

A. Safeguards Statement for 2016^{1, 2}

In 2016, safeguards were applied for 181 States^{3, 4} with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat's findings and conclusions for 2016 are reported below with regard to each type of safeguards agreement. These findings and conclusions are based upon an evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfilling its safeguards obligations for that year.

1. One hundred and twenty-four States had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force⁵:

- (a) For 69 of these States⁴, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.**
- (b) For 55 of these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.**

2. Safeguards activities were implemented for 49 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but without additional protocols in force. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

3. As of the end of 2016, 12 States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States Parties, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

4. Three States had safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 in force, requiring the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. One of these States, India, had an additional protocol in force. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis,

¹ The designations employed and the presentation of material in this report, including the numbers cited, do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Agency or its Member States concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

² The referenced number of States Parties to the NPT is based on the number of instruments of ratification, accession or succession that have been deposited.

³ These States do not include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Agency did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

⁴ And Taiwan, China.

⁵ Or an additional protocol being provisionally applied, pending its entry into force.

the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.

5. Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in all five States. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material in selected facilities to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

B. Background to the Safeguards Statement and Summary

B.1. Safeguards conclusions

1. The *Safeguards Statement* reflects the Secretariat's findings and conclusions resulting from the Agency's activities under the safeguards agreements in force. The Secretariat derives these conclusions on the basis of an evaluation of the results of its safeguards activities and of all other safeguards relevant information available to it. This section provides background to the *Safeguards Statement*.

Fact box 1. Safeguards activities overview

In 2016, there were:

- 709 (709)⁶ facilities and 581 (577) material balance areas (MBAs) containing locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) under safeguards;
- 204 073 (200 110) significant quantities⁷ of nuclear material and 433 (431) tonnes of heavy water under safeguards;
- 2216 (2118) inspections, 655 (623) design information verifications and 136 (64) complementary accesses utilizing 13 275 (13 248) calendar-days in the field for verification⁸.

2. A summary of the status of safeguards agreements and other information presented below is given in Tables 1 to 5 in Section B.7.

B.1.1. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force

3. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency has the “right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”⁹

4. Comprehensive safeguards agreements consist of Part I, Part II, and Definitions. Part I consists of general provisions and Part II describes the procedures for implementing those provisions. These procedures include the record keeping and reporting obligations of the State with regard to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs. They also include procedures related to Agency access to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs.

⁶ The numbers in parentheses provide the respective data for 2015.

⁷ Significant quantity — the approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.

⁸ Calendar-days in the field for verification comprise calendar-days spent on performing inspections, complementary access and design information verification and on the associated travel and rest periods.

⁹ Paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected).

5. The procedures set out in Part II of a comprehensive safeguards agreement include certain reporting requirements related to the export and import of material containing uranium or thorium which has not yet reached the stage of processing where its composition and purity make it suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment. Nuclear material which has reached that stage of processing, and any nuclear material produced at a later stage, is subject to all the other safeguards procedures specified in the agreement. An inventory of such nuclear material is established on the basis of an initial report by a State, which is then verified by the Agency and maintained on the basis of subsequent reports by the State and by Agency verification. The Agency performs its verification and evaluation activities in order to confirm that these declarations by the State are correct and complete — i.e. to confirm that all nuclear material in the State remains in peaceful activities.

Small quantities protocols

6. Many States with minimal or no nuclear activities have concluded a small quantities protocol (SQP) to their comprehensive safeguards agreement. Under a SQP based on the original standard text¹⁰ submitted to the Board of Governors in 1974, the implementation of most of the safeguards procedures in Part II of a comprehensive safeguards agreement are held in abeyance as long as certain criteria are met. In 2005, the Board of Governors approved the revision¹¹ of the standard text of the SQP. This revision changed the eligibility criteria for a SQP, making it unavailable to a State with an existing or planned facility, and reduced the number of measures held in abeyance. Of particular importance is the fact that, under the revised text of the SQP, the requirement that the State provide the Agency with an initial inventory report and the Agency's right to carry out ad hoc and special inspections are no longer held in abeyance.

Additional protocols

7. Although the Agency has the authority under a comprehensive safeguards agreement to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State (i.e. the correctness and completeness of the State's declarations), the tools available to the Agency under such an agreement are limited. The *Model Additional Protocol*¹², approved by the Board of Governors in 1997, equips the Agency with important additional tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under an additional protocol thus significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

B.1.1.1. States with both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force⁵

Status of implementation

8. As of 31 December 2016, 124 (121) States⁴ had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force⁵.

9. Safeguards implementation involved, as appropriate, activities carried out in the field, at regional offices and at Agency Headquarters in Vienna. The activities at Headquarters included the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards

¹⁰ GOV/INF/276/Annex B.

