Excerpt from the IAEA Annual Report for 1994

Safeguards statement

In carrying out the safeguards obligations of the Agency in 1994, the Secretariat did not find any indication of the diversion of a significant amount of nuclear material for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon, of for any other military purpose, of for the manufacture of any other nuclear explosive device or for purposes unknown. Nor did the Secretariat find any evidence of misuse of safeguarded facilities, equipment or non-nuclear material. On the basis of all the information available to the Agency, it is considered reasonable to conclude that the nuclear material and other items which had been placed under Agency safeguards remained in peaceful nuclear activities or were otherwise adequately accounted for. 1

Although the Agency is progressively strengthening its ability to detect any nuclear material or facilities which have not been declared to the Agency and placed under safeguards, it is not possible to draw conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared material and facilities with the level of confidence that is attainable for nuclear material and facilities which were placed under safeguards.

With respect to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the questions raised in 1992, regarding the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration, have not been resolved. In October 1994, the United States of America and the DPRK signed an "Agreed Framework" providing for -- inter alia -- a "freeze" at the DPRK's graphite moderated reactors and related facilities. In November 1994, the Board of Governors authorized the Agency to act upon a United Nations Security Council request (contained in the 4 November 1994 Statement of the President of the Security Council) regarding inspection activities in the DPRK. At the end of November 1994, the Agency resumed inspection activities to continue implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, including measures required for monitoring the freeze. However, the DPRK is still not co-operating with the Agency to verify the correctness and completeness of its initial declaration. As a result, the Agency is still unable to conclude that there has been no diversion of nuclear material, and the DPRK remains in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.

1 The probability of detecting a diversion of nuclear material in an amount less than one significant quantity is lower than that of detecting a diversion of one significant quantity. The probability depends on the amount of nuclear material concerned and the technical measure and the resources available.

Programme overview

As of 31 December 1994, 199 safeguards agreements were in force with 118 States (and with Taiwan, China), compared to 194 agreements with 116 States (and with Taiwan, China) at the end of 1993.

Safeguards agreements pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force with Armenia in May and with Zambia in September. The quadripartite safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the Agency entered into force in March 1994. A unilateral submission agreement with India for the application of safeguards to all nuclear material previously subject to Agency safeguards under the expired trilateral safeguards agreement between India, the USA and the Agency (INFCIRC/154) entered into force in March 1994, and an amendment thereto in September covering nuclear material supplied by any State to India for use in the Tarapur Atomic Power Station. A project agreement with Colombia covering the supply of enriched uranium entered into force in June and a project agreement with Ghana covering the supply of a research reactor and enriched uranium entered into force in October.

The Board of Governors approved draft safeguards agreements pursuant to NPT with Belarus, Croatia, Dominica, Kazakhstan, St. Kitts and Nevis, Slovenia and Uzbekistan. It also approved a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Ukraine covering all nuclear material in all peaceful nuclear activities. None of these agreements had entered into force at the end of 1994. In addition, there were 14 agreements pursuant to NPT or NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, one agreement pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and one project agreement, all of which had previously been approved by the Board of Governors but none of which had entered into force at the end of 1994.

At the end of 1994, there were still five States of the former USSR which the Agency believes to have significant nuclear activities but without any safeguards agreement in force.

At the end of 1994, safeguards were applied in 48 States under agreements pursuant to NPT or to NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in 1 State under an agreement pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, in 2 States pursuant to a comprehensive safeguards agreement and in 7 States under INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements. Safeguards activities pursuant to NPT in Iraq continued to be subsumed under activities pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 687. The Agency also applies safeguards to nuclear installations in Taiwan, China.

Voluntary-offer agreements were in force with the five nuclear-weapon States and safeguards were applied pursuant to these agreements at designated facilities in all nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards activities in nuclear-weapon States also continued where other obligations existed, e.g. INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements.

Each State that concludes a safeguards agreement with the Agency pursuant to the NPT undertakes to accept safeguards, in accordance with the guidelines for safeguards agreements contained in document INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere. Safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 require that safeguards be applied to the nuclear material, facilities, equipment and non-nuclear material and with regard to certain technological information specified in them. In the case of nuclear-weapon States, safeguards agreements do not provide for safeguards on all nuclear material, and these States have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

As of 31 December 1994, safeguards agreements were in force with 102 States pursuant to NPT. For 61 non-nuclear-weapon States party to NPT there is still no safeguards agreement in force required in accordance with Article III.4 of the Treaty. As far as the Agency is aware, six of these States have significant nuclear activities. Safeguards were being applied in one State pursuant to another safeguards agreement, and preparatory work for the application of safeguards is under way in the other five States.

