A. Safeguards Statement for 2023^{1,2}

In 2023, safeguards were applied for 189 States^{3,4} with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat's findings and conclusions for 2023 are reported below with regard to each type of safeguards agreement. These findings and conclusions are based upon an evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfilling its safeguards obligations for that year.⁵

1. One hundred and thirty-six States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force:

- (a) For 74 of these States⁴, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
- (b) For 62 of these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

2. Safeguards activities were implemented for 45 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but without additional protocols in force. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

3. As of the end of 2023, four States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States Parties, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

⁴ And Taiwan, China.

¹ The designations employed and the presentation of material in this report, including the numbers cited, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Agency or its Member States concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

² The referenced number of States Parties to the NPT is based on the number of instruments of ratification, accession or succession that have been deposited.

³ These States do not include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Agency did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

⁵ For States with a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in force with an operative small quantities protocol (SQP) based on the original standard text, the Agency's ability to draw a credible and soundly-based annual safeguards conclusion is significantly affected. This is due, inter alia, to the fact that the original standard text of the SQP holds in abeyance the requirement for these States to provide to the Agency an initial report on all nuclear material as well as the Agency's right to perform verification activities in these States. In light of such limitations, and given the significant lapse of time since the decision of the Board of Governors in 2005 authorizing the Director General to conclude with each State with an SQP based on the original standard text an exchange of letters giving effect to the revised standardized text and the modified criteria, the Agency will no longer be able to continue to draw a safeguards conclusion for such States.

4. Three States had safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 in force, requiring the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. One of these States, India, had an additional protocol in force. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied.

5. Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in all five States. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the undeclared withdrawal from safeguards of nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

B. Background to the Safeguards Statement and Summary

B.1. Safeguards conclusions

1. The *Safeguards Statement* reflects the Secretariat's findings and conclusions resulting from the Agency's activities under the safeguards agreements in force. The Secretariat derives these conclusions on the basis of an evaluation of the results of its safeguards activities and of all other safeguards relevant information available to it. The Secretariat follows uniform internal processes and defined procedures to draw independent and objective safeguards conclusions based on its own verification activities and findings. This section provides background to the *Safeguards Statement*.



Fact box 1. Safeguards activities in 2023

2. A summary of the status of safeguards agreements and other information presented below is provided in Tables 1 to 5 in Section B.7.

B.1.1. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force

3. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA), the Agency has the "right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or

⁶ A significant quantity is the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.

⁷ Material balance areas (MBAs) containing locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs).

⁸ Calendar-days in the field for verification (CDFVs) comprise calendar-days spent on performing inspections, complementary accesses, design information verifications at facilities and information verifications at LOFs and on the associated travel and rest periods.

carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".⁹

4. CSAs consist of Part I, Part II, and Definitions. Part I consists of general provisions and Part II describes the procedures for implementing those provisions. These procedures include the State's record keeping and reporting obligations with regard to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs. They also include procedures related to Agency access to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs.

5. The procedures set out in Part II of a CSA include certain reporting requirements related to the export and import of material containing uranium or thorium which has not yet reached the stage of processing where its composition and purity make it suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment. Nuclear material which has reached that stage of processing, and any nuclear material produced at a later stage, is subject to all the other safeguards procedures specified within the agreement. An inventory of such nuclear material is established on the basis of an initial report provided by a State, which is then verified by the Agency and maintained on the basis of subsequent reports by the State and by Agency verification. The Agency performs its verification and evaluation activities in order to confirm that these declarations by the State are correct and complete, i.e. to confirm that all nuclear material in the State remains in peaceful activities.

Small quantities protocols

6. Many States with minimal or no nuclear activities have concluded a small quantities protocol (SQP) to their CSA. Under an SQP based on the original standard text¹⁰ submitted to the Board of Governors in 1974, the implementation of most of the safeguards procedures in Part II of a CSA are held in abeyance as long as certain criteria are met. In 2005, the Board of Governors approved the revision¹¹ of the standard text of the SQP. This revision changed the eligibility criteria for an SQP, making it unavailable to a State with an existing or planned facility, and reduced the number of measures held in abeyance. Of particular importance is the fact that, under the revised standard text of the SQP, the requirement that the State provide the Agency with an initial inventory report and the Agency's right to carry out ad hoc and special inspections are no longer held in abeyance.

Additional protocols

7. Although the Agency has the authority under a CSA to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State (i.e. the correctness and completeness of the State's declarations), the tools available to the Agency under such an agreement are limited. The *Model Additional Protocol*¹², approved by the Board of Governors in 1997, equips the Agency with important additional tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under an additional protocol (AP) thus significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State with a CSA.

B.1.1.1. States with both CSAs and APs in force

Status of implementation

8. As of 31 December 2023, 136 (134)¹³ States had both CSAs and APs in force.

⁹ Paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected).

¹⁰ GOV/INF/276/Annex B.

¹¹ GOV/INF/276/Mod.1 and Corr.1.

¹² INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards.

¹³ The numbers in parentheses provide the respective data for 2022.

9. Safeguards implementation involved, as appropriate, activities carried out in the field, at regional offices and at Agency Headquarters in Vienna. The activities at Headquarters included the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under CSAs and APs and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

Deriving conclusions

10. A safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the Agency's finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, no indications of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs, and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The Agency draws such a conclusion only where a State has both a CSA and an AP in force and the evaluations described below have been completed.

