


IAEA CN-254 (IAEA HQ 2017.11.13-17)

TESS: Tool for evaluation security system

Introduction and Development status



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(*)Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control

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Background



Program development strategy



Main concepts



Algorithm



Implementation results

Background

■ Status of evaluating PPS vulnerability

- [IAEA INFCIRC/225/REV.5]

- [US 10 CFR PART 73.55]

- Licensee evaluates PPS performance and regulatory body to review it

■ Status of evaluating PPS vulnerability (R.O.K)

- [*APPRE/Article16/Requirement for protection of nuclear facilities]

- Regularly evaluate PP regulation and reflect the results

- [APPRE/Proposal]

- Licensee evaluates PPS performance and regulatory body to review it


- Detailed scope and method of evaluation

- Expectation of linkage with VA program

(*) Act on measures for the protection of nuclear facilities, prevention of radiation disasters

Background


■ Why we need a VA program



	Force on Force	VA program	Remark
Manpower	Need a lot	Relatively low	military, police, adversary, etc.
Budget	Need a lot	Relatively low	Manpower equal to budget
Time	Need a lot	Relatively low	More than a week (include preparation)
Reality	Relatively good	-	FOF is also constrained by safety reasons
Usability	Only for training	Regulatory purpose	Regulatory examination, facility inspection

Program development strategy (1)

■ Benchmark of latest commercial programs (AVERT)



→ VA was conducted through AVERT for two NPP from 2015 to 2017

→ To be implemented for all regulated nuclear facilities by 2019

Program development strategy (2)

■ Requirement for regulatory VA program

Experience using AVERT



Experience in regulating nuclear facilities




IAEA NUSAM Project (2013~2017) Results



Regulatory program requirements	
Conservative	Assumptions should be set conservatively rather than licensee.
Deterministic	The result of program should always be same. (Compare with monte carlo method)
Accuracy	Must be proved that route that is searched is weakest.
Clarity	The algorithm used should be easy and understandable.
Implement Same condition	Able to implement the same condition as simulator of licensee.
Reality of data	Data should be based on experiments and logical reasoning, not by the manufacturer.
Ease of analysis	Evaluate vulnerability versus protection requirements.

Main concepts (1)



■ Critical detection point (Timely detection)



→ Vulnerable path is minimum detection path before CDP, and minimum time path thereafter

Main concepts (2)


- 3D GUI Applied (view, move, installation, etc.)
- 2D Mesh based Algorithm (Apply after 3D data projection)



Object data projection to 2D mesh



Install building and PPS (CCTV, sensor, guard)





2D mesh has detection and delay data


Algorithm

■ Dijkstra algorithm


– [Path finding]



A: Start point B: Target



Collect data nearby A
chose smallest one




If small value is found, updated

■ Priority Queue(Min heap)

– [cost evaluation: detection rate and delay]

→ Always return minimum data


→ Maximum efficiency with Dijkstra




Implementation results (1)

TESS – Overview

EDIT Mode



EVALUATION Mode



Build a nuclear facility

Build a physical protection system

Evaluation of physical protection system

Implementation results (2)

EDIT Mode

• Double Fence

Attributes Cost : 0

Sensor : User Input

Adversary : Delay First


Tool : Power Tool

Detection : 0 %

Delay : 10 sec Infinite

Response Force

Delay : 10 sec Infinite



Attributes Cost : 0

Sensor : Taut Wire

Adversary : Delay First

Tool : Power Tool

Detection : 25 %

Delay : 10 sec Infinite

Response Force

Delay : 10 sec Infinite



• Active IR

Attributes Cost : 0

Type : Active Infrared

Adversary : Delay First

Tool : Power Tool

Detection : 40 %

Delay : 0 sec Infinite

Response Force

Delay : 0 sec Infinite

• Wall

Attributes Cost : 0

Material : 20cm reinforced conc.