NPT safeguards agreements are in force with all 11 signatories of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Rarotonga Treaty); safeguards were applied in one of these States pursuant to such an agreement.

Twenty of the 29 States party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco have concluded safeguards agreements with the Agency pursuant to that Treaty and at the end of 1994 safeguards agreements pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco were in force with 18 States. Safeguards agreements pursuant to Additional Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco are in force with two States with territories in the zone of application of the Treaty, and a similar agreement with a third such State has been approved by the Board of Governors, but has not yet entered into force. Negotiation of a safeguards agreement between Chile and the Agency pursuant to the Treaty has entered into its final stage. In addition, the Secretariat has taken the view that the safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the Agency (INFCIRC/435) is compatible with the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

As a result of the revelations regarding the existence of a clandestine nuclear weapons programme in Iraq and various developments elsewhere, Member States of the Agency are strongly supportive of a strengthened safeguards regime that inter alia is better equipped to provide assurance regarding both the correctness and the completeness of a State's nuclear programme declaration. In April 1993, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI), acting on a request by the Director General, submitted its recommendations for improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system. Drawing on SAGSI's recommendations and other proposals, the Agency embarked on a major development programme (Programme '93+2') for a more cost effective system. The programme proceeded with the direct involvement of a number of Member States in testing the proposed measures.

Two meetings held in 1994 provided the opportunity for exchanges of information on recent developments in safeguards: a seminar on the current and future safeguards role of the Agency was held in January and a symposium on international nuclear safeguards was held in March.

Extensive discussions took place during 1994 with a view to finding remedies to the problem of trafficking in nuclear materials. The General Conference adopted a resolution calling upon Member States to take all necessary measures to prevent trafficking in nuclear material and inviting the Director General to intensify the Agency's activities and to prepare proposals for additional activities. In November a meeting of governmental experts was held. While confirming that the primary responsibility for preventing and responding to trafficking rests with the governments concerned, the meeting urged that practical and effective additional measures be taken at the international level particularly by and through the Agency. Proposals were submitted to the Board of Governors in December aimed at intensifying the Agency's activities, particularly in assistance with physical protection measures, improving State systems of accounting and control, and developing a reliable database of information on incidents of trafficking to assist governments of Member States and to better inform the public.

Owing to the 10% cut in the financial plan for 1994, there were delays in filling a number of vacant posts. The shortfall in funds also meant that the ability to co-ordinate the implementation of new safeguards equipment was adversely affected. Inspections in nuclear-weapon States under voluntary-offer agreements remained at a minimum. On the other hand, the release of deferred funds and the provision by several States of extrabudgetary resources for equipment procurement helped to alleviate the equipment shortages.

Events in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

In January 1994, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) indicated its readiness to accept inspection of declared nuclear material and installations required to provide the continuity of safeguards. A detailed list of inspection activities was agreed upon with the Agency on 15 February.

Following these discussions with the DPRK, an inspection was carried out in March to provide a continuity of knowledge at the declared facilities. However, at one of the seven declared facilities, a reprocessing plant known as the Radiochemical Laboratory, Agency inspectors were denied access to perform certain required and agreed safeguards activities. On 21 March this was reported to the Board of Governors, which adopted a resolution which, inter alia, called upon the DPRK immediately to allow the Agency to complete all requested inspection activities and requested the Director General to transmit the resolution to the Security Council. On 31 March, the President of the United Nations Security Council called upon the DPRK to enable Agency inspectors to complete the inspection activities outstanding since March.

The DPRK started the discharge of spent fuel from the reactor core of the experimental nuclear power plant at Nyongbyon on 9 May without the presence of Agency inspectors. The Agency confirmed to the DPRK that the discharge of fuel without the required safeguards measures related to the selection, segregation and securing of certain fuel rods would constitute a serious violation of the DPRK's safeguards agreement and requested that arrangements be made promptly for the necessary safeguards measures and urged that, until these were in place, further discharge should be deferred. The DPRK declined to accede to this request but nevertheless agreed to receive Agency officials to discuss the issue. However, although an Agency team had extensive discussions with DPRK officials from 25 to 27 May in an attempt to reach agreement about how to proceed with the implementation of the safeguards measures required, no agreement was reached. The Agency concluded that if the discharge of fuel from the reactor were to continue at the same pace as it had proceeded up until the time of the Agency teams visit, the opportunity to select, segregate and secure fuel rods for later measurements in accordance with Agency standards would be lost within days.