11. To ascertain that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities, no indications of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs, and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State as a whole, the Agency needs to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of the consistency of all safeguards relevant information available to it about a State. This includes:

- Information provided by the State itself under the CSA and AP in force with regard to, inter alia, the design and operation of nuclear facilities and LOFs, the State's nuclear material accounting reports and AP declarations, including clarifications and amplifications at the Agency's request, and information provided voluntarily;
- Information from safeguards activities conducted by the Agency in the field and at Headquarters to verify the information provided by the State under the CSA and AP; and
- Other relevant information, e.g. open source information or third party information.

12. The Agency evaluates, inter alia, whether information has been submitted by the State as required and whether access to nuclear material, facilities, sites and other locations was provided in accordance with the CSA and AP. Moreover, all anomalies, discrepancies, or inconsistencies identified in the course of the Agency's implementation of safeguards must be addressed appropriately.

13. When the evaluations described in paragraphs 11 and 12 have been completed and no indication has been found by the Agency that, in its judgement, would give rise to a safeguards concern, the Secretariat can draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in a State remained in peaceful activities. Subsequently, when the necessary arrangements have been completed, the Agency implements integrated safeguards — an optimized combination of safeguards measures available under CSAs and APs — based on the State-level safeguards approach (SLA) developed for that State. Due to increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole, the frequency and the intensity of verification activities at declared facilities and LOFs are optimized. Integrated safeguards were implemented for the whole of 2023 or part thereof for 70 (69) States.^{4,14}

¹⁴ Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austraia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Türkiye, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

Overall conclusions for 2023

14. On the basis of the evaluations described in paragraphs 11 and 12, the Secretariat drew the conclusions referred to in paragraph 1(a) of the *Safeguards Statement* for 74 (74) States⁴ — Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark¹⁵, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, the Kingdom of the Netherlands¹⁶, New Zealand¹⁷, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

15. Because the evaluation process described in paragraphs 11 and 12 had not yet been completed for 62 (60) States, the conclusion drawn for these States relates only to declared nuclear material in peaceful activities. The conclusion in paragraph 1(b) of the *Safeguards Statement* was drawn for Afghanistan, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Benin, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, the Niger, Panama, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Serbia, Thailand, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe.

B.1.1.2. States with CSAs in force but no APs in force

Status of implementation

16. As of 31 December 2023, safeguards were implemented for 45 (46) States in this category. Safeguards implementation involved activities in the field and at Headquarters, including the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under CSAs and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

Deriving conclusions

17. For a State with a CSA, the Agency's right and obligation are as described in paragraph 3. The evaluation process performed for such States is as described in paragraphs 11 and 12. However, the safeguards relevant information available to the Agency for such States does not include any AP related information. Moreover, although the implementation of safeguards strengthening measures¹⁸ under such an agreement have increased the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities, the activities that the Agency may

¹⁵ This conclusion is drawn with regard to that part of Denmark which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. Denmark and the Faroe Islands, and to Greenland for which Denmark has concluded a separate CSA and an AP thereto (INFCIRC/176 and INFCIRC/176/Add.1, respectively).

¹⁶ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Europe, which excludes the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. The Kingdom of the Netherlands has concluded a separate CSA that applies to its constituent parts mentioned above (INFCIRC/229), but has not yet concluded an AP thereto.

¹⁷ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to New Zealand which is covered by INFCIRC/185 and Mod.1 (CSA with an amended SQP) and INFCIRC/185/Add.1 (AP); it is not drawn for the Cook Islands and Niue, which are also covered by INFCIRC/185 (CSA with an original SQP), but not by INFCIRC/185/Mod.1 (amended SQP) and INFCIRC/185/Add.1 (AP).

¹⁸ Such measures include the early provision of design information, environmental sampling and the use of satellite imagery.

conduct in this regard are limited for a State without an AP. Thus, the conclusion in the *Safeguards Statement* for a State with a CSA alone relates only to declared nuclear material in peaceful activities.

18. In the course of its evaluation, the Agency also seeks to determine whether there is any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole which would need to be reflected in the *Safeguards Statement*. However, without the measures provided for in the *Model Additional Protocol* being implemented, the Agency is not able to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole.

Islamic Republic of Iran

19. On 4 March 2023, the Director General and the Vice-President of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran agreed a Joint Statement covering the implementation of Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement, the outstanding safeguards issues, further verification and monitoring activities and the spirit of collaboration in interactions between the Agency and Iran¹⁹. In this context, Iran provided information to the Agency on the presence of uranium particles of anthropogenic origin at one of the three locations in Iran not declared to the Agency where the Agency had conducted complementary access. While its assessment of the undeclared nuclear-related activities that were undertaken at the undeclared location related to this issue remains unchanged, the Agency regarded the matter as no longer outstanding at this stage.

20. By the end of the year, outstanding safeguards issues stemming from Iran's obligations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement remained unresolved. The outstanding safeguards issues need to be resolved for the Agency to be in a position to provide assurance that Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively peaceful. Iran was also not implementing modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, which is a legal obligation for Iran.

21. In 2023, Iran withdrew the designation of several experienced Agency inspectors designated for Iran. This decision has directly and seriously affected the Agency's ability to conduct its verification activities in Iran effectively, in particular at the enrichment facilities.

22. By the end of the year, the Director General had expressed his serious concern that Iran appeared to have "frozen" the implementation of the Joint Statement and questioned Iran's continued commitment to its implementation.