¹¹ GOV/INF/276/Mod.1 and Corr.1.

¹² INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), *Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards*.

agreements and additional protocols and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

Deriving conclusions

10. A safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the Agency's finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The Agency draws such a conclusion only where a State has both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force and the evaluations described below have been completed.

11. To ascertain that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities in a State, the Agency needs to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of all safeguards relevant information available to it, which includes information provided by the State with regard to the design and operation of nuclear facilities and LOFs, the State's nuclear material accounting reports, the State's declarations submitted under the additional protocol and the results of the Agency's in-field activities carried out to verify the State's declarations.

12. To ascertain that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State, the Agency needs to carry out an evaluation of the consistency of the State's declared nuclear programme with the results of the Agency's verification activities under the relevant safeguards agreements and additional protocols and with all other safeguards relevant information available to the Agency. In particular, the Agency needs to have:

- conducted a comprehensive State evaluation based on all safeguards relevant information available to the Agency about the State's nuclear and nuclear-related activities (including design information on facilities and information on LOFs, declarations submitted under additional protocols, and information collected by the Agency through its verification activities and from other sources);
- performed complementary access, as necessary, in accordance with the State's additional protocol;
- addressed all anomalies, discrepancies and inconsistencies identified in the course of its evaluation and verification activities.

13. When the evaluations described in paragraphs 11 and 12 above have been completed and no indication has been found by the Agency that, in its judgement, would give rise to a proliferation concern, the Secretariat can draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in a State remained in peaceful activities. Subsequently, the Agency implements integrated safeguards — an optimized combination of safeguards measures available under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols — for that State. Due to increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole, the intensity of inspection activities at declared facilities and LOFs can be reduced. Integrated safeguards were implemented during 2016 for 57 (54) States.^{4, 13}

¹³ Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.

Overall conclusions for 2016

14. On the basis of the evaluations described in paragraphs 11 and 12, the Secretariat drew the conclusions referred to: in paragraph 1(a) of the *Safeguards Statement* for 69 (67) States⁴ — Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Denmark¹⁴, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, the Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands¹⁵, New Zealand¹⁶, Norway, Palau, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Romania, the Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Viet Nam. For Montenegro and Tajikistan the conclusion in paragraph 1(a) of the *Safeguards Statement* was drawn for the first time.

15. Because the evaluation process described in paragraph 12 had not yet been completed for 55 (54) States¹⁷, the conclusion drawn for these States relates only to declared nuclear material in peaceful activities. The conclusion in paragraph 1(b) of the *Safeguards Statement* was drawn for: Afghanistan, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Swaziland, Togo, Turkmenistan, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu.

B.1.1.2. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force but no additional protocols in force

Status of implementation

16. As of 31 December 2016, safeguards were implemented for 49 (52) States in this category. Safeguards implementation involved activities in the field and at Headquarters, including the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

¹⁴ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of Denmark which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add. 8, i.e. Denmark and the Faroe Islands, which excludes Greenland. Denmark has concluded a separate comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol thereto that apply to Greenland (INFCIRC/176 and INFCIRC/176/Add.1, respectively).

¹⁵ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of the Netherlands which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. the Netherlands in Europe, which excludes the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. The Netherlands has concluded a separate comprehensive safeguards agreement that applies to its constituent parts mentioned above (INFCIRC/229), but has not yet concluded an additional protocol thereto.

¹⁶ This conclusion is drawn with regard only to New Zealand which is covered by INFCIRC/185 and INFCIRC/185/Add.1; it is not drawn for the Cook Islands and Niue, which are also covered by INFCIRC/185, but not by INFCIRC/185/Add.1.

¹⁷ This conclusion is also drawn with regard to that part of Denmark which is covered by INFCIRC/176 and INFCIRC/176/Add.1 (i.e. Greenland) for which the broader conclusion was not drawn.

Deriving conclusions

17. For a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency's right and obligation are as described in paragraph 3 above. Although the implementation of safeguards strengthening measures¹⁸ under such an agreement have increased the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities, the activities that the Agency may conduct in this regard are limited for a State without an additional protocol. Thus, the conclusion in the *Safeguards Statement* for a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement alone relates only to the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities.