On 30 May, the President of the Security Council stated, inter alia, that the Council strongly urges the DPRK only to proceed with the discharge operation at the 5 MW(e) reactor in a manner which preserves the technical possibility of fuel measurements, in accordance with the Agency's requirements in this regard and that the Council calls for immediate consultations between the Agency and the DPRK on the necessary technical measures. In response to this statement, the Agency put forward three viable options but, despite such efforts, the core discharge was irreversible and seriously eroded the Agency's ability to undertake further measures crucial to its ability to ascertain whether all the plutonium produced in the DPRK had been declared to the Agency. In a further resolution on 10 June, the Board of Governors found that the DPRK was continuing to widen its non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, decided, in conformity with the provisions of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute, to suspend non-medical Agency assistance to the DPRK and asked the Director General to transmit the resolution to all Members of the Agency, to the Security Council and to the United Nations General Assembly.

On 15 June, the USA, in its capacity as depositary of the Statute, notified the Agency that the DPRK had decided to withdraw from Agency membership. This withdrawal did not affect the validity of the safeguards agreement between the DPRK and the Agency, which remains in force.

Bilateral talks between the DPRK and the USA culminated in an Agreed Framework signed in Geneva on 21 October. This document envisages specific functions for the Agency, notably to monitor a freeze on the DPRK's graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, to continue with verification activities at facilities not covered by the freeze and to take measures to verify the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK. A statement of 4 November by the President of the Security Council requested the Agency to take all steps necessary as a consequence of the Agreed Framework to monitor the freeze and requested the Agency to continue to report to it on the implementation of the safeguards agreement until the DPRK has come into full compliance with that agreement.

On 11 November the Board of Governors authorized the Agency to act upon the Security Council's request concerning inspections in the DPRK, including monitoring of the freeze. The activities required are part of activities which the Agency may perform while implementing safeguards agreements. Later in November, an Agency technical team visited the DPRK to explain the verification measures required.

The Agency's understanding of the freeze is that there will be no operations at the facilities covered by the freeze and no construction work of any kind, at either existing facilities or new, related facilities. The facilities covered by the freeze are the Nyongbyon 5 MW(e) Experimental Nuclear Power Plant, the Nyongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant, the Radiochemical Laboratory of the Institute of Radiochemistry of Nyongbyon, the Nyongbyon 50 MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant (under construction) and the Taechon 200 MW(e) Nuclear Power Plant (under construction). The Agency team visited the facilities subject to the freeze and was able to confirm that they were not in operation and that construction work had stopped.

The November discussions were constructive and arrangements were made to enable the Agency to meet most of its objectives. Further technical discussions with DPRK representatives were necessary regarding a few areas. Notwithstanding a continuing difference of view between the Agency and the DPRK as to the current status of the safeguards agreement, the DPRK has responded positively towards a number of safeguards measures that the Agency needs to perform to continue implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, including measures required for monitoring the freeze. Other issues remain open.

Activities in Iraq under United Nations Security Council resolutions

In 1994, the Agency's safeguards activities in Iraq pursuant to the safeguards agreement between Iraq and the Agency (INFCIRC/172) continued to be subsumed under activities pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for activities beyond those specified in that agreement. The Agency, which carried out five inspection missions to Iraq in 1994, continued to perform activities relating to the destruction, removal and rendering harmless of items pursuant to resolution 687 (1991). The removal of spent fuel from Iraq under a contract with the Russian Ministry for Atomic Energy was completed; the second and last shipment of 96 fuel assemblies out of Iraq, for processing and storage in the Russian Federation, was carried out in February. In accordance with its obligations under Security Council Resolution 715 (1991), with regard to ongoing monitoring and verification activities, the Agency has maintained a continuous presence of its inspectors in Iraq since August 1994. Office space and technical support (communications, transportation, interpretation and medical services) have been obtained in Baghdad, at the Monitoring and Verification Center which has been established by the United Nations Special Commission in consultation with the Agency. With the continuous presence of Agency inspectors in Iraq, the elements of the Agency's plan for the ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions are in place and operational.