23. During 2023, the Director General submitted four reports to the Board of Governors entitled *NPT* Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2023/9, GOV/2023/26, GOV/2023/43 and GOV/2023/58) and one report providing an update on developments in between the publication of the quarterly reports (GOV/INF/2023/14).

Syrian Arab Republic

24. In August 2023, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors entitled *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic* (GOV/2023/42) covering relevant developments since the previous report in August 2022 (GOV/2022/41). The Director General informed the Board of Governors that no new information had come to the knowledge of the Agency that would have an impact on the Agency's assessment that it was very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in 2007 was a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency by Syria.²⁰ The Director

¹⁹ GOV/2023/9, Annex.

²⁰ The Board of Governors, in its resolution GOV/2011/41 of June 2011 (adopted by a vote), had, inter alia, called on Syria to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and, in particular, to provide the Agency with updated reporting under its Safeguards Agreement and access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to verify such reporting and resolve all outstanding questions so that the Agency could provide the necessary assurance as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear programme.

General, in his letter dated 11 August 2023, also reiterated his willingness to engage with Syria to discuss all unresolved issues.

25. In 2023, the Agency carried out a physical inventory verification and a design information verification at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor facility near Damascus.

26. On the basis of the evaluation of information provided by Syria, and all other safeguards relevant information available to it, the Agency found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared production or processing of nuclear material at declared facilities and LOFs. For 2023, the Agency concluded for Syria that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

Overall conclusions for 2023

27. On the basis of the evaluation performed and as reflected in paragraph 2 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat concluded that for the 45 (46) States²¹, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. This conclusion was drawn for Algeria, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Egypt, Grenada, Guyana, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kiribati, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, the Federated States of Micronesia, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, the State of Palestine²², the Sudan, Suriname, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen and Zambia.

B.1.2. States Parties to the NPT without CSAs in force

28. As of 31 December 2023, four (five) States Parties to the NPT had yet to bring CSAs into force pursuant to Article III of the Treaty.

Overall conclusions for 2023

29. As indicated in paragraph 3 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions for Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Somalia and Timor-Leste.

B.1.3. States with safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 in force

30. Under safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency applies safeguards in order to ensure that nuclear material, facilities and other items specified under the safeguards agreement are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any military purpose, and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

 $^{^{21}}$ In addition, this conclusion is drawn for those territories of the Kingdom of the Netherlands referred to in footnote 16 for which the broader conclusion is not drawn – i.e. the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten; and the Cook Islands and Niue, which are covered by New Zealand's CSA but not by its AP – see footnote 17. It is also drawn for France's territories covered by the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/718 between France, EURATOM and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco; and for the United States of America's territories covered by the safeguards agreement the United States of America and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

²² The designation employed does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

Status of implementation

31. As of 31 December 2023, safeguards were implemented at facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan pursuant to safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. India has an AP to its INFCIRC/754 safeguards agreement in force.

Deriving conclusions

32. The conclusion referred to in paragraph 4 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for these three States, and relates to the nuclear material, facilities and other items to which safeguards were applied. To draw such a conclusion in respect of these States, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information available to it, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

Overall conclusions for 2023

33. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded that the nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied in India, Israel and Pakistan remained in peaceful activities.

B.1.4. States with both voluntary offer agreements and APs in force

34. Under a voluntary offer agreement, the Agency applies safeguards to nuclear material in those facilities that have been selected by the Agency from the State's list of eligible facilities in order to verify that the material is not withdrawn from peaceful activities except as provided for in the agreement. In selecting facilities under voluntary offer agreements for the application of safeguards, the Agency takes such factors into consideration as: (i) whether the selection of a facility would satisfy legal obligations arising from other agreements concluded by the State; (ii) whether useful experience may be gained in implementing new safeguards approaches or in using advanced equipment and technology; and (iii) whether the cost efficiency of Agency safeguards may be enhanced by applying safeguards, in the exporting State, to nuclear material being shipped to States with CSAs in force. By implementing measures under the AP in these five States with voluntary offer agreements, the Agency also seeks to obtain and verify information that could enhance the safeguards conclusions for States with CSAs in force.

Status of implementation

35. During 2023, safeguards were implemented at ten facilities selected by the Agency in the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) and the United States of America.

Deriving conclusions

36. The conclusion referred to in paragraph 5 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force in which safeguards were applied to nuclear material in selected facilities. To draw the safeguards conclusion, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information available to it, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

Overall conclusions for 2023

37. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded for China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn as provided for in the agreements. There were no such withdrawals from the selected facilities in France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom.

B.2. Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

38. Between 16 January 2016 and 23 February 2021, the Agency, in light of UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), verified and monitored Iran's implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). From 8 May 2019 onwards, however, Iran reduced the implementation of those commitments on a step-by-step basis and, from 23 February 2021 onwards, stopped the implementation of those commitments altogether, including the AP. This seriously affected the Agency's verification and monitoring in relation to the JCPOA, which was exacerbated in June 2022 by Iran's decision to remove all of the Agency's equipment previously installed in Iran for surveillance and monitoring activities in relation to the JCPOA. Consequently, the Agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to the production and inventory of centrifuges, rotors and bellows, heavy water and uranium ore concentrate.

39. During 2023, in line with the Joint Statement of 4 March, Iran allowed the Agency to install cameras at workshops in Esfahan where centrifuge machine components are manufactured, although without providing access to the Agency to the data recorded by those cameras. By the end of the year, the Director General had expressed his serious concern that Iran appeared to have also "frozen" the implementation of further verification and monitoring activities under the Joint Statement, and questioned Iran's continued commitment to its implementation.

