because of the urgent need for scientists and technicians in developing countries.

105. His delegation had consistently advocated the establishment of regional training centres and asked that research contracts be awarded to developing countries. While approving the establishment of training centres in Latin America and in the Arab countries, he wished again to emphasize the needs of the Far East. The radioisotope training centre planned by the Japanese Government, for which Agency help had been asked, was a significant step towards the peaceful applications of atomic energy in that area.

106. The establishment of reactor centres was equally urgent and his Government was pleased to be participating in the forthcoming conference at Bangkok. If the regional centres were to be successful, all Member States in the area must take part in operating them.

107. Research contracts were a useful spur to research workers in developing areas and deserved to be given priority. His country had applied for one under the Agency's exchange programme for 1962, but no decision had been reached despite the urgent need for a favourable reply.

108. In deciding where symposia and seminars should be held, the problem of expenditure for participants must be taken into consideration.

109. He hoped that the Agency would help developing countries, which badly needed up-to-date scientific and technical data, by encouraging the supply and exchange of information.

110. Mr. COUTURE (France) said that, after some years of excessive optimism about the rapid advent of nuclear power, countries with large-scale nuclear programmes had gone through a discouraging period during which they had seen the goal they thought to be on the point of attainment recede. It was all the easier to be frank about those difficulties because the experience gained of operating nuclear power stations and the more precise economic estimates which could now be obtained on the basis of what had already been achieved gave promise of a considerable expansion of atomic energy; and that was, after all, the prime objective of all the programmes. In the light of those events it was not surprising that the Agency had been unable to expand, in its early years, as its founders had anticipated. He therefore noted with satisfaction that the Agency's technical assistance programme was becoming increasingly effective.

111. His Government was grateful to Dr. Eklund for accepting the difficult office of Director General; it admired the work he had already done and the way in which he had quickly mastered the workings of a large international organization. Furthermore, it approved of his efforts to stabilize the size of the staff while increasing the emphasis on the technical side, and to keep the 1963 Budget at more or less the 1962 level.

112. One of the Agency's main tasks was to serve all its Members. Amongst the general activities he particularly stressed the importance of the regulatory functions, including radiological protection, reactor operation codes and siting. The countries more advanced in atomic energy would welcome the Agency's continuing interest in the technical, administrative and legal problems that were familiar to all concerned with the international transport of radioactive materials and particularly irradiated fuels.

113. Scientific conferences and publications were also useful to Member States. Interest in the first had grown, and he had been glad to note that the records of proceedings were now issued more promptly. The time had come to arrange another Geneva conference, and he hoped one would take place in 1964. The Agency should undertake to organize it on behalf of the United Nations.

114. His Government had always believed that the Agency's essential task was to assist countries on the threshold of atomic development both from its own resources and by acting as a channel for the technical assistance which the more advanced countries could provide.

115. Training remained the fundamental problem for countries embarking on a nuclear programme and France accordingly favoured an expansion of the fellowship programme. In 1962 it would receive fifty Agency fellows and would continue to accept them for training courses and work in its laboratories. The provision of experts was another particularly effective form of assistance provided that their duties were well defined and that they could be integrated into an existing team. A dozen French experts would be at the Agency's disposal during the current year.

116. For many countries radioisotopes were the first practical application of atomic energy that could contribute to their general development, and in that respect the Agency's Laboratory could be most useful as a training centre for technicians. He was pleased to announce that France had decided to make a gift to the Laboratory of a unit for handling radioisotopes which was specially adapted for training purposes and valued at \$25 000.

117. Research reactors, usually of the swimming-pool type, came as a second stage of nuclear development. However, it was important to remember that the simplest reactor was expensive both to buy and to run and must be used to the full if it were to justify its existence. His country therefore renewed an offer it had made two years earlier: to train experts who would be responsible for the operation of reactors in their own countries at the ten research reactors currently operating in France. The Agency could - as it intended to do in Asia at the end of the year - play a major role in ensuring that maximum use was made of such reactors, perhaps by encouraging a system of close association between reactor centres.

118. Although the Agency had not yet received any specific requests for assistance with power reactors, it had carried out some interesting studies on the possible establishment of nuclear power stations in various countries and a number of Member States were known to be contemplating requests for help in drawing up programmes for the production of nuclear electric power.

119. Developing countries should once again be warned against premature or over-ambitious power programmes which would lead them to invest in one industrial sector only. However, at a moment when the first nuclear power station in France was approaching criticality, the French authorities were more than ever convinced that such stations would be valuable in the near future. He only hoped that the Agency would advise countries to study their own requirements and not embark upon costly plans unless they were based on thorough and impartial studies. It would in itself be a great achievement to help countries with limited resources to avoid ruinous experiments.

120. The present structure of the Agency would probably have to be modified if it was to carry out its programmes, and no doubt the Director General would submit suitable proposals in due course.

121. On the grounds of both efficiency and economy, his delegation had often expressed the view that the Board's meetings were too frequent and too long. It was therefore pleased to note that they were now less frequent and shorter, and that the hundred or so meetings of 1958 had been reduced to thirty in 1962. He hoped that the Board would eventually come to have a single main annual session devoted especially to the programme and budget, with a limited number of meetings in the interval attended by alternates to the Governors. The French delegation also hoped that the General Conference (which would presumably be shorter in the present year) would be reduced to a week, from Monday to Saturday. At the same time it recognized the great usefulness of the Conference, which provided the only opportunity for those in charge of atomic energy commissions throughout the world to come together, apart from international conferences of the type held in Geneva in 1955 and 1958.

122. His suggestions were made in a constructive rather than a critical spirit, and with the aim of helping the Agency to frame its long-term programme and define more precisely the direction its activities should take in the coming years. France had every confidence that, under the leadership of the Director General and with its admirably qualified Secretariat, the Agency would be capable of playing its full part in enhancing the role of atomic energy throughout the world.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.