18. In the course of its evaluation, the Agency also seeks to determine whether there is any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State which would need to be reflected in the *Safeguards Statement*. However, without the measures provided for in the *Model Additional Protocol* being implemented, the Agency is not able to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole.

Syrian Arab Republic

19. In August 2016, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors entitled *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic* (GOV/2016/44) covering relevant developments since the previous report in August 2015 (GOV/2015/51). The Director General informed the Board of Governors that no new information had come to the knowledge of the Agency that would have an impact on the Agency's assessment that it was very likely that a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor that should have been declared to the Agency by Syria.¹⁹ In 2016, the Director General renewed his call on Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations. Syria has yet to respond to these calls.

20. On the basis of the evaluation of information provided by Syria, and all other safeguards relevant information available to it, the Agency found no indication of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities. For 2016, the Agency concluded for Syria that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

Overall conclusions for 2016

21. On the basis of the evaluation performed and as reflected in paragraph 2 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat concluded that for the 49 (52) States²⁰, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. This conclusion was drawn for Algeria, Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Dominica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands,

¹⁸ Such measures include the early provision of design information, environmental sampling and the use of satellite imagery.

¹⁹ The Board of Governors, in its resolution GOV/2011/41 of June 2011 (adopted by a vote) had, inter alia, called on Syria to urgently remedy its non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement and, in particular, to provide the Agency with updated reporting under its Safeguards Agreement and access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to verify such reporting and resolve all outstanding questions so that the Agency could provide the necessary assurance as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear programme.

²⁰ In addition, this conclusion is drawn for those territories of the Netherlands referred to in footnote 15 for which the broader conclusion is not drawn – i.e. the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten; it is also drawn for the Cook Islands and Niue, which are covered by New Zealand's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement but not by its Additional Protocol – see footnote 16.

Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

B.1.2. States Parties to the NPT without comprehensive safeguards agreements in force

22. As of 31 December 2016, 12 (12) States Parties to the NPT had yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force pursuant to Article III of the Treaty.

Overall conclusions for 2016

23. As indicated in paragraph 3 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions for: Benin, Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Federated States of Micronesia, Palestine, São Tome and Principe, Somalia and Timor-Leste.

B.1.3. States with safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 in force

24. Under safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency applies safeguards in order to ensure that nuclear material, facilities and other items specified under the safeguards agreement are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any military purpose, and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

Status of implementation

25. As of 31 December 2016, safeguards were implemented at facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan pursuant to safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. The implementation of safeguards under four safeguards agreements between the Agency and India (INFCIRC/260/Mod.1, INFCIRC/360/Mod.1, INFCIRC/374/Mod.1 and INFCIRC/433/Mod.2) was suspended, while the safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/754 is in force. India has an additional protocol to its INFCIRC/754 safeguards agreement in force.

Deriving conclusions

26. The conclusion described in paragraph 4 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for these three States, and relates to the nuclear material, facilities and other items to which safeguards were applied. To draw such a conclusion in respect of these States, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information available to it, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

Overall conclusions for 2016

27. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded that the nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied in India, Israel and Pakistan remained in peaceful activities.

B.1.4. States with both voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force

28. Under a voluntary offer agreement, the Agency applies safeguards to nuclear material in those facilities that have been selected by the Agency from the State's list of eligible facilities in order to verify that the material is not withdrawn from peaceful activities except as provided for in the agreement. In selecting facilities under voluntary offer agreements for the application of safeguards, the Agency takes such factors into consideration as: (i) whether the selection of a facility would satisfy legal obligations arising from other agreements concluded by the State; (ii) whether useful experience may be gained in implementing new safeguards approaches or in using advanced equipment and technology; and (iii) whether the cost efficiency of Agency safeguards may be enhanced by

applying safeguards, in the exporting State, to nuclear material being shipped to States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. By implementing measures under the additional protocol in these five States with voluntary offer agreements, the Agency also seeks to obtain and verify information that could enhance the safeguards conclusions in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force.

Status of implementation

29. During 2016, safeguards were implemented at facilities selected by the Agency in the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) and the United States of America.

Deriving conclusions

30. The conclusion contained in paragraph 5 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force in which safeguards were applied to nuclear material in selected facilities. To draw the safeguards conclusion, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information available to it, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

Overall conclusions for 2016

31. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded for China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn as provided for in the agreements. There were no such withdrawals in France and the United Kingdom.