40. Throughout the year, Iran continued to accumulate enriched uranium well beyond the limits agreed under the JCPOA. Iran remains the only non-nuclear-weapon State that is producing and stockpiling high enriched uranium.

41. During 2023, the Director General submitted to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the United Nations Security Council four quarterly reports (GOV/2023/8, GOV/2023/24 and Corr.1, GOV/2023/39 and GOV/2023/57), and two reports (GOV/INF/2023/1 and GOV/INF/2023/18) providing updates on developments in between the issuance of the quarterly reports, entitled *Verification and monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).*

B.3. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

42. In August 2023, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and General Conference entitled *Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (GOV/2023/41-GC(67)/20), which included new information since the Director General's report of September 2022 (GOV/2022/40-GC(66)/16). In December 2023, the Director General issued a Statement on Recent Developments in the DPRK's Nuclear Programme.

43. Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the DPRK's NPT Safeguards Agreement. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able — and, since April 2009, has not been able — to implement any verification measures in the DPRK, and, therefore, the Agency could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the DPRK.

44. In 2023, no verification activities were implemented in the field but the Agency continued to monitor developments in the DPRK's nuclear programme and to evaluate all safeguards relevant information available to it, including open source information and satellite imagery.

45. In 2023, the Secretariat continued to maintain the Agency's enhanced readiness to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme. The Secretariat continued its collection and analysis of safeguards relevant open source information on the DPRK's nuclear programme, increased its collection and analysis of high resolution commercial satellite imagery, maintained necessary equipment and supplies, prepared Agency inspectors for verification and monitoring activities in the DPRK, and continued to review and document the Agency's knowledge of the DPRK's nuclear programme. Once a political agreement has

been reached among the countries concerned, the Agency is ready to return to the DPRK in a timely manner, if requested to do so by the DPRK and subject to approval by the Board of Governors.

46. In 2023, the Agency continued to monitor the Yongbyon site. At the light water reactor (LWR), increased levels of activity were seen throughout the year, including tests of the cooling water system. From mid-October onwards, a strong, almost continuous, water outflow was observed from the cooling water system, and there were indications in December that the water outflow was warm; this is consistent with the LWR having reached criticality and being in the process of commissioning. There were indications throughout the year consistent with the operation of the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5MW(e)) reactor. There were several periods when the 5MW(e) reactor was shut down, usually for only a few days, with one longer shutdown, of approximately three weeks, in September/October. Between June and August, intermittent operation of the steam plant at the Radiochemical Laboratory was observed, which is consistent with possible waste treatment or maintenance activities. As previously reported, between September 2021 and May 2022, a new annex to the reported centrifuge enrichment facility (CEF) at Yongbyon was constructed, thereby increasing the overall floor area of the facility by approximately one third. There were indications during 2023 that the CEF continued to operate, and that activities related to uranium enrichment had commenced within the new annex.

47. In 2023, there were indications of ongoing activities at the Kangson complex, in the vicinity of Pyongyang.

48. As previously reported, in March 2022, work commenced near Adit 3 at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site to reopen the test tunnel after its partial demolition in May 2018. By May 2022, excavation work at Adit 3 was possibly completed. Further activities were observed at Adit 3 during 2023, including the delivery of lumber into the tunnel during March. The road to the former Adit 4 entrance at the nuclear test site was restored in 2022, but there was very little activity near Adit 4 in 2023, with only a small support structure constructed during April.

49. The Agency has not had access to the Yongbyon site or to other locations in the DPRK. Without such access, the Agency cannot confirm either the operational status or configuration/design features of the facilities or locations, or the nature and purpose of the activities conducted therein.

50. The DPRK's nuclear activities continue to be a cause for serious concern. The continuation of the DPRK's nuclear programme, including construction and operation of the LWR, is a clear violation of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions and is deeply regrettable.

B.4. Areas of difficulty in safeguards implementation

51. The armed conflict in Ukraine that began in late February 2022 created unprecedented challenges for the Agency in the implementation of safeguards in Ukraine under the CSA (INFCIRC/550) and the AP (INFCIRC/550/Add.1). Nevertheless, the Agency continued to undertake its vital verification role in Ukraine throughout the year and was able to conduct sufficient in-field verification activities necessary to draw the safeguards conclusion for Ukraine for 2023.

52. The performance and the effectiveness of State or regional authorities responsible for safeguards implementation (SRAs) and of their respective systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs/RSACs) have a significant impact upon the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards implementation. The effectiveness of some SRAs is affected by issues identified by the Agency in one or more of the following areas: provision of safeguards information to the Agency; provision of access to the Agency to conduct in-field verification activities; technical effectiveness of SSACs; and States' cooperation and logistical support related to the Agency's verification activities in the field or at Headquarters. Addressing these issues led to additional costs, effort and use of resources for the Agency.

53. In 2023, despite the above-mentioned issues, the Agency — based on the evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available to it — was able to draw the safeguards conclusions as reported in the *Safeguards Statement* for 2023.

54. The Agency continues to address these issues to resolve them through cooperation and engagement with the States concerned. There are different causes of these issues. Some States have still not established SSACs, which are required under CSAs. Moreover, not all SRAs have the necessary legal authority, independence from facility or LOF operators, resources or technical capabilities to implement the requirements of safeguards agreements and APs.