Safeguards Operation


Steps were taken to arrange for the introduction of new or modified safeguards approaches in order to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards activities. For example:

New methods, procedures and techniques were developed and/or introduced in order to improve the quality and cost-effectiveness of Agency verification. For example: The recent entry into force of a number of new safeguards agreements and the anticipated conclusion of other agreements required additional inspection effort. In particular:

Pursuant to the proposal made by the President of the United States of America in September 1993 to submit to Agency safeguards nuclear material deemed by the USA to be excess to its weapon needs, Agency officials made several technical visits to the USA in order to discuss the implementation of Agency safeguards with respect to the material concerned. On the basis of an exchange of letters and in the framework of the voluntary-offer safeguards agreement between the Agency and the USA, safeguards began to be applied on a first quantity of excess nuclear material in September. By the end of December, the Agency had verified the initial inventories of high enriched uranium and plutonium at two sites.

The Regional Offices continued to contribute to the implementation of Agency safeguards in a cost effective manner. The Toronto Regional Office was able to provide a base for carrying out field trials under Programme 93+2 in Canada.

Negotiation of subsidiary arrangements

Some progress was made in the negotiation of Subsidiary Arrangements. One new and five revised General Parts of Subsidiary Arrangements (three new and 6 revised in 1993) and 29(15 new and 14 revised) facility attachments (29 in 1993) entered into force. In particular, the following should be noted:

Liaison with State authorities

Committee meetings and other regular forms of contact between the Agency and Member States continued to contribute to the further improvement of safeguards implementation. In particular, discussion were held on implementing measures to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the safeguards system and on the Agency's Programme '93+2'.

As part of the effort to establish State systems of accounting and control in States formed after the dissolution of the former USSR, several donor States have provided financial assistance. The Agency co- ordinated the identification of safeguards requirements and State needs for the support by these donor States. An important part of the support involving the Agency's assistance was the training in nuclear material accountancy organized for State and facility personnel. On the basis of information collected during technical visits, safeguards equipment requirements have been identified and budgeted, and initial purchases made for items with long lead times.

A large plutonium oxide store, incorporating state-of-the art technology, was selected to be placed under safeguards under a voluntary-offer agreement with a nuclear-weapon State. A safeguards system which includes on-line verification of nuclear material transfers in unattended mode was developed jointly with EURATOM. The installation of the equipment is scheduled to be completed before the first receipt of nuclear material into the store.

Nuclear material accountancy

During 1994, 216 semi-annual statements of book inventory were provided to States pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements. Fourteen reports of annual inventory were provided to States pursuant to INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements. Nuclear material accounting information was received from 54 States, following the INFCIRC/153-type reporting requirements and seven States submitted reports pursuant to INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 type agreements. A total of 20 613 nuclear material accounting reports were processed, consisting of 1 386 588 line entries.

Efforts to obtain universal acceptance of the reporting scheme endorsed by the Board of Governors at its meeting in February 1993 were continued. Forty-three States and the European Union have so far indicated their willingness to participate in the scheme. A computer system was developed to store and process the information received. The Board of Governors at its December meeting approved a modified list of equipment to be reported.

Support and development

Instrumentation development and field support

The extrabudgetary Member State support programmes continued to provide major contributions to the research and development and safeguards implementation support activities. The role of support programmes is important in realizing the expectations for strengthening the safeguards system and for developing and testing new techniques, concepts and procedures. Some 250 projects were under way, addressing safeguards needs identified by the Agency. During the year, bilateral meetings were held to review the status and activities of all the programmes.

Work continued on the development of instruments for specific applications in particular facilities as well as for general use. The following development and application tasks were successfully carried out:

An Advisory Group meeting on containment and surveillance was held to discuss remote instrumentation and data transport for safeguards application. The final report of the Advisory Group contains six recommendations which are in the process of being implemented by the Agency.

