International Atomic Energy Agency
(Unofficial electronic edition)
Agreement of 8 October 1994 Between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the
International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- The text of the Agreement between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is reproduced in this document for the information of
all Members. The Agreement was approved by the Agency's Board of Governors on
21 February 1994 and signed in Vienna on 5 April 1994 and in Tashkent on 8 October 1994.
- The Agreement entered into force, pursuant to Article 24, on 8 October 1994.
On 25 November 1998 an addendum was issued to this document (INFCIRC/508/Add.2)
Agreement Between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the International Atomic Energy Agency
for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
WHEREAS the Republic of Uzbekistan (hereinafter referred to as "Uzbekistan") is a party
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (reproduced in document INFCIRC/140) (hereinafter referred to as "the
Treaty") opened for signature at London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968 and which
entered into force on 5 March 1970;
WHEREAS paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty reads as follows:
WHEREAS the International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency")
is authorized, pursuant to Article III of its Statute, to conclude such agreements;
"Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safeguards, as set
forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy
Agency in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its
obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy
from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for
the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special
fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear
facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be
applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within
the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere".
NOW THEREFORE Uzbekistan and the Agency have agreed as follows:
Uzbekistan undertakes, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article III of the Treaty, to accept
safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction
or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such
material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS
The Agency shall have the right and the obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied,
in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material
in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of Uzbekistan, under its jurisdiction or
carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such
material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
CO-OPERATION BETWEEN UZBEKISTAN AND THE AGENCY
Uzbekistan and the Agency shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards
provided for in this Agreement.
IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS
The safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:
- to avoid hampering the economic and technological development of Uzbekistan or
international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including
international exchange of nuclear material;
- to avoid undue interference in Uzbekistan's peaceful nuclear activities, and in
particular in the operation of facilities; and
- to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and
safe conduct of nuclear activities.
- The Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets
and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of
- The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organisation or
person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation
of this Agreement, except that specific information relating to the
implementation thereof may be given to the Board of Governors of the
Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Board") and to such Agency staff
members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in
connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency
to fulfil its responsibilities in implementing this Agreement.
- Summarized information on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if the States directly
concerned agree thereto.
- The Agency shall, in implementing safeguards pursuant to this Agreement, take full
account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make
every effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle
of safeguarding effectively the flow of nuclear material subject to safeguards under
this Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points
to the extent that present or future technology permits.
- In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use shall be made, for example, of
such means as:
- containment as a means of defining material balance areas for accounting
- statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear
- concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel
cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material
from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily
be made, and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other
nuclear material, on condition that this does not hamper the Agency in
applying safeguards under this Agreement.
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF MATERIALS CONTROL
- Uzbekistan shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all
nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
- The Agency shall apply safeguards in such a manner as to enable it to verity, in
ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses
to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of Uzbekistan's
system. The Agency's verification shall include, inter alia, independent
measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the
procedures specified in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency, in its verification,
shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of Uzbekistan's system.
PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY
- In order to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards under this Agreement,
Uzbekistan shall, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II of this
Agreement, provide the Agency with information concerning nuclear material subject
to safeguards under this Agreement and the features of facilities relevant to
safeguarding such material.
- The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data
consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under this Agreement.
- Information pertaining to facilities shall be the minimum necessary for
safeguarding nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
- If Uzbekistan so requests, the Agency shall be prepared to examine on premises of
Uzbekistan design information which Uzbekistan regards as being of particular
sensitivity. Such information need not be physically transmitted to the Agency
provided that it remains readily available for further examination by the Agency on
premises of Uzbekistan.
- The Agency shall secure the consent of Uzbekistan to the designation of
Agency inspectors to Uzbekistan.
- If Uzbekistan, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after
a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall
propose to Uzbekistan an alternative designation or designations.
- If, as a result of the repeated refusal of Uzbekistan to accept the designation
of Agency inspectors, inspections to be conducted under this Agreement
would be impeded, such refusal shall be considered by the Board, upon
referral by the Director General of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the
Director General"), with a view to its taking appropriate action.
- Uzbekistan shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can
effectively discharge their functions under this Agreement.