B.2. Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)

32. In 2016, the Agency continued monitoring and verification in the Islamic Republic of Iran in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out in the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) until being informed, on 19 January 2016, by China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States of America (E3+3) and Iran, on behalf of the E3/EU+3 and Iran, that – with the start of the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the JPA was no longer in effect.²¹

33. On 16 January 2016, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors and in parallel to the United Nations Security Council that the Agency had verified that Iran had taken the actions specified in paragraphs 15.1–15.11 of Annex V of the JCPOA. Implementation Day occurred on the same day.

34. Also on 16 January 2016, Iran began to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force, and to fully implement the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement.

35. Since Implementation Day, the Agency has been verifying and monitoring Iran's nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. During 2016, the Director General submitted six reports to the Board

²¹ In January 2016, the Director General submitted to the Board of Governors a report entitled *Status of Iran's Nuclear Programme in relation to the Joint Plan of Action* (GOV/INF/2016/3).

of Governors and in parallel to the United Nations Security Council entitled *Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)* (GOV/INF/2016/1, GOV/2016/8, GOV/2016/23, GOV/2016/46, GOV/2016/55 and GOV/INF/2016/13).

B.3. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

36. In August 2016, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and General Conference entitled *Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea* (GOV/2016/45–GC(60)/16), which provided an update of developments since the Director General's report of August 2015 (GOV/2015/49-GC(59)/22).

37. Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the DPRK's NPT Safeguards Agreement. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able — and, since April 2009, has not been able — to implement any verification measures in the DPRK, and, therefore, the Agency could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the DPRK.

38. On 6 January 2016 the DPRK announced that it had conducted a nuclear test and on 9 September 2016 the DPRK announced that it had conducted another nuclear test.

39. In 2016, no verification activities were implemented in the field, but the Agency continued to monitor the DPRK's nuclear activities by using open source information, including satellite imagery and trade information. The Agency maintained operational readiness to resume safeguards implementation in the DPRK, and continued to further consolidate its knowledge of the DPRK's nuclear programme.

40. During 2016, the Agency continued to observe indications which were consistent with the operation of the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5 MW(e)) at Yongbyon. This follows a period between mid-October and early December 2015 when there were no such indications. This period was sufficient for the reactor to have been de-fuelled and subsequently re-fuelled. Based on past operational cycles, a new cycle commencing in early December 2015 can be expected to last about two years.

41. From the first quarter of 2016, there were multiple indications consistent with the Radiochemical Laboratory's operation, including deliveries of chemical tanks and the operation of the associated steam plant. Such indications ceased in early July 2016. In previous reprocessing campaigns, the Radiochemical Laboratory's operation involved the use of the spent fuel discharged from the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5 MW(e)).

42. At the Yongbyon Nuclear Fuel Rod Fabrication Plant there were indications consistent with the use of the reported centrifuge enrichment facility located within the plant. Additional construction work around the building that houses this reported facility has been ongoing.

43. The Agency has not had access to the Yongbyon site. Without access to the site, the Agency cannot confirm the operational status of the facilities on the site, or the nature and purpose of the activities observed.

44. The continuation and further development of the DPRK's nuclear programme and related statements by the DPRK, including those about continuing to “boost” its “nuclear force”, are a major cause for concern. The DPRK's nuclear activities, including those in relation to the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant (5 MW(e)) and the Radiochemical Laboratory, and the use of the building which houses the reported enrichment facility are deeply regrettable. Such actions are clear violations of relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 2270

(2016) and 2321 (2016). The DPRK's fourth and fifth nuclear tests, announced on 6 January and 9 September 2016, respectively, are also in clear violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions and deeply regrettable.

B.4. Areas of difficulty in safeguards implementation

45. Although progress was made during 2016 in addressing some of the areas of difficulty in implementing safeguards, further work remains to be done.

46. The performance and effectiveness of State and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSACs/RSACs) have significant impacts upon the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards implementation. In 2016, some States still had not established SSACs, which are required under comprehensive safeguards agreements. Moreover, not all State authorities responsible for safeguards implementation have the necessary authority, resources, technical capabilities or independence from nuclear facility or LOF operators to implement the requirements of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. Furthermore, some State authorities do not provide sufficient oversight of nuclear material accounting and control systems at nuclear facilities and LOFs to ensure the required accuracy and precision of the data transmitted to the Agency.

47. For Agency inspectors to conduct their verification activities effectively, they must be able to access installations and perform the verification activities within agreed timeframes. Access restrictions to locations, material, facility records and other relevant documentation were experienced in a number of States.