Implementation, maintenance and calibration services for safeguards equipment used by the inspectorate including preventive maintenance and the servicing of equipment in facilities continued to be provided. A programme for the replacement of aged equipment was implemented. Work on the standardization of gamma spectroscopy instrumentation for inspection use was completed. A gamma detector testing facility resulting in more streamlined and effective calibration and testing of gamma measurement systems became operational. A total of 15 portable multichannel analysers, 105 MIVS systems and 3 MXTV systems were upgraded. An additional 23 MIVS systems, 3 MUX systems and 8 COSMOS systems were installed. A total of 117 calibrations and 379 equipment maintenance actions were performed.

A meeting was convened with the MIVS developer and manufacturer as well as with representatives of EURATOM to review the status of MIVS performance, and to identify possible technical and procedural means to improve field performance. It was concluded that MIVS performance limitations are caused by a broad range of facility, procedural, training and reporting issues. Recommendations resulting from the meeting are being implemented.

Work progressed on the development of the equipment management information system, including a subsystem designed to provide up to date information regarding equipment needs, procurement and funding status and inventory.

The Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) and the Network of Analytical Laboratories (NWAL) performed 3067 measurements for calibration and quality control on NDA techniques, for certification of secondary reference samples, for maintenance and improvement of off-site destructive analysis (DA) and for testing procedures for on-site DA. In addition, 3062 measurements were performed by SAL and the NWAL for the routine quality control of the analysis of inspection samples. SAL also assisted in the measurement of samples taken in Iraq during inspections carried out pursuant to relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, and performed 418 such measurements. A total of 268 analytical results were reported by SAL on non-nuclear and environmental type samples. The median times required to complete verification by off-site DA were 51 days for uranium, 59 days for plutonium and 74 days for spent fuel samples.

Ground breaking took place on 14 October for the construction of a class 100 clean room at the SAL for the handling and analyses of environmental samples. Construction is scheduled to be completed by the end of 1995. A new high performance thermal ionization mass spectrometer for analyses in the subnanogram range of uranium and plutonium in environmental samples was installed. Testing of the equipment is in progress. Laboratories from seven Member States provided assistance in the analysis of environmental samples taken during environmental monitoring field trials. With the assistance of Member State support programmes and the NWAL, the following major development activities were accomplished/pursued:

Development of a safeguards system for a large reprocessing plant in Japan (JNFL)

During 1994, a revised project implementation plan was prepared for a large reprocessing plant in Japan (JNFL), taking into account the construction schedule and progress made in reaching agreement on different aspects of implementation.

Agreement was reached on the safeguards approach to be followed in the spent fuel receipt and storage area in the period before reprocessing commences. Containment/surveillance and monitoring equipment specifications and a procurement list were agreed upon. The equipment is expected to be available for installation and testing at the end of 1995.

Technical agreement was reached on the measurements to be supported and the general layout of the joint analytical laboratory. Work progressed on the development of joint-analyst working arrangements. Provisional cost estimates were prepared and discussions continued on cost sharing arrangements.

A proposed safeguards approach for the head-end of the facility, beginning with the shearing of spent fuel assemblies up to and including input accountability verification, was developed by the Agency and is presently under discussion.

Development of a safeguards system for a heavy water production plant in Agentina (PIAP Arroyito)

Ad hoc inspections were carried out early in 1994 for calibration of safeguards equipment installed at the Arroyito heavy water production plant in Argentina. Upon entry into force of the safeguards agreement between Argentina, Brazil, the ABACC and the Agency, safeguards activities at the plant were suspended.

Development of a safeguards system for a multi-unit on-load reactor in Canada (Darlington Units 3 and 4)

The Darlington Project, which had been extended into 1994, was finalized after completion of several pending tasks related to the core discharge monitor system and to other items of installed equipment.

Development of a safeguards system for a Siemens MOX fuel fabrication system in Germany

Completion of the construction of a Siemens MOX fuel fabrication plant was deferred until the plant obtains licensing. As a result, activities required before safeguards need to be implemented have been deferred.

Data processing development and services

Within the framework of the overall IAEA Safeguards Information System (ISIS), the nuclear material accounting system and inspection application systems were further developed and improved. In-field applications were improved and extended. The computerized inspection reports were further refined and improved, management information reporting was enhanced and quality controls were reinforced.

Further enhancements were made to the computer systems, including installation of new hardware and software to integrate mainframe databases into LAN applications. Within the framework of the LAN, the electronic mailing system was extended to cover the Regional Offices in Tokyo and Toronto.