- The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as:
- to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to
Uzbekistan and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected; and
- to ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information
coming to the inspectors' knowledge.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Uzbekistan shall accord to the Agency (including its property, funds and assets) and to its
inspectors and other officials, performing functions under this Agreement, the same privileges
and immunities as those set forth in the relevant provisions of the Agreement on the
Privileges and Immunities of the International Atomic Energy Agency. (Reproduced in
TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS
Consumption or dilution of nuclear material
Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material upon determination by the Agency that the
material has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for
any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably
Transfer of nuclear material out of Uzbekistan.
Uzbekistan shall give the Agency advance notification of intended transfers of nuclear
material subject to safeguards under this Agreement out of Uzbekistan, in accordance with the
provisions set out in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency shall terminate safeguards on
nuclear material under this Agreement when the recipient State has assumed responsibility
therefor, as provided for in Part II of this Agreement. The Agency shall maintain records
indicating each transitory and, where applicable, the re-application of safeguards to the
transferred nuclear material.
Provisions relating to nuclear material to be used in non-nuclear activities
Where nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement is to be used in
non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, Uzbekistan shall
agree with the Agency, before the material is so used, on the circumstances under which the
safeguards on such material may be terminated.
NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN
If Uzbekistan intends to exercise its discretion to use nuclear material which is
required to be safeguarded under this Agreement in a nuclear activity which does not require
the application of safeguards under this Agreement, the following procedures shall apply:
- Uzbekistan shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:
- that the use of the nuclear material in a non-proscribed military activity will
not be in conflict with an undertaking Uzbekistan may have given and in
respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the material will be used only
in a peaceful nuclear activity; and
- that during the period of non-application of safeguards the nuclear material
will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear
- Uzbekistan and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while the
nuclear material is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in this Agreement will not
be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or
circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the
safeguards provided for in this Agreement shall apply again as soon as the nuclear material is
reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept
informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafe guarded material in
Uzbekistan and of any export of such material; and
- each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. Such agreement
shall be given as promptly as possible and shall relate only to such matters as, inter alia,
temporal and procedural provisions and reporting arrangements, but shall not involve
any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of
the nuclear material therein.
Uzbekistan and the Agency will bear the expenses incurred by them in implementing
their respective responsibilities under this Agreement. However, if Uzbekistan or persons
under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the
Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to
do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling
which inspectors may request.
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE
Uzbekistan shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of
nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security, which may be available
under its laws or regulations shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the
implementation of this Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of
Any claim by Uzbekistan against the Agency or by the Agency against Uzbekistan in
respect of any damage resulting from the implementation of safeguards under this Agreement,
other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, shall be settled in accordance with
MEASURES IN RELATION TO VERIFICATION OF NON-DIVERSION
If the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by Uzbekistan
is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that nuclear material subject to
safeguards under this Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, the Board may call upon Uzbekistan to take the required action without delay,
irrespective of whether procedures have been invoked pursuant to Article 22 of this
Agreement for the settlement of a dispute.
If the Board, upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director
General, finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of
nuclear material required to be safeguarded under this Agreement to nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII
of the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Statute") and may also take,
where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the
Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that
have been applied and shall afford Uzbekistan every reasonable opportunity to furnish the
Board with any necessary reassurance.
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT
Uzbekistan and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult about any question
arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement.
Uzbekistan shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the
interpretation or application of this Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall
invite Uzbekistan to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board.
Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement, except a
dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under Article 19 or an action taken by the
Board pursuant to such a finding, which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure
agreed to by Uzbekistan and the Agency shall, at the request of either, be submitted to an
arbitral tribunal composed as follows: Uzbekistan and the Agency shall each designate one
arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman.
If, within thirty days of the request for arbitration, either Uzbekistan or the Agency has not
designated an arbitrator, either Uzbekistan or the Agency may request the President of the
International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if,
within thirty days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third
arbitrator has not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal shall
constitute a quorum, and all decisions shall require the concurrence of two arbitrators.
The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal shall be
binding on Uzbekistan and the Agency.
AMENDMENT OF THE AGREEMENT
- Uzbekistan and the Agency shall, at the request of either, consult each other on
amendment to this Agreement.
- All amendments shall require the agreement of Uzbekistan and the Agency.
- Amendments to this Agreement shall enter into force in the same conditions as
entry into force of the Agreement itself.
- The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the Agency of
any amendment to this Agreement.
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION
This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by the representatives of
Uzbekistan and the Agency. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of
the Agency of the entry into force of this Agreement.
This Agreement shall remain in force as long as Uzbekistan is party to the Treaty.
P A R T II
The purpose of this part of the Agreement is to specify the procedures to be applied in
the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.
OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDS
The objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in this part of the Agreement is
the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful
nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices
or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.
For the purpose of achieving the objective set forth in Article 27, material accountancy
shall be used as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and
surveillance as important complementary measures.
The technical conclusion of the Agency's verification activities shall be a statement, in
respect of each material balance area, of the amount of material unaccounted for over a
specific period, and giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.
NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR
Pursuant to Article 7 the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make
full use of Uzbekistan's system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to
safeguards under this Agreement and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of Uzbekistan's
accounting and control activities.
Uzbekistan's system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to
safeguards under this Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas, and
shall make provision, as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, for the
establishment of such measures as:
- a measurement system for the determination of the quantities of nuclear material
received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the
quantities on inventory;
- the evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements and the estimation of
- procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver
- procedures for taking a physical inventory;
- procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and
- a system of records and reports showing, for each material balance area, the
inventory of nuclear material and the changes in that inventory including receipts into
and transfers out of the material balance area;
- provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being
operated correctly; and
- procedures for the provision of reports to the Agency in accordance with Articles
STARTING POINT OF SAFEGUARDS
Safeguards under this Agreement shall not apply to material in mining or ore
- When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage
of the nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (c) is directly or indirectly exported
to a non-nuclear-weapon State, Uzbekistan shall inform the Agency of its quantity,
composition and destination, unless the material is exported for specifically
- When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage
of the nuclear fuel cycle described in paragraph (c) is imported, Uzbekistan shall
inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported
for specifically non-nuclear purposes; and
- When any nuclear material of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication
or for isotopic enrichment leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been
produced, or when such nuclear material, or any other nuclear material produced at
a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into Uzbekistan, the nuclear
material shall become subject to the other safeguards procedures specified in this
TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS
- Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 11. Where the conditions of that
Article are not met, but Uzbekistan considers that the recovery of safeguarded nuclear
material from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, Uzbekistan
and the Agency shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be applied.
- Safeguards shall terminate on nuclear material subject to safeguards under this
Agreement, under the conditions set forth in Article 13, provided that Uzbekistan and
the Agency agree that such nuclear material is practicably irrecoverable.
EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS
At the request of Uzbekistan, the Agency shall exempt nuclear material from
safeguards, as follows:
- special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing
component in instruments;
- nuclear material, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with
Article 13. if such nuclear material is recoverable: and
- plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%.
At the request of Uzbekistan the Agency shall exempt from safeguards nuclear
material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards, provided that the total quantity of
nuclear material which has been exempted in Uzbekistan in accordance with this Article may
not at any time exceed:
- one kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or
more of the following:
- uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by
multiplying its weight by its enrichment; and
- uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural
uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square
of its enrichment;
- ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an
enrichment above 0.005 (0 5%);
- twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5%) or
- twenty metric tons of thorium;
or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board for uniform application.
If exempted nuclear material is to be processed or stored together with nuclear
material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, provision shall be made for the
re-application of safeguards thereto.
Uzbekistan and the Agency shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify
in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this
Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in this
Agreement are to be applied. The Subsidiary Arrangements may be extended or changed by
agreement between Uzbekistan and the Agency without amendment of this Agreement.
The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as
possible after, the entry into force of this Agreement. Uzbekistan and the Agency shall make
every effort to achieve their entry into force within ninety days of the entry into force of this
Agreement; an extension of that period shall require agreement between Uzbekistan and the
Agency. Uzbekistan shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for
completing the Subsidiary Arrangements. Upon the entry into force of this Agreement, the
Agency shall have the right to apply the procedures laid down therein in respect of the
nuclear material listed in the inventory provided for in Article 40, even if the Subsidiary
Arrangements have not yet entered into force.
On the basis of the initial report referred to in Article 61, the Agency shall establish a
unified inventory of all nuclear material in Uzbekistan subject to safeguards under this
Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and shall maintain this inventory on the basis of
subsequent reports and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventory shall
be made available to Uzbekistan at intervals to be agreed.
Pursuant to Article 8, design information in respect of existing facilities shall be
provided to the Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements. The time limits
for the provision of design information in respect of the new facilities shall be specified in the
Subsidiary Arrangements and such information shall be provided as early as possible before
nuclear material is introduced into a new facility.
