

**STATEMENT**  
**of the Head of the Delegation of Ukraine**  
**at the 64<sup>th</sup> IAEA General Conference,**  
**(21-25 September 2020, Vienna)**

**Mr President,**

It is an honour to join you today notwithstanding this format and circumstances.

At the outset, Mr. President, I kindly congratulate you on taking this responsible position.

On behalf of the Government of Ukraine, I would like to use this opportunity to convey Ukraine's warmest congratulations to IAEA Director General.

Mr Grossi, you have the privilege to preside over the extremely delicate period, perhaps the hardest in the Agency's history. Ukraine believes that your determination and sense of purpose all augur well for leading the Agency forward in these exceptional times.

**Mr President, DG Grossi,**

Let me assure you that my delegation stands ready to work constructively under your leadership within this General Conference.

**Mr President,**

The significant events of this year became a real ordeal for the international community in general and the Agency in particular. Due to the current COVID-19 pandemic, the

ability of the IAEA to achieve its objectives were put to the test. Though it has confronted numerous challenges, the Agency has passed this test with a head held high.

Ukraine applauds for the IAEA's swift reaction to launch unprecedented by its scope technical cooperation project already on the early stage of COVID-19 pandemic. We recognize the Agency's prominent role in combating the pandemic by providing extensive and effective support to more than 120 countries and territories. At the same time, we are aware of cruciality of generous extrabudgetary and other voluntary contributions made by Member States and involved organizations to enable this approach.

I will now turn to Safeguards.

### **Safeguards**

Since its establishment in 1961, the IAEA's safeguards system has undergone significant changes to meet the requirements specified in the Agency's Statute. To this date, the balance between conceptual development and practical safeguards implementation is reached by establishment of a State-level-concept. Ukraine has its own experience of implementing a State-level-concept. We are confident that this system effectively underpins the NPT and contributes to international peace and security.

Against this background, we see major implications for the IAEA safeguards mechanism deriving from inability of a specific Member State to meet its obligations under the NPT.

Let us recall that for the 7<sup>th</sup> year in a row, the Ukrainian peninsula Crimea and the city of Sevastopol have been occupied by a nuclear-weapon state – the Russian Federation. In addition to this, Russia is continuing its military aggression in the certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine.

In terms of safeguards challenges, the case of a Russian aggression against Ukraine inevitably leads to the necessity of reassessing the qualitative component of the State-level-concept in order to consider the political repercussions.

The complexity of this issue is compounded by the fact that Ukraine was assaulted by the nuclear-weapon-state. Moreover, the ongoing transformation of Crimea into a huge military base may indicate the plausible deploying of nuclear capabilities on the occupied peninsula. Thus, undermining the non-nuclear-weapon status of Ukraine.

Until today, based on all technically credible safeguards relevant information, the Agency did not find any indication of a proliferation concern in Ukraine, including on the occupied territories.

Unfortunately, there is no metric providing an answer to the question of how effective the IAEA safeguards are with regard to the nuclear material located on the occupied territories, either in Ukraine or any other country. But it is absolutely obvious that the deterrence level will stay low until the safeguards system will address vulnerabilities, deriving from aggressor's behaviour.

A few remarks on nuclear energy issues.

## **Nuclear Energy**

Energy Strategy of Ukraine for the period till 2030 envisages to keep the share of the NPP generation in the electricity production mix at the level NPP have attained, which is to date more than 50% of the total electricity production in the country.

In this regard, Ukraine gives high priority to the long-term operation of its nuclear power plants. For this purpose, Ukraine has requested the SALTO (Safety Aspects of Long-Term Operation) mission to conduct comprehensive safety review and address strategy and key elements for the safe long-term operation of South Ukraine NPP. Due to restrictions caused by COVID-19 pandemic, the mission will come to Ukraine in January 2021.

The overall impact of COVID-19 pandemic has not resulted in any enforced shutdowns of NPPs in Ukraine or major disruptions to outages or projects during this year. But nonetheless, the question remains open for Ukraine on how the situation in the nuclear supply chain market of products and services will change in the long term.

Against this background, Ukraine is of the view that Member States will benefit from the exchange of information on relevant experience and lessons learned regarding this situation. The IAEA's dedicated webinars and databases, such as OPEX Network, are an invaluable contribution to this process and are highly appreciated.

Let me now turn to Technical Cooperation.

## **Technical Cooperation**

Next year will mark the 35<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Chornobyl tragedy. As we still continue to learn lessons on remediation of territories affected by the accident and decommissioning of the Chornobyl NPP, it is imperative that this issue remains on the Agency's agenda.

Ukraine reiterates its interest in continuing constructive cooperation with the IAEA in this regard, both on a national basis and within regional TC projects.

We also note with appreciation that the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme keeps pace with the overarching importance of applying the nuclear techniques in human health.

In this regard, Ukraine fully supports IAEA's efforts to respond to the growing global cancer crisis by further developing the Program of Action for Cancer Therapy – PACT. Ukraine has developed one national TC project dedicated to dealing with pediatric cancer and is looking forward to fruitful cooperation with the Agency in this regard.

I will continue on the issues of Nuclear Safety and Security.

## **Nuclear Safety and Security**

Ukraine fully shares the view that responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State. We also recognize the central role of the Agency in coordinating international efforts to strengthen nuclear safety globally.

The postponement of this year's main international

activities under Convention on Nuclear Safety and Joint Convention constitute a shortcoming in terms of substantive discussion on primary nuclear safety related issues. Ukraine is looking forward to successful conducting of these meetings already in 2021.

Ukraine is seriously concerned by a number of radioactive incidents with transboundary implications happened recently.

In addition to the incident with release of ruthenium 106 in 2017 and undefined radioactive explosion near the city of Archangelsk (Russian Federation) in 2019, one more case with ruthenium and cesium detections happened this year.

These incidents obviously point at the problem of one State's incompliance with international nuclear safety obligations. The international community should not allow the violator any further malicious steps. There is a clear need and a right time to draw relevant conclusions out of these events.

We call on all Member States to share any available information in this regard with the IAEA, notwithstanding its form or completeness or statute of limitations.

**Mr President,**

In closing, let me reaffirm Ukraine's continued support of the IAEA work and our conviction in the important role the Agency plays in support of international peace and security.

**Thank you.**