55. As concluded by the Board of Governors in 2005, the SQP based on the original standard text is a weakness in the Agency's safeguards system. For States with an operative SQP based on the original standard text, the Agency's authority to require the submission of an initial report on all nuclear material subject to safeguards and early design information, to determine the status of any nuclear facilities and to be able to perform verification activities in the field is held in abeyance. Therefore, the Agency's ability to draw a credible and soundly-based annual safeguards conclusion for those States is significantly affected. In recent years, the Director General has reiterated to the Board of Governors that the SQP based on the original standard text was inadequate for the Agency safeguards system and, on repeated occasions, called upon States with an SQP based on the original standard text to amend or rescind their SQPs as soon as possible. At the end of 2023, 21 (22) States²³ had operative SQPs that had yet to be amended or rescinded. In light of the aforementioned limitations, and given the significant lapse of time since the decision of the Board of Governors in 2005 authorizing the Director General to conclude with each State with an SQP based on the original standard text on an exchange of letters giving effect to the revised standardized text and the modified criteria, the Agency will no longer be able to continue to draw a safeguards conclusion for such States.

56. The Agency remains ready to provide assistance to the States concerned in amending or rescinding their SQP as well as in establishing and maintaining their SSAC as required under their CSA.

B.5. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards

57. The Agency has continued to improve the efficiency of safeguards implementation while strengthening its effectiveness wherever possible. This improvement has been essential since the number of safeguards agreements and APs in force, the quantities of nuclear material and other items under safeguards and the number of facilities and LOFs under safeguards have all increased over recent years. In contrast, the Agency's financial resources have not risen commensurately. While a number of facilities are being retired from service, this does not immediately reduce the Agency's verification effort as safeguards continue to be applied to those facilities until their status is confirmed by the Agency as 'decommissioned for safeguards purposes'.

58. Some of the factors contributing to strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards are shown in Fact box 2. As a result of these improvements, safeguards have been implemented more effectively in the field and have been complemented by enhanced and improved activities at Headquarters.

59. In 2023, the Agency concluded the pilot phase of the IAEA Comprehensive Capacity-Building Initiative for SSACs and SRAs (COMPASS) in the seven participating States. Designed to further support States in building capacity towards safeguards implementation, COMPASS is structured as a collaborative endeavour aimed at strengthening the effectiveness of SSACs and enhancing the cooperation between SRAs and the

²³ The States with SQPs based on the original standard text are: Barbados, Bhutan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, Yemen and Zambia. In addition, there is an SQP based on the original standard text to the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/229 between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Agency pursuant to the NPT and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. New Zealand's CSA with an SQP based on the original standard text reproduced in INFCIRC/185 applies to the Cook Islands and Niue.

Agency. During the two-year pilot phase, a total of 96 activities such as technical visits and training events were conducted collaboratively between the pilot States and the Agency, including 28 activities implemented in cooperation with Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs) and other supporting Member States. Upon completion of the pilot phase, COMPASS will continue to be implemented by the Agency as part of its suite of safeguards assistance for States.

60. In 2023, the Agency developed an SLA for two States with a CSA and an AP in force for which the broader conclusion has been drawn for 2023, based on the refined departmental methodology. This brings the total number of States with a CSA in force for which an SLA has been developed to 135. These 135 States hold 97% of all nuclear material (by significant quantity) under Agency safeguards in States with a CSA in force. These 135 States comprise 71 States²⁴ with a CSA and an AP in force for which the broader conclusion has been drawn for 2023 (of which 18 are States with an SQP); 39 States²⁵ with a CSA and an AP in force for which the broader conclusion was not drawn for 2023 (of which 27 are States with an SQP); and 25 States²⁶ with a CSA with an SQP in force but no AP in force. There are also two States²⁷ with a voluntary offer agreement and an AP in force for which an SLA has been developed.

61. To further ensure consistency and non-discrimination in the development and implementation of SLAs, in 2023 the Agency continued to improve its internal work practices performing acquisition path analysis and developing SLAs for States under integrated safeguards, taking into account experience gained and lessons learned in the development of SLAs for States for which the broader conclusion has been drawn. During the year, the departmental methodology for setting technical objective performance targets continued to be implemented through use of a dedicated software application to support and simplify acquisition path analysis and developing SLAs. Additionally, refinements relating to the optimization of verification activities at facilities and other locations under safeguards in the State were developed for increased efficiency. The refined methodology increases the consistency in the development of SLAs for States with a broader conclusion and improves both the planning and implementation of safeguards activities, as well as the State evaluation process.


²⁴ Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austraia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Türkiye, the United Arab Emirates, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam.

²⁵ Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, the Niger, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Senegal, Thailand, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe.

²⁶ Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Kiribati, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Maldives, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Zambia.

²⁷ France and the United Kingdom.

Fact box 2. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards




62. Under the departmental quality management system (QMS), regular oversight of the key safeguards processes and their output is provided through internal quality audits, assessments and improvement activities. These are intended to ensure impartiality, effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards implementation.

63. Internal evaluation of the effectiveness of safeguards implementation was performed through peer reviews of annual implementation plans (AIPs) and State evaluation reports. In 2023, all AIPs approved at the beginning of the year were reviewed. Moreover, the effectiveness of safeguards implementation was evaluated for 37 (34) AIPs implemented in 2023. In addition, the State evaluation of three States was peer reviewed by ad hoc departmental teams. This additional layer of internal evaluation further strengthens the effectiveness of safeguards implementation and increases the level of consistency and standardization across the Department of Safeguards.