Systems studies and approaches

The safeguards strengthening measures developed under Programme 93+2 were tested in four Member States. The field trials included the testing of measures aimed at increased transparency of a State's nuclear activities based on two complementary features increased physical access and increased access to information.

Following the endorsement by the Board of Governors of the proposed improvements in the early provision of design information and the continuity of this knowledge through the lifetime of the plant to its shutdown condition, work began on the preparation of procedures for reviewing and verifying the declared design information throughout the facility life-cycle. Work also progressed on the development of criteria for verification of final decommissioning of a facility.

Procedures for the termination of safeguards on nuclear material in waste, providing practical conditions for terminating safeguards on conditioned reprocessing waste, were prepared and implemented for specific safeguards situations. Work began on the development of procedures for the exemption of nuclear material from safeguards.

An evaluation was also carried out on whether the conditions for the starting point of safeguards are met at an earlier point in the fuel cycle (uranyl nitrate). This proposal was discussed by SAGSI and will be the subject of further studies.

Following established procedures, the Safeguards Research and Development and Implementation Support Programme for 1995-1996 was updated. This programme focuses on objectives based on foreseeable future safeguards conditions. It relies heavily on the voluntary participation of Member State support programmes and information presented in the programme on specific needs (description, priority level and desirable target date) and provides both the Agency and Member State support programmes with a basis for allocation of resources aimed at achieving these objectives.

A comprehensive study of the potential for plutonium production in different types of large research reactors was completed, with the participation of six Member State support programmes. Detailed analysis confirmed the validity of quantitative criteria established earlier for specific safeguards measures against unreported plutonium production in research reactors.

To facilitate an analysis of States nuclear and nuclear related activities, in particular by using a computerized information system, work was initiated on the development of a proliferation critical path structure and associated logical rules. With expert assistance from Member States, a proliferation critical path was developed as a means to structure both information and analysis requirements. The proliferation critical path is designed to include all known pathways for the production of weapons-usable material and subsequent weaponization. Identification and development of computer hardware and software for automating the information management and analysis system was initiated.

Experts from Member States, international organizations and the media were invited to attend a seminar on the current and future safeguards role of the Agency: challenges and opportunities, in January. The seminar provided an opportunity to take stock of the expanding verification mission of the Agency pursuant to multilateral another non-proliferation arrangements including nuclear weapon free zones. The meeting also discussed efforts to strengthen the Agencys safeguards system and to render it more effective and efficient. Proposals for the assignment of new verification responsibilities to the Agency in the field of arms control were also addressed.

A symposium on International Nuclear Safeguards was held in March, the seventh in a series. The symposium covered experience gained by the safeguards community on conventional safeguards measures and emerging technological developments. Recent issues were also addressed in order to provide guidance on safeguards technologies for the 21st century. Also included were presentations related to: measures being evaluated for further strengthening the Agency's safeguards system and improving cost effectiveness; the application of safeguards in the newly independent States of the former USSR; and the future implementation of safeguards in Brazil and Argentina.


A modified computerized inspection report system, which includes a formal material balance evaluation procedure, was implemented.

New models for statements provided to States on results and conclusions on safeguards activities performed under INFCIRC/153-type agreements, expected to be introduced in 1994, was postponed in order to improve the reliability of these models. The development of software for drafting the models was completed,including comprehensive testing of model statements for different types of facilities and the preparation of new instructions for completing the statements. The new statements will be implemented in 1995.

A total of 2044 inspection reports (2114 in 1993) and 2301 inspection statements (2417 in 1993) were reviewed and computerized quality control checks applied.

Reports on the quality and timeliness of inspection documentation packages were made routinely. Special emphasis was put on cases which required the longest times for processing with a view to identifying the causes for delays and introducing corrections. The average time between an inspection and the dispatch of results to the State was 61 days (56 days in 1993).

Reports on the quality controls applied to containment measures were made. In particular, the results of the monitoring of the verification of seals detached ‘blind seals programme’ and of the re-review of film/tapes were periodically issued.

Statistical analysis

Software which enables inspectors to produce in-field sampling plans and random item selections for verification measurements were successfully implemented in routine inspections. Work on existing near- real-time accountancy software resulted in the implementation of improved software.

In the evaluation of environmental monitoring techniques for safeguards applications related to Programme 93 + 2, nine sampling field trials were planned, carried out and, as far as results became available during 1994, evaluated.