48. In accordance with the decision of the Board of Governors in September 2005, States which have not amended or rescinded their SQPs should do so as soon as possible. At the end of 2016, 38 (40) States²² had operative SQPs that had yet to be amended.

B.5. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards

49. The Agency has continued to improve the efficiency of safeguards implementation while maintaining or strengthening its effectiveness. This improvement has been essential since the quantities of nuclear material and other items under safeguards and the number of facilities under safeguards has increased in recent years. In contrast, the Agency's financial resources have not risen commensurately. It should be noted that while a number of facilities are being retired from service, this will not immediately reduce verification effort as safeguards continue to be applied to those facilities until their status is confirmed by the Agency as decommissioned for safeguards purposes.

50. Some of the factors contributing to strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards are shown in Fact box 2.

²² The States with SQPs based on the original text are: Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Dominica, Ethiopia, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Maldives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sudan, Suriname, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Zambia.

Fact box 2. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards

In 2016, significant progress was made, as follows:

- At the end of the year, 129 States⁴ had additional protocols in force and one State had its additional protocol provisionally applied, pending its entry into force.
- Additional protocols entered into force for Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire.
- Iran applied its Additional Protocol provisionally, pending its entry into force.
- Afghanistan and Saint Kitts and Nevis amended their operative SQPs.
- At the end of the year, 56 (54) States²³ had SQPs in force based on the revised standard text.
- The Agency completed updating State-level safeguards approaches for the remaining States in the original group of 53 States that were already under integrated safeguards at the start of 2015, and developed State-level safeguards approaches for 11 other States.
- Strategic planning activities continued, with adaptations to planning processes and updating of the Department of Safeguards' strategic plan and with Departmental support for the development of the Agency Medium Term Strategy (MTS) 2018–2023.
- Internal procedures and guidance on conducting acquisition path analysis and developing State-level safeguards approaches for States with comprehensive safeguards agreements were updated to take account of experience gained to date.
- The Agency updated an internal guideline for the joint use of safeguards equipment.
- Through the Modernization of Safeguards Information Technology (MOSAIC) project, the Agency continued to make improvements to the performance and security of the safeguards information system. Development of six applications was completed in 2016 and the development of other applications remained on schedule.
- The Agency published the *Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide on Provision of Information to the IAEA (IAEA Service Series 33)* and updated the *Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols (IAEA Service Series 21)*.
- The quality management system continued to result in process improvement with a focus on documentation management, performance indicators, knowledge retention, cost calculation methodology and tools to help improve processes, such as internal audits and condition reports.

51. As a result of these improvements, safeguards have been implemented more effectively and it has been possible to reduce the number of calendar-days spent in the field for verification⁸ in some States. The reduction of inspection effort in the field has been compensated for by an increase in evaluation activities at Headquarters.

52. Member State Support Programmes (MSSPs) and the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) continued to make substantial contributions to Agency safeguards through the provision of assistance and advice, respectively.

53. The MOSAIC project was initiated in 2015 and is due for completion in 2018. During 2016, the project introduced new IT tools and capabilities, completed the enhancement of all legacy safeguards

²³ The States with SQPs in force based on the revised standard text are: Afghanistan, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Gambia, Guatemala, the Holy See, Honduras, Iceland, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Qatar, the Republic of Moldova, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, Senegal, the Seychelles, Singapore, Swaziland, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe.

IT applications and strengthened the information security of safeguards data. In 2016, of the 25 applications covered by the MOSAIC project overall, six were completed on budget and on schedule and another ten were initiated.

B.6. Safeguards expenditures and resources

54. During 2016, the activities of Major Programme 4 — Nuclear Verification — were funded from various sources — primarily through the Regular Budget and extrabudgetary contributions. The Regular Budget²⁴ appropriation for 2016 was adjusted to €133.1 (€130.7) million at the average United Nations exchange rate. Figure 1²⁵ presents indexed real growth by comparing the increase in the adjusted budget²⁶ to the approved budget excluding price adjustment and currency revaluation.




Figure 1. Indexed real growth of Regular Budget, 2012–2016 (base 2012=100)

55. The expenditures for Major Programme 4 were €133.0 (€130.7) million from the Regular Budget, an increase of 1.8%, compared with 2015. The Regular Budget utilization rate for 2016 was 99.9% (100%) with an unspent balance at the end of the year of €0.1 million. Figure 2 shows the utilization trend of Major Programme 4 for the period 2012–2016.

²⁴ €135.0 million (at an exchange rate €1=\$1).