²⁸ The States with SQPs in force based on the revised standard text are: Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Benin, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Djibouti, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, the Holy See, Honduras, Iceland, Kenya, Kuwait, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nicaragua, North Macedonia, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, the State of Palestine²², the Sudan, Suriname, Togo, Tonga, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe. In addition, the SQP to the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/718 between France, EURATOM and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the SQP to the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/366 between the United States of America and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco were amended. New Zealand's amended SQP reproduced in INFCIRC/185/Mod.1 does not apply to the Cook Islands and Niue.

64. The Agency continued to promote the use of the protocol reporter software (PR3), which supports the preparation and submission of AP declarations. The newest release of the software (r.1.6), which includes

improvements in the browsing, searching and validation functions, facilities the information exchange and provides more flexibility, especially for users dealing with large data volumes. By the end of 2023, the Agency had provided the software to 124 (112) States⁴, and 45 of these States⁴ had already upgraded to the newest release. The number of States that use the protocol reporter software to submit their AP declarations has been steadily increasing over the past years. During 2023, 85 (80) States⁴ submitted



declarations using this software, which is approximately 70% (70%) of the States that received the upgraded version of the software, and 60% (57%) of the States with an AP in force.

65. MSSPs and the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) continued to make substantial contributions to Agency safeguards through the provision of assistance and advice. In 2023, the Agency established two new MSSPs: with Norway and with the United Arab Emirates. MSSP activities, now in partnership with 23 States and the European Commission, focus on addressing specific development and implementation support needs for safeguards through collaboration, research and development, and the provision of equipment, materials, and access to facilities for training or equipment testing purposes.

66. In 2023, the Agency also signed practical arrangements with one entity to further broaden the support base for Agency safeguards.

B.6. Safeguards expenditures and resources

67. During 2023, the activities of Major Programme 4 — Nuclear Verification — were funded through the Regular Budget primarily, but also through extrabudgetary contributions. The Regular Budget appropriation of $\notin 163.8$ ($\notin 153.7$) million²⁹ for 2023 was adjusted to $\notin 161.9$ ($\notin 152.4$) million at the United Nations operational average rate of exchange for the year. Figure 1 presents the budget growth³⁰ for the period 2019–2023 by comparing the growth of the final budget³¹ to the growth of the approved budget³².

²⁹ At an exchange rate €1=\$1, excluding Major Capital Investment Fund.

 $^{^{30}}$ As per GC(60)/2, it includes the gradual integration in the Regular Budget of \notin 5.2 million allocated during the period 2017–2019 for the Agency's verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).

³¹ Represents the operational portion of the Regular Budget appropriation as represented in the annual Agency's Financial Statements, including the effects of the price adjustment and the recalculation of the Regular Budget portion of US dollars at the United Nations operational average rate of exchange for the year.

³² Represents the Regular Budget approved by the Agency's policy-making organs excluding the effects of currency revaluation.




Figure 1. Budget growth of the Regular Budget, 2019–2023 (base 2019=0%)

68. The expenditures for Major Programme 4 were $\notin 161.8$ ($\notin 152.2$) million from the 2023 Regular Budget, an increase of 6.3% compared with 2022. The Regular Budget utilization rate for 2023 was 100% (99.9%) with an unspent balance of $\notin 64$ thousand at the end of the year. Figure 2 shows the utilization trend of the Regular Budget of Major Programme 4 for the period 2019–2023.




Figure 2. Major Programme 4 — Nuclear Verification — budget and expenditures, 2019–2023

69. The expenditures³³ from the extrabudgetary contributions were $\in 28.4$ ($\in 26.0$) million, an increase of 9% compared with 2022. This increase resulted mainly from additional costs arising from logistical and organizational efforts associated with the implementation of safeguards in Ukraine.

³³ Including Programme Support Costs.

B.7. Status of safeguards agreements (as of 31 December 2023)

70. This section contains information — presented in the five tables below — on safeguards agreements that provide the basis for the Agency's implementation of safeguards in 2023. It does not include agreements under which the application of safeguards has been suspended in the light of implementation of safeguards pursuant to another agreement. For full details, see the Agency's website: https://www.iaea.org.

State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP (date of entry into force)
Afghanistan	X(A)	257	19 July 2005
Albania		359	3 November 2010
Andorra	X(A)	808	19 December 2011
Angola	X(A)	800	28 April 2010
Antigua and Barbuda	X(A)	528	15 November 2013
Armenia		455	28 June 2004
Australia		217	12 December 1997
Austria		193	30 April 2004
Azerbaijan		580	29 November 2000
Bahrain	X(A)	767	20 July 2011
Bangladesh		301	30 March 2001
Belgium		193	30 April 2004
Benin	X(A)	930	17 September 2019
Bolivia, Plurinational State of	X	465	7 December 2023
Bosnia and Herzegovina		851	3 July 2013
Botswana		694	24 August 2006
Bulgaria ⁽¹⁾		193	1 May 2009
Burkina Faso	X(A)	618	17 April 2003
Burundi	X(A)	719	27 September 2007
Cabo Verde	X(A)	1048	7 September 2022
Cambodia	X(A)	586	24 April 2015
Cameroon	X(A)	641	29 September 2016
Canada		164	8 September 2000
Central African Republic	X(A)	777	7 September 2009
Chad	X(A)	802	13 May 2010
Chile		476	3 November 2003
Colombia		306	5 March 2009
Comoros	X(A)	752	20 January 2009
Congo	X(A)	831	28 October 2011
Costa Rica	X(A)	278	17 June 2011
Côte d'Ivoire		309	5 May 2016
Croatia ⁽¹⁾		193	1 April 2017
Cuba		633	3 June 2004
Cyprus ⁽¹⁾		193	1 May 2008
Czech Republic ⁽¹⁾		193	1 October 2009