The design information to be provided to the Agency shall include, in respect of each
facility, when applicable:
- the identification of the facility, stating its general character, purpose, nominal
capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine
- a description of the general arrangement of the facility with reference, to the extent
feasible, to the form, location and flow of nuclear material and to the general layout
of important items of equipment which use, produce or process nuclear material;
- a description of features of the facility relating to material accountancy,
containment and surveillance; and
- a description of the existing and proposed procedures at the facility for nuclear
material accountancy and control, with special reference to material balance areas
established by the operator, measurements of flow and procedures for physical
Other information relevant to the application of safeguards shall also be provided to
the Agency in respect of each facility, in particular on organisational responsibility for
material accountancy and control. Uzbekistan shall provide the Agency with supplementary
information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with
which the inspectors shall comply at the facility.
The Agency shall be provided with design information in respect of a modification
relevant for safeguards purposes, for examination, and shall be informed of any change in the
information provided to it under Article 43, sufficiently in advance for the safeguards
procedures to be adjusted when necessary.
Purposes of examination of design information
The design information provided to the Agency shall be used for the following
- to identify the features of facilities and nuclear material relevant to the application
of safeguards to nuclear material in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;
- to determine material balance areas to be used for Agency accounting purposes and
to select those strategic points which are key measurement points and which will be
used to determine flow and inventory of nuclear material; in determining such
material balance areas the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria:
- the size of the material balance area shall be related to the accuracy with
which the material balance can be established;
- in determining the material balance area advantage shall be taken of any
opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the
completeness of flow measurements and thereby to simplify the application
of safeguards and to concentrate measurement efforts at key measurement
- a number of material balance areas in use at a facility or at distinct sites may
be combined in one material balance area to be used for Agency accounting
purposes when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its
verification requirements; and
- a special material balance area may be established at the request of
Uzbekistan around a process step involving commercially sensitive
- to establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of physical inventory of
nuclear material for Agency accounting purposes;
- to establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation
- to establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and
location of nuclear material; and
- to select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and
techniques and the strategic points at which they are to be applied.
The results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the
Re-examination of design information
Design information shall be re-examined in the light of changes in operating
conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application of
verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action the Agency has taken pursuant to
Verification of design information
The Agency, in co-operation with Uzbekistan, may send inspectors to facilities to
verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to Articles 41-44, for the
purposes stated in Article 45.
INFORMATION IN RESPECT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUTSIDE FACILITIES
The Agency shall be provided with the following information when nuclear material is
to be customarily used outside facilities, as applicable:
- a general description of the use of the nuclear material, its geographic location, and
the user's name and address for routine business purposes; and
- a general description of the existing and proposed procedures for nuclear material
accountancy and control, including organisational responsibility for material
accountancy and control.
The Agency shall be informed, on a timely basis, of any change in the information
provided to it under this Article.
The information provided to the Agency pursuant to Article 48 may be used, to the
extent relevant, for the purposes set out in Article 45(b)-(f).
In establishing its system of materials control as referred to in Article 7, Uzbekistan
shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each material balance area. The records to
be kept shall be described in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
Uzbekistan shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by
inspectors, particularly if the records are not kept in English, French, Russian or Spanish.
Records shall be retained for at least five years.
Records shall consist, as appropriate, of:
- accounting records of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement;
- operating records for facilities containing such nuclear material.
The system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports
are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in
quality to such standards.
The accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each material balance
- all inventory changes, so as to permit a determination of the book inventory at any
- all measurement results that are used for determination of the physical inventory;
- all adjustments and corrections that have been made in respect of inventory
changes book inventories and physical inventories.
For all inventory changes and physical inventories the records shall show, in respect of
each batch of nuclear material: material identification, batch data and source data. The
records shall account for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each batch of nuclear
material. For each inventory change, the date of the inventory change and, when appropriate,
the originating material balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient,
shall be indicated.
The operating records shall set forth, as appropriate, in respect of each material
- those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and
composition of nuclear material;
- the data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling
and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived
estimates of random and systematic error;
- a description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a
physical inventory, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and
- a description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of
any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.
Uzbekistan shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in Articles 59-68 in
respect of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement.
Reports shall be made in English, French, Russian or Spanish, except as otherwise
specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
Reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with Articles 50-57 and shall
consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports.
The Agency shall be provided with an initial report on all nuclear material subject to
safeguards under this Agreement. The initial report shall be dispatched by Uzbekistan
to the Agency within thirty days of the last day of the calendar month in which this
Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month.
Uzbekistan shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports for each
material balance area:
- inventory change reports showing all changes in the inventory of nuclear material.