Adversary : Delay First


Tool : Power Tool

Detection : 50 %

Delay : 600 sec Infinite

Response Force

Delay : 600 sec Infinite



• Gate

Attributes Cost : 0

Material : 30cm wood & metal

Adversary : Delay First

Tool : Power Tool

Detection : 50 %

Delay : 530 sec Infinite

Response Force

Delay : 0 sec Infinite

• Response

Common Adversary Response

- List

Intention	Number	Speed (km/h)	Weight (kg)
Sabotage	2	2	7

- Basic

Intention : Sabotage Theft

Number : 2 (1~30)

Speed : Walk 2 km/h

Tool : Power Tool 2 kg

Skill : Medium(Competence 100%)

- Battle

Tactic : Defense Assault

Weapon : Semi-Automatic Rifle 3 kg

Magazine # : 4 2 kg

Firing Exposure : Kneel(0.5) 50 %

Reloading Exposure : Kneel(0.5) 50 %

Firing Time Delay : 50 %

Firing Accuracy Degradation due to Illumination : 0 %

Departure from Average Firing Proficiency : 0 % Better

• Adversary

Common Adversary Response

- List

#	Number	PPS RT (sec)	Tactic	Weight (kg)
1	4	600	Defense	5

- Basic

Number : 4 (1~30)

PPS Response Time : 600 sec

Alarm Comm. Time : 1 sec

Alarm Assess. Time : 30 sec

Guard-RF Comm. Time : 20 sec

RF Prep. Time : 180 sec

RF Travel. Time : 339 sec

RF Deploy. Time : 30 sec

- Battle

Tactic : Defense Assault

Weapon : Semi-Automatic Rifle 3 kg

Magazine # : 4 2 kg

Firing Exposure : Kneel(0.5) 50 %

Reloading Exposure : Kneel(0.5) 50 %

Firing Time Delay : 50 %



Firing Accuracy Degradation due to Illumination : 0 %

Departure from Average Firing Proficiency : 0 % Better

Implementation results (3)

■ Evaluation Mode

- CDP calculation : From target to outside until $\langle RFT = \text{delay time} \rangle$
- Path Finding : From Target CDP to outside $\langle \text{minimum detection probability} \rangle$
- Neutralization : Using BATTELLE code from U.S DOE
- Result : P_E and time after interruption



→ CDP depends on RFT and delay elements

Implementation results (4)

Demo video

TESS
Tool for Evaluating Security System

www.BANDICAM.COM

File Structure Barrier Sensor Target ROI View Ruler Option Undo

EVALUATION

Map View EX.11.IV.4_170925.xml

Multi Path Single Path

Common Adversary Response

Target
Option : Or

Battle
Firing Range : 50 m
Fire : None 0 sec
Suppression : 0 sec

Character
Scale : 10 (Default : 10)

X : 357.27, Y : -190.97

P₁ P_N

Implementation results (5)


Upgrade plan (detection and delay)

The screenshot displays the kinac_defense software interface. At the top, there is a menu bar with options like File, Structure, Barrier, Sensor, Target, ROI, View, Ruler, Option, and Undo. Below the menu is a 3D map view showing a terrain with a path and a north arrow. The main area is divided into several panels:


- PI Sensitivity Graph:** A panel with a 'Calculate' button and a 'To-Be' input field set to 70.00%. It contains six bar charts comparing 'As-Is' and 'To-Be' detection and delay percentages for various targets. The 'Reactor #2-Door' target is highlighted in yellow.
- Path Simulation:** A table showing events along a path, including combat, pass, encounter, sabotage, and mission completion.
- List of Paths:** A table listing 10 paths with their respective probabilities (P_I, P_N, P_E) and time left.
- PPS Response Time:** A panel with various time settings for alarm communication, assessment, and RF deployment.

Future plans


Application of large-scale nuclear facilities (2017~2019)



Algorithm improvements (2017~2019)



Adaptive mesh



Path pattern

Thank You.

Q & A