	Table 1 – Stat	tes with CSAs	s and APs in force
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State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP (date of entry into force)
Democratic Republic of the Congo		183	9 April 2003
Denmark ⁽²⁾		193 176	30 April 2004 22 March 2013
Djibouti	X(A)	884	26 May 2015
Dominican Republic	X(A)	201	5 May 2010
Ecuador	X(A)	231	24 October 2001
El Salvador	X(A)	232	24 May 2004
Eritrea	X(A)	960	20 April 2021
Estonia ⁽¹⁾		193	1 December 2005
Eswatini	X(A)	227	8 September 2010
Ethiopia	X(A)	261	18 September 2019
Fiji	Х	192	14 July 2006
Finland		193	30 April 2004
Gabon	X(A)	792	25 March 2010
Gambia	X(A)	277	18 October 2011
Georgia		617	3 June 2003
Germany		193	30 April 2004
Ghana		226	11 June 2004
Greece		193	30 April 2004
Guatemala	X(A)	299	28 May 2008
Guinea-Bissau	X(A)	1005	23 June 2022
Haiti	X(A)	681	9 March 2006
Holy See	X(A)	187	24 September 1998
Honduras	X(A)	235	17 November 2017
Hungary ⁽¹⁾		193	1 July 2007
Iceland	X(A)	215	12 September 2003
Indonesia		283	29 September 1999
Iraq		172	10 October 2012
Ireland		193	30 April 2004
Italy		193	30 April 2004
Jamaica		265	19 March 2003
Japan		255	16 December 1999
Jordan		258	28 July 1998
Kazakhstan		504	9 May 2007
Kenya	X(A)	778	18 September 2009
Korea, Republic of		236	19 February 2004
Kuwait	X(A)	607	2 June 2003
Kyrgyzstan	Х	629	10 November 2011
Latvia ⁽¹⁾		193	1 October 2008
Lesotho	X(A)	199	26 April 2010
Liberia	X(A)	927	10 December 2018
Libya		282	11 August 2006
Liechtenstein		275	25 November 2015
Lithuania ⁽¹⁾		193	1 January 2008

State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP (date of entry into force)
Luxembourg		193	30 April 2004
Madagascar	X(A)	200	18 September 2003
Malawi	X(A)	409	26 July 2007
Mali	X(A)	615	12 September 2002
Malta ⁽¹⁾		193	1 July 2007
Marshall Islands		653	3 May 2005
Mauritania	X(A)	788	10 December 2009
Mauritius	X(A)	190	17 December 2007
Mexico		197	4 March 2011
Monaco	X(A)	524	30 September 1999
Mongolia	Х	188	12 May 2003
Montenegro	X(A)	814	4 March 2011
Morocco		228	21 April 2011
Mozambique	X(A)	813	1 March 2011
Namibia	X(A)	551	20 February 2012
Netherlands, Kingdom of the ⁽³⁾		193	30 April 2004
New Zealand ⁽⁴⁾	X(A)	185	24 September 1998
Nicaragua	X(A)	246	18 February 2005
Niger		664	2 May 2007
Nigeria		358	4 April 2007
North Macedonia	X(A)	610	11 May 2007
Norway		177	16 May 2000
Palau	X(A)	650	13 May 2005
Panama	X(A)	316	11 December 2001
Paraguay	X(A)	279	15 September 2004
Peru		273	23 July 2001
Philippines		216	26 February 2010
Poland ⁽¹⁾		193	1 March 2007
Portugal		193	30 April 2004
Republic of Moldova	X(A)	690	1 June 2012
Romania ⁽¹⁾		193	1 May 2010
Rwanda	X(A)	801	17 May 2010
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X(A)	514	19 May 2014
Sao Tome and Principe	X(A)	1082	31 March 2023
Senegal	X(A)	276	24 July 2017
Serbia		204	17 September 2018
Seychelles	X(A)	635	13 October 2004
Singapore	X(A)	259	31 March 2008
Slovakia ⁽¹⁾		193	1 December 2005
Slovenia ⁽¹⁾		193	1 September 2006
South Africa		394	13 September 2002
Spain		193	30 April 2004
Sweden		193	30 April 2004

State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP (date of entry into force)
Switzerland		264	1 February 2005
Tajikistan		639	14 December 2004
Thailand		241	17 November 2017
Тодо	X(A)	840	18 July 2012
Türkiye		295	17 July 2001
Turkmenistan		673	3 January 2006
Uganda	X(A)	674	14 February 2006
Ukraine		550	24 January 2006
United Arab Emirates		622	20 December 2010
United Republic of Tanzania	X(A)	643	7 February 2005
Uruguay		157	30 April 2004
Uzbekistan		508	21 December 1998
Vanuatu	X(A)	852	21 May 2013
Viet Nam		376	17 September 2012
Zimbabwe	X(A)	483	21 September 2021
General Notes:			

General Notes:

• In addition, safeguards, including the measures of the Model Additional Protocol, were applied for Taiwan, China.

• The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/193 is that concluded between the non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), EURATOM and the Agency.

• 'X' in the 'SQP' column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standard text (see Section B, paragraph 6).

Table Notes:

(1) The date refers to accession to INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8.