²⁵ Represents indexed real growth. The total growth after price adjustment amounts to 8.3%.

²⁶ Original approved budget including price adjustment, revalued at the average United Nations operational rate of exchange for the year.




Figure 2. Major Programme 4 — Nuclear Verification — budget and expenditures, 2012–2016

56. The expenditures²⁷ from the extrabudgetary contributions were €29.8 (€26.9) million, an increase of 10.9% compared with 2015. This increase resulted mainly from the implementation of Iran’s Additional Protocol, verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA and the Agency’s MOSAIC project.

B.7. Status of safeguards agreements (as of 31 December 2016)

57. This section contains information — presented in the five tables below — on safeguards agreements that provide the basis for the Agency’s implementation of safeguards in 2016. It does not include agreements under which the application of safeguards has been suspended in the light of implementation of safeguards pursuant to another agreement. For full details see the Agency’s website: <http://www.iaea.org>.

Table 1 – States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
Afghanistan	X(A)	257	19 July 2005		
Albania		359	03 November 2010	X	X*
Andorra	X(A)	808	19 December 2011	X	X*
Angola	X(A)	800	28 April 2010		
Antigua and Barbuda	X(A)	528	15 November 2013		
Armenia		455	28 June 2004	X	X
Australia		217	12 December 1997	X	X
Austria		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Azerbaijan		580	29 November 2000		
Bahrain	X(A)	767	20 July 2011		
Bangladesh		301	30 March 2001	X	X
Belgium		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Bosnia and Herzegovina		851	03 July 2013		

²⁷ Including Programme Support Costs.

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
Botswana		694	24 August 2006	X	
Bulgaria⁽¹⁾		193	01 May 2009	X	X
Burkina Faso	X(A)	618	17 April 2003	X	X
Burundi	X(A)	719	27 September 2007		
Cambodia	X(A)	586	24 April 2015		
Cameroon	X	641	29 September 2016		
Canada		164	08 September 2000	X	X
Central African Republic	X(A)	777	07 September 2009		
Chad	X(A)	802	13 May 2010		
Chile		476	03 November 2003	X	X
Colombia		306	05 March 2009		
Comoros	X(A)	752	20 January 2009		
Congo	X(A)	831	28 October 2011		
Costa Rica	X(A)	278	17 June 2011		
Côte d'Ivoire		309	05 May 2016		
Croatia	X(A)	463	06 July 2000	X	X
Cuba		633	03 June 2004	X	X
Cyprus⁽¹⁾		193	01 May 2008		
Czech Republic⁽¹⁾		193	01 October 2009	X	X
Democratic Republic of the Congo		183	09 April 2003		
Denmark⁽²⁾		193 176	30 April 2004 22 March 2013	X	X
Djibouti	X(A)	884	26 May 2015		
Dominican Republic	X(A)	201	05 May 2010		
Ecuador	X(A)	231	24 October 2001	X	X
El Salvador	X(A)	232	24 May 2004		
Estonia⁽¹⁾		193	01 December 2005	X	X
Fiji	X	192	14 July 2006		
Finland		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Gabon	X(A)	792	25 March 2010		
Gambia	X(A)	277	18 October 2011		
Georgia		617	03 June 2003		
Germany		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Ghana		226	11 June 2004	X	X
Greece		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Guatemala	X(A)	299	28 May 2008		
Haiti	X	681	09 March 2006		
Holy See	X(A)	187	24 September 1998	X	X
Hungary⁽¹⁾		193	01 July 2007	X	X
Iceland	X(A)	215	12 September 2003	X	X
Indonesia		283	29 September 1999	X	X
Iraq		172	10 October 2012		
Ireland		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Italy		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Jamaica		265	19 March 2003	X	X
Japan		255	16 December 1999	X	X
Jordan		258	28 July 1998	X	
Kazakhstan		504	09 May 2007	X	
Kenya	X(A)	778	18 September 2009		
Korea, Republic of		236	19 February 2004	X	X
Kuwait	X(A)	607	02 June 2003	X	
Kyrgyzstan	X	629	10 November 2011		
Latvia⁽¹⁾		193	01 October 2008	X	X

