



# Development and Evaluation of the Design Basis Threat in Germany

Claudia Engelhardt

Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation,  
Building and Nuclear Safety, Germany

International Conference on Physical Protection  
of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities  
13 - 17 November 2017, IAEA, Vienna, Austria

# Outline



## Situation in Germany

### Development of the Design Basis Threat (DBT)

- threat situation, threat assessment
- roles and responsibilities
- different DBTs for different target materials and types of facilities


### Integrated Security- and Protection Concept

### Evaluation of the DBT(s)


- evaluation cycle (modes: regular, triggered)

# Nuclear Facilities in Germany

- 18 NPPs at 13 sites  
(8 still in operation)
- 7 research reactors
- 12 on-site interim storage facilities
- 4 central interim storage facilities
- 2 repositories for low and medium active waste
- 1 uranium enrichment plant
- 1 fuel assembly fabrication plant



# Licence Prerequisite



licence prerequisite defined in the National Law

ordinances and guidelines

threat situation

threat assessment  
&  
design basis threat

# Threat Situation



- constantly monitored and assessed by the national security authorities
- annual report about threat situation in Germany (focused on nuclear facilities)
- regular exchange of information between the competent authorities responsible for nuclear and the national security in permanent working groups
- ad-hoc information due to new insights

# Threat Assessment



- Input: Current threat situation in Germany
- Roles and Responsibilities are determined:



(permanent) working group  
managed and chaired by BMUB  
competent nuclear security authorities  
and security authorities  
consensus between all participants

- According to NSS No. 10 (except “motivation”)

# Design Basis Threat (DBT)




Federal Ministry for the  
Environment, Nature Conservation,  
Building and Nuclear Safety

## Threat assessment

Process of evaluating and decision making

→ Legitimation by all relevant national committees  
up to the political level  
(both authorities under nuclear legislation and of  
the interior)




Top document within  
the nuclear security regulatory  
framework




# Different DBTs

- Three (four) different DBTs reflecting different needs for protection (different target materials, different types of facilities)





# Basis for Security Measures



# Integrated Security- and Protection Concept




Federal Ministry for the  
Environment, Nature Conservation,  
Building and Nuclear Safety

Since 1977 the nuclear security measures of the operator/ shipper and the protection measures of the State have to intertwine.

## Operator/Shipper:

Nuclear security measures and security guards must protect the facility/transport providing delay for a defined time



## State:

Response forces must take over within the defined delay time

# Evaluation of the DBT(s)




- Regular evaluation every three years at the latest
- Triggered evaluation
  - new findings by the security authorities
  - incident not corresponding with the current DBT

in each case: process of approval up to the political level

- Modification of the respective ordinances and guidelines as consequence

Next regular evaluation starts in January 2018



# Contact



Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation,  
Building and Nuclear Safety (BMUB), Germany

Claudia Engelhardt

Division RS I 6

Security of Nuclear Installations and Transports of Nuclear Material,  
Defence against Nuclear Hazards, Technical Qualification

Tel.: (+49) 228 99305-2872

Fax: (+49) 228 99305-2889

[claudia.engelhardt@bmub.bund.de](mailto:claudia.engelhardt@bmub.bund.de)

[RSI6@bmub.bund.de](mailto:RSI6@bmub.bund.de)

[www.bmub.bund.de](http://www.bmub.bund.de)