- (2) The application of safeguards in Denmark under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/176), in force since 1 March 1972, was suspended on 21 February 1977, on which date the safeguards agreement between the non-nuclear-weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the Agency (INFCIRC/193) entered into force for Denmark. Since 21 February 1977, INFCIRC/193 also applies to the Faroe Islands. Upon Greenland's secession from EURATOM as of 31 January 1985, the agreement between the Agency and Denmark (INFCIRC/176) re-entered into force for Greenland. The AP to this agreement entered into force on 22 March 2013 (INFCIRC/176/Add.1).
- (3) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/229 with regard to the Caribbean part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten is pursuant to the NPT and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an original SQP to this agreement. No AP is in force for that agreement.
- (4) The safeguards agreement with an original SQP reproduced in INFCIRC/185 is also applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue. The amended SQP reproduced in INFCIRC/185/Mod.1 and the AP reproduced in INFCIRC/185/Add.1, however, are not applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue.

State	SQP	INFCIRC	AP
Algeria		531	Signed: 16 February 2018
Argentina		435	
Bahamas	X(A)	544	
Barbados	Х	527	
Belarus		495	Signed: 15 November 2005
Belize	X(A)	532	
Bhutan	Х	371	
Brazil		435	
Brunei Darussalam	X(A)	365	
Democratic People's Republic of Korea ⁽¹⁾		403	
Dominica	Х	513	
Egypt		302	
Grenada	Х	525	
Guyana	Х	543	
Iran, Islamic Republic of ⁽²⁾		214	Signed: 18 December 2003
Kiribati	Х	390	Signed: 9 November 2004
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X(A)	599	Signed: 5 November 2014
Lebanon	X(A)	191	
Malaysia		182	Signed: 22 November 2005
Maldives	X(A)	253	
Micronesia, Federated States of	X(A)	962	
Myanmar	Х	477	Signed: 17 September 2013
Nauru	X(A)	317	Approved: 22 November 2023
Nepal	Х	186	
Oman	Х	691	
Papua New Guinea	X(A)	312	
Qatar	X(A)	747	
Saint Lucia	X(A)	379	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Х	400	
Samoa	Х	268	
San Marino	X(A)	575	
Saudi Arabia	Х	746	
Sierra Leone	Х	787	Signed: 31 October 2022
Solomon Islands	Х	420	
Sri Lanka		320	Approved: 12 September 2018
State of Palestine ⁽³⁾	X(A)	1050	
Sudan	X(A)	245	
Suriname	X(A)	269	
Syrian Arab Republic		407	
Tonga	X(A)	426	
Trinidad and Tobago	Х	414	
Tunisia		381	Signed: 24 May 2005
Tuvalu	X(A)	391	

Table 2 – States with CSAs but no APs in force

SQP	INFCIRC	AP
	300	
Х	614	
X	456	Signed: 13 May 2009
	SQP X X	300 X 614

General Notes:

• The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/435 is that concluded between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the Agency.

• 'X' in the 'SQP' column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standard text (see Section B, paragraph 6).

Table Notes:

- (1) In a letter to the Director General dated 10 January 2003, the DPRK stated that the Government had "decided to lift the moratorium on the effectiveness of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" and that "its decision to withdraw from the Treaty will come into effect from 11 January 2003 onwards."
- (2) On 16 January 2016, as notified in its letter to the Director General of 7 January 2016, Iran began to provisionally apply its AP in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force. The AP, which was provisionally applied by Iran as of 16 January 2016, has not been applied since 23 February 2021.
- (3) The designation employed does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

States Parties to the NPT	SQP	Safeguards agreement	AP		
Equatorial Guinea	Х	Approved: 13 June 1986			
Guinea	X(A)	Signed: 13 December 2011	Signed: 13 December 2011		
Somalia IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII					
Timor-LesteX(A)Signed: 6 October 2009Signed: 6 October 2009					
General Note: • 'X' in the 'SOP' column indicates that the State has an SOP 'X(A)' indicates that the SOP is based on the revised SOP					

• 'X' in the 'SQP' column indicates that the State has an SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP is based on the revised SQP standard text (see Section B, paragraph 6). In both cases, the SQP will come into force at the same time as the safeguards agreement.

State	INFCIRC	AP
India	754	In force: 25 July 2014
Israel	249/Add.1	
Pakistan	34 116 135 239 248 393 418 705 816 920	

Table 4 – States with safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 in force

State	INFCIRC	AP
China	369	In force: 28 March 2002
France ⁽¹⁾	290	In force: 30 April 2004
Russian Federation	327	In force: 16 October 2007
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ^{(2), (3), (4)}	951	In force: 31 December 2020
United States of America ⁽⁵⁾	288	In force: 6 January 2009

Table 5 – States with voluntary offer agreements and APs in force

Table Notes:

(1) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/718 between France, EURATOM and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an SQP to this agreement. The SQP was amended. No AP to that agreement has been concluded.

(2) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/175, which remains in force, is an INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreement, concluded between the United Kingdom and the Agency.

(3) The safeguards agreement between the United Kingdom, EURATOM and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed but has not entered into force. There is an SQP to this agreement. No AP to that agreement has been concluded.

(4) The voluntary offer safeguards agreement between the United Kingdom and the Agency (reproduced in INFCIRC/951) and the AP thereto (reproduced in INFCIRC/951/Add.1) entered into force on 31 December 2020 at 23:00 GMT.

(5) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/366 between the United States of America and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an SQP to this agreement. The SQP was amended. No AP to that agreement has been concluded.