The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days
after the end of the month in which the inventory changes occurred or were
- material balance reports showing the material balance based on a physical
inventory of nuclear material actually present in the material balance area. The reports shall
be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within thirty days after the
physical inventory has been taken.
The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be
corrected at a later date, as required.
Inventory change reports shall specify identification and batch data for each batch of
nuclear material, the date of the inventory change and, as appropriate, the originating material
balance area and the receiving material balance area or the recipient. These reports shall be
accompanied by concise notes:
- explaining the inventory changes, on the basis of the operating data contained in
the operating records provided for under Article 57(a); and
- describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational
programme, particularly the taking of a physical inventory.
Uzbekistan shall report each inventory change, adjustment and correction, either
periodically in a consolidated list or individually. Inventory changes shall be reported in terms
of batches. As specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, small changes in inventory of
nuclear material, such as transfers of analytical samples, may be combined in one batch and
reported as one inventory change.
The Agency shall provide Uzbekistan with semi-annual statements of book inventory
of nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement, for each material balance
area, as based on the inventory change reports for the period covered by each such statement.
Material balance reports shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by
Uzbekistan and the Agency:
- beginning physical inventory;
- inventory changes (first increases, then decreases);
- ending book inventory;
- shipper/receiver differences;
- adjusted ending book inventory;
- ending physical inventory; and
- material unaccounted for.
A statement of the physical inventory, listing all batches separately and specifying
material identification and batch data for each batch, shall be attached to each material
Uzbekistan shall make special reports without delay:
- if any unusual incident or circumstances lead Uzbekistan to believe that there is or
may have been loss of nuclear material that exceeds the limits specified for this
purpose in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or
- if the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary
Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of nuclear material has become
Amplification and clarification of reports
If the Agency so requests, Uzbekistan shall provide it with amplifications or
clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
The Agency shall have the right to make inspections as provided for in Articles 70-81.
Purposes of inspections
The Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to:
- verify the intimation contained in the initial report on the nuclear material subject
to safeguards under this Agreement;
- identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of
the initial report; and
- identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, nuclear material in
accordance with Articles 92 and 95, before its transfer out of or upon its transfer into
The Agency may make routine inspections in order to:
- verify that reports are consistent with records;
- verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all nuclear material
subject to safeguards under this Agreement; and
- verity information on the possible causes of material unaccounted for,
shipper/receiver differences and uncertainties in the book inventory.
Subject to the procedures laid down in Article 76, the Agency may make special
- in order to verify the information contained in special reports; or
- if the Agency considers that information made available by Uzbekistan, including
explanations from Uzbekistan and information obtained from routine inspections, is
not adequate for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under this Agreement.
An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine
inspection effort provided for in Articles 77-81 or involves access to information or locations
in addition to the access specified in Article 75 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both.
Scope of inspections
For the purposes specified in Articles 70-72, the Agency may:
- examine the records kept pursuant to Articles 50-57;
- make independent measurements of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under
- verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and
- apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and
- use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically
Within the scope of Article 73, the Agency shall be enabled:
- to observe that samples at key measurement points for material balance
accountancy are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples,
to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such
- to observe that the measurements of nuclear material at key measurement points
for material balance accountancy are representative, and to observe the calibration of the
instruments and equipment involved;
- to make arrangements with Uzbekistan that, if necessary:
- additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the
- the Agency's standard analytical samples are analysed;
- appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other
- other calibrations are carried out;
- to arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance,
and if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to arrange to install
- to apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to
containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and
- to make arrangements with Uzbekistan for the shipping of samples taken for the
Access for inspections
- For the purposes specified in Article 70(a) and (b) and until such time as the
strategic points have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency inspectors
shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried
out in connection with it indicate that nuclear material is present;
- For the purposes specified in Article 70(c) the inspectors shall have access to any
location of which the Agency has been notified in accordance with Articles 91(d)(iii)
- For the purposes specified in Article 71 the inspectors shall have access only to the
strategic points specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records
maintained pursuant to Articles 50-57; and
- In the event of Uzbekistan concluding that any unusual circumstances require
extended limitations on access by the Agency, Uzbekistan and the Agency shall
promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its
safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall
report each such arrangement to the Board.
In circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in
Article 72 Uzbekistan and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such
consultations the Agency may:
- make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in
- obtain access, in agreement with Uzbekistan, to information or locations in
addition to those specified in Article 75. Any disagreement concerning the need for additional
access shall be resolved in accordance with Articles 21 and 22; in case action by
Uzbekistan is essential and urgent, Article 18 shall apply.
Frequency and intensity of routine inspections
The Agency shall keep the number, intensity and duration of routine inspections,
applying optimum timing, to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the
safeguards procedures set forth in this Agreement, and shall make the optimum and most
economical use of inspection resources available to it.
The Agency may carry out one routine inspection per year in respect of facilities and
material balance areas outside facilities with a content or annual throughput, whichever is
greater, of nuclear material not exceeding five effective kilograms.
The number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of
facilities with a content or annual throughput of nuclear material exceeding five effective
kilograms shall be determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the
inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain
continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of nuclear material, and the maximum
routine inspection effort in respect of such facilities shall be determined as follows:
- for reactors and sealed storage installations the maximum total of routine
inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a man-year of inspection for
each such facility;
- for facilities, other than reactors or sealed storage installations, involving
plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine inspection per
year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility 30 x square root of E man-days of
inspection per year, where E is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear
material, whichever is greater, expressed in effective kilograms. The maximum
established for any such facility shall not, however, be less than 1.5 man-years of
- for facilities not covered by paragraphs (a) or (b), the maximum total of routine
inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such facility one third
of a man-year of inspection plus 0.4 x E man-days of inspection per year, where E
is the inventory or annual throughput of nuclear material, whichever is greater,
expressed in effective kilograms.
Uzbekistan and the Agency may agree to amend the figures for the maximum
inspection effort specified in this Article, upon determination by the Board that such
amendment is reasonable.
Subject to Articles 77-79 the criteria to be used for determining the actual number,
intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections in respect of any facility shall
- the form of the nuclear material, in particular, whether the nuclear material is in
bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in the
case of uranium, whether it is of low or high enrichment; and its accessibility;
- the activeness of Uzbekistan's accounting and control system, including the extent
to which the operators of facilities are functionally independent of Uzbekistan's
accounting and control system; the extent to which the measures specified in Article
31 have been implemented by Uzbekistan; the promptness of reports provided to the
Agency; their consistency with the Agency's independent verification; and the amount
and accuracy of the material unaccounted for, as verified by the Agency;
- characteristics of Uzbekistan's nuclear fuel cycle, in particular, the number and
types of facilities containing nuclear material subject to safeguards, the characteristics of
such facilities relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent
to which the design of such facilities facilitates verification of the flow and inventory
of nuclear material; and the extent to which information from different material
balance areas can be correlated;
- international interdependence, in particular, the extent to which nuclear material is
received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activities
by the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which Uzbekistan's nuclear
activities are interrelated with those of other States; and
- technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical
techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of nuclear material.
Uzbekistan and the Agency shall consult if Uzbekistan considers that the inspection
effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular facilities.
Notice of inspections
The Agency shall give advance notice to Uzbekistan before arrival of inspectors at
facilities or material balance areas outside facilities, as follows:
- for ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 70(c), at least 24 hours; for those
pursuant to Article 70(a) and (b) as well as the activities provided for in Article 47, at least
- for special inspections pursuant to Article 72, as promptly as possible after
Uzbekistan and the Agency have consulted as provided for in Article 76, it being
understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the
- for routine inspections pursuant to Article 71, at least 24 hours in respect of the
facilities referred to in Article 79(b) and sealed storage installations containing
plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, and one week in all other cases.
Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the inspectors and shall indicate
the facilities and the material balance areas outside facilities to be visited and the periods
during which they will be visited. If the inspectors are to arrive from outside Uzbekistan the
Agency shall also give advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in Uzbekistan.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 82, the Agency may, as a supplementary
measure, carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant
to Article 79 in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any
unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any operational programme
provided by Uzbekistan pursuant to Article 63(b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the
basis of the operational programme, it shall advise Uzbekistan periodically of its general
programme of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when
inspections are foreseen. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make
every effort to minimize any practical difficulties for Uzbekistan and for facility operators,
bearing in mind the relevant provisions of Articles 43 and 88. Similarly Uzbekistan shall
make every effort to facilitate the task of the inspectors.