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
Lesotho	X(A)	199	26 April 2010		
Libya		282	11 August 2006	X	X
Liechtenstein		275	25 November 2015		
Lithuania⁽¹⁾		193	01 January 2008	X	X
Luxembourg		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Madagascar	X(A)	200	18 September 2003	X	X
Malawi	X(A)	409	26 July 2007		
Mali	X(A)	615	12 September 2002	X	X
Malta⁽¹⁾		193	01 July 2007	X	X
Marshall Islands		653	03 May 2005		
Mauritania	X(A)	788	10 December 2009		
Mauritius	X(A)	190	17 December 2007	X	
Mexico		197	04 March 2011		
Monaco	X(A)	524	30 September 1999	X	X
Mongolia	X	188	12 May 2003		
Montenegro	X(A)	814	04 March 2011	X	
Morocco		228	21 April 2011		
Mozambique	X(A)	813	01 March 2011		
Namibia	X	551	20 February 2012		
Netherlands⁽³⁾		193	30 April 2004	X	X
New Zealand⁽⁴⁾	X(A)	185	24 September 1998	X	
Nicaragua	X(A)	246	18 February 2005		
Niger		664	02 May 2007		
Nigeria		358	04 April 2007		
Norway		177	16 May 2000	X	X
Palau	X(A)	650	13 May 2005	X	X
Panama	X(A)	316	11 December 2001		
Paraguay	X	279	15 September 2004		
Peru		273	23 July 2001	X	X
Philippines		216	26 February 2010	X	
Poland⁽¹⁾		193	01 March 2007	X	X
Portugal		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Republic of Moldova	X(A)	690	01 June 2012		
Romania⁽¹⁾		193	01 May 2010	X	X
Rwanda	X(A)	801	17 May 2010		
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X(A)	514	19 May 2014		
Seychelles	X(A)	635	13 October 2004	X	X
Singapore	X(A)	259	31 March 2008	X	X
Slovakia⁽¹⁾		193	01 December 2005	X	X
Slovenia⁽¹⁾		193	01 September 2006	X	X
South Africa		394	13 September 2002	X	X
Spain		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Swaziland	X(A)	227	08 September 2010		
Sweden		193	30 April 2004	X	X
Switzerland		264	01 February 2005	X	
Tajikistan		639	14 December 2004	X	
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	X(A)	610	11 May 2007	X	X
Togo	X(A)	840	18 July 2012		
Turkey		295	17 July 2001	X	
Turkmenistan		673	03 January 2006		
Uganda	X(A)	674	14 February 2006		
Ukraine		550	24 January 2006	X	X

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
United Arab Emirates	X	622	20 December 2010		
United Republic of Tanzania	X(A)	643	07 February 2005	X	X*
Uruguay		157	30 April 2004	X	X
Uzbekistan		508	21 December 1998	X	X
Vanuatu	X(A)	852	21 May 2013		
Viet Nam		376	17 September 2012	X	

General Notes:

- In addition, safeguards, including the measures of the Model Additional Protocol, were applied for Taiwan, China. The broader conclusion was drawn for Taiwan, China, in 2006 and integrated safeguards were implemented from 1 January 2008.
- The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/193 is that concluded between the non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), EURATOM and the Agency.
- 'X' in the 'SQP' column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standard text (see Section B, paragraph 6).
- 'X' in the 'broader conclusion drawn' column indicates that the broader conclusion has been drawn as described in Section B, paragraph 13.
- 'X' in the 'integrated safeguards implemented' column indicates that integrated safeguards were implemented for the whole of the year. X* in this column indicates that integrated safeguards were started during the course of the year.

Footnotes:

- (1) The date refers to accession to INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8.
- (2) The application of safeguards in Denmark under the bilateral NPT safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/176), in force since 1 March 1972, was suspended on 21 February 1977, on which date the Safeguards Agreement between the non-nuclear-weapon States of EURATOM, EURATOM and the Agency (INFCIRC/193) entered into force for Denmark. Since 21 February 1977, INFCIRC/193 also applies to the Faroe Islands. Upon Greenland's secession from EURATOM as of 31 January 1985, the Agreement between the Agency and Denmark (INFCIRC/176) re-entered into force for Greenland. The additional protocol to this agreement entered into force on 22 March 2013 (INFCIRC/176/Add.1).
- (3) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/229 with regard to the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba), Aruba, Curacao and Sint Maarten is pursuant to the NPT and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an SQP to this agreement. No additional protocol is in force for that agreement.
- (4) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/185 is also applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue. The additional protocol reproduced in INFCIRC/185/Add. 1; however, is not applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue.