During 1994, more than 470 routine data evaluation reports were prepared, comprising material balance evaluations (157), operator inspector pair evaluations (220) and verification performance history analyses (100). An annual summary of verification performance, covering all facilities, was prepared for DA and NDA measurements. A computer code to load the material balance evaluation results into the computerized inspection report system was implemented.

Throughout the year, a substantial effort was devoted to direct participation in inspections for specific activities, such as implementation of tank calibration software, review of operator measurement systems, as well as improvements in on-site data handling and evaluation procedures.

Safeguards training

During 1994, 43 training courses were conducted at Headquarters and in Member States. Of this total 27 courses provided basic, advanced, refresher and special training for Agency staff, primarily safeguards inspectors. Twelve other courses provided staff members with new and/or advanced skills applicable to data processing and other safeguards support areas. Individualized refresher training was given on C/S and NDA instrumentation.

Under the New Partnership Approach between the Agency and EURATOM, five inspectors from EURATOM participated in two Agency training courses and eight Agency inspectors were trained at two EURATOM sponsored courses.

Development of a safeguards system for the CANDU 600 nuclear power complex in Romania (Cernavoda Units 1 and 2)

Arrangements for the implementation of safeguards at the Cernavoda plant proceeded according to schedule, whereby it is expected that the first unit will commence operation in 1995. Field testing of a Mark II spent fuel bundle counter was undertaken prior to installation in the facility during 1995.

Programme "93+2"- a development programme for strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards

The Agency's programme to develop proposals for a strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards system (Programme 93+2) continued throughout 1994. The measures being developed are broad in scope and diverse in nature, dealing both with improvements in the cost effectiveness of safeguards on declared nuclear material and with increasing the assurance of the completeness of the declared nuclear activities in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements. A feature of the strengthened safeguards system under development is a greater transparency in States' nuclear activities. This transparency derives from an expanded declaration by the State in relation to all of its nuclear and related activities and broad access for the Agency to declared locations to assess that declaration. An information analysis system covering a wide range of sources is also being developed to support this assessment. Another key feature being developed is a greater level of co-operation with State systems of accounting and control (SSACs); this could introduce both safeguards strengthening measures, through the provision of increased access at declared locations, and cost-effective measures through, for example, joint activities, enabling a reduction in the Agency's efforts on declared nuclear material, while maintaining the Agency's ability to draw independent conclusions. Field tests of an integrated approach involving both strengthening measures and safeguards on declared material were carried out in four Member States.

In connection with Programme 93+2, as part of re-assessment of the current safeguards implementation, the effect (both cost and technical implications) of possible changes in significant quantities, in conversion and detection times, and in the starting point of safeguards was considered. Any update of the values assigned to safeguards implementation parameters will be further evaluated in the broader context of all measures undertaken towards a strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards system.

Twenty Member States assisted the Agency by permitting field trials of environmental monitoring and other safeguards strengthening measures or measures designed to make safeguards more cost effective. Progress reports were submitted to the Board of Governors in February, June and December and to the General Conference in September. SAGSI reviewed the programme at two junctures during the year.

Safeguards Management

Planning direction, co-ordination and control

SAGSI held two regular meetings and two working group meetings during 1994. It reviewed the programme on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system (Programme 93+2) in the light of the recommendations it had presented to the Director General in April 1993.

The internal review of technical policies placed emphasis on issues associated with Programme 93+2 in the areas of the termination of safeguards and exemptions. Technical reviews were carried out (as required by the safeguards criteria) on an increasing number of proposed safeguards approaches using dual C/S systems.

The mid-term review of the safeguards criteria 1991-1995 was completed and the resulting minor modifications were introduced in April. Thereafter, the review of the safeguards criteria was continued, addressing in particular criteria for safeguards measures on retained waste.

Effectiveness evaluation

The evaluation of inspection goal attainment in 1993 at facilities under safeguards was performed according to the 1991-1995 criteria. The areas in which the inspection goals could not be fully attained, for financial or other reasons, were identified and analysed. Conformity was established between the results reported to States in summary statements on inspection activities and the final evaluation results for 1993. The results of the evaluations were summarized in the SIR for 1993 and provided to the Board of Governors.

Provisional evaluations of inspection goal attainment were also performed on a continuous basis to assist the Inspectorate resolve problem areas and to aid in effective planning of subsequent inspection activities. This information was generated for use in the SIR for 1994.