Designation of inspectors
The following procedures shall apply to the designation of inspectors:
- the Director General shall inform Uzbekistan in writing of the name, qualifications,
nationality, grade and such other particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency
artificial he proposes for designation as an inspector for Uzbekistan;
- Uzbekistan shall inform the Director General within thirty days of the receipt of
a proposal whether it accepts the proposal;
- the Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by
Uzbekistan as one of the inspectors for Uzbekistan, and shall inform Uzbekistan of
such designations; and
- the Director General, acting in response to a request by Uzbekistan or on his own
initiative, shall immediately inform Uzbekistan of the withdrawal of the designation
of any official as an inspector for Uzbekistan.
However, in respect of inspectors needed for the activities provided for in Article 47
and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to Article 70(a) and (b) the designation
procedures shall be completed if possible within thirty days after the entry into force of this
Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, inspectors for such
purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis.
Uzbekistan shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where
required, for each inspector designated for Uzbekistan.
Conduct and visits of inspectors
Inspectors, in exercising their functions under Articles 47 and 70-74, shall carry out
their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction,
commissioning or operation of facilities, or affecting their safety. In particular inspectors shall
not operate any facility themselves or direct the staff of a facility to carry out any operation.
If inspectors consider that in pursuance of Articles 73 and 74, particular operations in a
facility should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor.
When inspectors require services available in Uzbekistan, including the use of
equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, Uzbekistan shall facilitate the
procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by inspectors.
Uzbekistan shall have the right to have inspectors accompanied during their
inspections by representatives of Uzbekistan, provided that inspectors shall not thereby be
delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.
STATEMENTS ON THE AGENCY'S VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
The Agency shall inform Uzbekistan of:
- the results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary
- the conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities in Uzbekistan, in
particular by means of statements in respect of each material balance area, which
shall be made as soon as possible after a physical inventory has been taken and
verified by the Agency and a material balance has been struck.
Nuclear material subject or required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement
which is transferred internationally shall, for purposes of this Agreement, be regarded as
being the responsibility of Uzbekistan:
- in the case of import into Uzbekistan, from the time that such responsibility ceases
to lie with the exporting State, and no later than the time at which the material
reaches its destination; and
- in the case of export out of Uzbekistan, up to the time at which the recipient State
assumes such responsibility, and no later than the time at which the nuclear material
reaches its destination.
The point at which the transfer of responsibility will take place shall be determined in
accordance with suitable arrangements to be made by the States concerned. Neither
Uzbekistan nor any other State shall be deemed to have such responsibility for nuclear
material merely by reason of the fact that the nuclear material is in transit on or over its
territory, or that it is being transported on a ship under its flag or in its aircraft.
Transfers out of Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan shall notify the Agency of any intended transfer out of Uzbekistan of
nuclear material subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the shipment exceeds
one effective kilogram, or if, within a period of three months, several separate
shipments are to be made to the same State, each of less than one effective kilogram
but the total of which exceeds one effective kilogram.
Such notification shall be given to the Agency after the conclusion of the
contractual arrangements leading to the transfer and normally at least two weeks before the
nuclear material is to be prepared for shipping.
Uzbekistan and the Agency may agree on different procedures for advance
The notification shall specify:
- the identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of
the nuclear material to be transferred, and the material balance area from
which it will come;
- the State for which the nuclear material is destined;
- the dates on and locations at which the nuclear material is to be prepared for
- the approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the nuclear material; and
- at what point of the transfer the recipient State will assume responsibility for
the nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date
on which that point will be reached.
The notification referred to in Article 91 shall be such as to enable the Agency to
make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and
composition of, the nuclear material before it is transferred out of Uzbekistan and, if the
Agency so wishes or Uzbekistan so requests, to affix seals to the nuclear material when it has
been prepared for shipping. However, the transfer of the nuclear material shall not be delayed
in any way by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to such a
If the nuclear material will not be subject to Agency safeguards in the recipient State,
Uzbekistan shall make arrangements for the Agency to receive, within three months of
the time when the recipient State accepts responsibility for the nuclear material from
Uzbekistan, confirmation by the recipient State of the transfer.
Transfers into Uzbekistan
- Uzbekistan shall notify the Agency of any expected transfer into Uzbekistan of
nuclear material required to be subject to safeguards under this Agreement if the
shipment exceeds one effective kilogram, or if, within a period of three months,
several separate shipments are to be received from the same State, each of less than
one effective kilogram but the total of which exceeds one effective kilogram.
- The Agency shall be notified as much in advance as possible of the expected
arrival of the nuclear material, and in any case not later than the date on which Uzbekistan
assumes responsibility for the nuclear material.