Table 2 – States with comprehensive safeguards agreements but no additional protocols in force

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
Algeria		531	Approved: 14 September 2004
Argentina		435	
Bahamas	X(A)	544	
Barbados	X	527	
Belarus		495	Signed: 15 November 2005
Belize	X	532	
Bhutan	X	371	
Bolivia, Plurinational State of	X	465	
Brazil		435	
Brunei Darussalam	X	365	
Democratic People's Republic of Korea⁽¹⁾		403	
Dominica	X	513	
Egypt		302	
Ethiopia	X	261	
Grenada	X	525	

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
Guyana	X	543	
Honduras	X(A)	235	Signed: 07 July 2005
Iran, Islamic Republic of⁽²⁾		214	Signed: 18 December 2003
Kiribati	X	390	Signed: 09 November 2004
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X	599	Signed: 05 November 2014
Lebanon	X(A)	191	
Malaysia		182	Signed: 22 November 2005
Maldives	X	253	
Myanmar	X	477	Signed: 17 September 2013
Nauru	X	317	
Nepal	X	186	
Oman	X	691	
Papua New Guinea	X	312	
Qatar	X(A)	747	
Saint Lucia	X	379	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	X	400	
Samoa	X	268	
San Marino	X(A)	575	
Saudi Arabia	X	746	
Senegal	X(A)	276	Signed: 15 December 2006
Serbia		204	Signed: 03 July 2009
Sierra Leone	X	787	
Solomon Islands	X	420	
Sri Lanka		320	
Sudan	X	245	
Suriname	X	269	
Syrian Arab Republic		407	
Thailand		241	Signed: 22 September 2005
Tonga	X	426	
Trinidad and Tobago	X	414	
Tunisia		381	Signed: 24 May 2005
Tuvalu	X	391	
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of		300	
Yemen	X	614	
Zambia	X	456	Signed: 13 May 2009
Zimbabwe	X(A)	483	

General Notes:

- The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/435 is that concluded between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) and the Agency.
- 'X' in the 'SQP' column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standard text (see Section B, paragraph 6).

Footnotes:

- (1) In a letter to the Director General dated 10 January 2003, the DPRK stated that the Government had "decided to lift the moratorium on the effectiveness of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" and that "its decision to withdraw from the Treaty will come into effect from 11 January 2003 onwards."
- (2) On 16 January 2016, as notified in its letter to the Director General of 7 January 2016, Iran began to provisionally apply its Additional Protocol in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol, pending its entry into force.

Table 3 – States Parties to the NPT without comprehensive safeguards agreements in force

States Parties to the NPT	SQP	Safeguards agreement	Additional protocol
Benin	X(A)	Signed: 07 June 2005	Signed: 07 June 2005
Cabo Verde	X(A)	Signed: 28 June 2005	Signed: 28 June 2005
Equatorial Guinea	X	Approved: 13 June 1986	
Eritrea			
Guinea	X(A)	Signed: 13 December 2011	Signed: 13 December 2011
Guinea-Bissau	X(A)	Signed: 21 June 2013	Signed: 21 June 2013
Liberia	X(A)	Approved: 08 June 2016	Approved: 08 June 2016
Micronesia, Federated States of	X(A)	Signed: 01 June 2015	
Palestine			
São Tome and Principe			
Somalia			
Timor-Leste	X(A)	Signed: 06 October 2009	Signed: 06 October 2009

General Note:

- ‘X’ in the ‘SQP’ column indicates that the State has an SQP. ‘X(A)’ indicates that the SQP is based on the revised SQP standard text (see Section B, paragraph 6). In both cases the SQP will come into force at the same time as the safeguards agreement.

Table 4 – States with INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements

State	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
India	260 ⁽¹⁾ 360 ⁽¹⁾ 374 ⁽¹⁾ 433 ⁽¹⁾ 754	In force: 25 July 2014
Israel	249/Add.1	
Pakistan	34 116 135 239 248 393 418 705 816	

Footnote:
(1) Application of safeguards under these agreements was suspended on 30 June 2016.

Table 5 – States with voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force

State	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
China	369	In force: 28 March 2002
France⁽¹⁾	290	In force: 30 April 2004
Russian Federation	327	In force: 16 October 2007
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland^{(2), (3)}	263	In force: 30 April 2004
United States of America⁽⁴⁾	288	In force: 06 January 2009

Footnotes:

- (1) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/718 between France, EURATOM and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an SQP to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.
- (2) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/175, which remains in force, is an INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreement, concluded between the United Kingdom and the Agency.
- (3) The safeguards agreement between the United Kingdom, EURATOM and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed but has not entered into force. There is an SQP to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.
- (4) The safeguards agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/366 between the United States of America and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an SQP to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.