- Uzbekistan and the Agency may agree on different procedures for advance
- The notification shall specify:
- the identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of
the nuclear material;
- at what point of the transfer Uzbekistan will assume responsibility for the
nuclear material for the purpose of this Agreement, and the probable date on
which that point will be reached; and
- the expected date of arrival, the location where, and the date on which, the
nuclear material is intended to be unpacked.
The notification referred to in Article 94 shall be such as to enable the Agency to
make, if necessary, an ad hoc inspection to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and
composition of, the nuclear material at the time the consignment is unpacked. However,
unpacking shall not be delayed by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant
to such a notification.
Uzbekistan shall make a special report as envisaged in Article 67 if any unusual
incident or circumstances lead Uzbekistan to believe that there is or may have been loss of
nuclear material, including the occurrence of significant delay, during an international
For the purposes of this Agreement:
- adjustment means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a
shipper/receiver difference or material unaccounted for.
- annual throughput means, for the purposes of Articles 78 and 79, the amount
nuclear material transferred annually out of a facility working at nominal capacity.
- batch means a portion of nuclear material handled as a unit for accounting
at a key measurement point and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a
single set of specifications or measurements. The nuclear material may be in bulk form or
contained in a number of separate items.
- batch data means the total weight of each element of nuclear material and, in
case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of
account shall be as follows:
- grams of contained plutonium;
- grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for
uranium enriched in these isotopes; and
- kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium.
For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the batch shall be added
together before rounding to the nearest unit.
- book inventory of a material balance area means the algebraic sum of the
recent physical inventory of that material balance area and of all inventory changes that have
occurred since that physical inventory was taken.
- correction means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an
identified mistake or to reelect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered
into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains.
- effective kilogram means a special unit used in safeguarding nuclear
quantity in effective kilograms is obtained by taking:
- for plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
- for uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms
multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
- for uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 ( 1 %) and above 0.005 (0.5 %), its
weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and
- for depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below, and for
thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005
- enrichment means the ratio of the combined weight of the isotopes
and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question.
- facility means:
- a reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing
plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or
- any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram
is customarily used.
- inventory change means an increase or decrease, in terms of batches, of
material in a material balance area; such a change shall involve one of the following:
- domestic receipt: receipts from other material balance areas, receipts from a
non-safeguarded (non-peaceful) activity or receipts at the starting point of
- nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor
- de-exemption: re-application of safeguards on nuclear material previously
exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity.
- domestic shipment: shipments to other material balance areas or shipments
for a non-safeguarded (non-peaceful) activity;
- nuclear loss: loss of nuclear material due to its transformation into other
element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions;
- measured discard: nuclear material which has been measured, or estimated
on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not
suitable for further nuclear use;
- retained waste: nuclear material generated from processing or from an
operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being
but which is stored;
- exemption: exemption of nuclear material from safeguards on account of its
use or quantity; and
- other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent
loss of nuclear material as the result of an operational accident) or theft.
- key measurement point means a location where nuclear material appears in
form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. Key measurement
points thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured
discards) and storages in material balance areas.
- man-year of inspection means, for the purposes of Article 79, 300 man-days
inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a facility at
any time for a total of not more than eight hours.
- material balance area means an area in or outside of a facility such that:
- the quantity of nuclear material in each transfer into or out of each material
balance area can be determined; and
- the physical inventory of nuclear material in each material balance area can be
determined when necessary, in accordance with specified procedures,
in order that the material balance for Agency sate guards purposes can be established.
- material unaccounted for means the difference between book inventory and
- nuclear material means any source or any special fissionable material as
Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore
or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute after the
entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials considered to be source
material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Agreement only upon
acceptance by Uzbekistan.
- physical inventory means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of
quantities of nuclear material on hand at a given time within a material balance area, obtained
in accordance with specified procedures.
- shipper/receiver difference means the difference between the quantity of
material in a batch as stated by the shipping material balance area and as measured at the
receiving material balance area.
- source data means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or
to derive empirical relationships, which identify nuclear material and provide batch data.
Source data may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine
weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship
between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and
- strategic point means a location selected during examination of design
where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all strategic
points taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of
safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a strategic point may include any location
where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where
containment and surveillance measures are executed.
DONE in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
|For the REPUBLIC OF
|For the INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
Kamilov Abdulaziz Hafizovich
|Tashkent, 8 October 1994
||Vienna, 5 April 1994