

## Safeguards Statement for 2011

In 2011, safeguards were applied for 178 States<sup>1,2</sup> with safeguards agreements in force with the Agency. The Secretariat's findings and conclusions for 2011 are reported below with regard to each type of safeguards agreement. These findings and conclusions are based upon an evaluation of all the information available to the Agency in exercising its rights and fulfilling its safeguards obligations for that year.

1. One hundred and nine States<sup>2</sup> had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force:

- (a) For 58 of these States<sup>2</sup>, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.
- (b) For 51 of these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. Evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for each of these States remained ongoing. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

2. Safeguards activities were implemented for 61 States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force, but without additional protocols in force. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

While the Secretariat concluded that, for 2011, declared nuclear material in Iran remained in peaceful activities, it was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities<sup>3</sup>.

3. As of the end of 2011, 14 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the Agency as required by Article III of that Treaty. For these States, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions.

4. Three States had safeguards agreements in force based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, requiring the application of safeguards to nuclear material, facilities and other items specified in the relevant safeguards agreement. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material or of the misuse of the facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards had been applied remained in peaceful activities.

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<sup>1</sup> These States do not include the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), where the Agency did not implement safeguards and, therefore, could not draw any conclusion.

<sup>2</sup> And Taiwan, China.

<sup>3</sup> See paragraph 23.

5. Five nuclear-weapon States had voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force. Safeguards were implemented with regard to declared nuclear material in selected facilities in all five States. For these States, the Secretariat found no indication of the diversion of nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied. On this basis, the Secretariat concluded that, for these States, nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn from safeguards as provided for in the agreements.

# Background to the Safeguards Statement and Summary

## 1. Safeguards conclusions

1. The *Safeguards Statement* reflects the safeguards conclusions resulting from the Agency's activities under the safeguards agreements in force. The Secretariat derives these conclusions on the basis of an evaluation of the results of its verification activities and of all the safeguards relevant information available to it. This section provides background to the *Safeguards Statement*.

2. In 2011, there were:

- 680 facilities and 532 material balance areas containing locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs) under safeguards;
- 177 473 significant quantities of nuclear material and 440 tonnes of heavy water under safeguards;
- 2026 inspections, 604 design information verification visits and 109 complementary accesses utilizing 11 937 calendar-days in the field for verification<sup>4</sup>.

3. A summary of the status of States' safeguards agreements and other information presented below is given in Tables 1 to 5 in Section B.7.

### 1.1. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force

4. Under a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the Agency has the "right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices"<sup>5</sup>.

5. Comprehensive safeguards agreements consist of Part I, Part II, and Definitions. Part I consists of general provisions and Part II describes the procedures for implementing those provisions. These procedures include the record keeping and reporting obligations of the State with regard to nuclear material, nuclear facilities and LOFs. They also include procedures related to Agency access to nuclear material, facilities and LOFs.

6. The procedures set out in Part II of a comprehensive safeguards agreement include certain reporting requirements related to the export and import of material containing uranium or thorium which has not yet reached the stage of processing where its composition and purity make it suitable for fuel fabrication or for isotopic enrichment. Nuclear material which has reached that stage of processing, and any nuclear material produced at a later stage, is subject to all the other safeguards procedures specified in the agreement. An inventory of such nuclear material is established on the basis of an initial report by a State, which is then verified by the Agency and maintained on the basis of subsequent reports by the State and by Agency verification. The Agency performs its verification and evaluation activities in order to confirm that these declarations by the State are correct and complete — i.e. to confirm that all nuclear material in the State remains in peaceful activities.

### Small quantities protocols

7. Many States with minimal or no nuclear activities have concluded a small quantities protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement. Under a small quantities protocol based on the original standard text

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<sup>4</sup> Calendar-days in the field for verification comprise calendar-days spent in performing inspections, complementary access and design information verification and in the associated travel and rest periods.

<sup>5</sup> Paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected).

submitted to the Board of Governors in 1974<sup>6</sup>, the implementation of most of the safeguards procedures in Part II of a comprehensive safeguards agreement are held in abeyance as long as certain criteria are met. In 2005, the Board of Governors approved the revision of the standard text of the small quantities protocol<sup>7</sup>. This revision changed the eligibility criteria for a small quantities protocol, making it unavailable to a State with an existing or planned facility, and reduced the number of measures held in abeyance. Of particular importance is the fact that, under the revised text of the small quantities protocol, the requirement that the State provide the Agency with an initial inventory report and the Agency's right to carry out ad hoc and special inspections are no longer held in abeyance.

### **Additional protocols**

8. Although the Agency has the authority under a comprehensive safeguards agreement to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State (i.e. the correctness and completeness of the State's declarations), the tools available to the Agency under such an agreement are limited. The Model Additional Protocol<sup>8</sup>, approved by the Board of Governors in 1997, equips the Agency with important supplementary tools that provide broader access to information and locations. The measures provided for under an additional protocol thus significantly increase the Agency's ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement.

#### **1.1.1. States with both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force**

### **Status of implementation**

9. As of 31 December 2011, 109 States<sup>2</sup> had both comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force.

10. Safeguards implementation involved, as appropriate, activities carried out in the field, at regional offices and at Agency Headquarters in Vienna. The activities at Headquarters included the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

### **Deriving conclusions**

11. A safeguards conclusion that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in a State is based on the Agency's finding that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities and no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a whole. The Agency draws such a conclusion only where a State has both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force and the evaluations described below have been completed.

12. To ascertain that there are no indications of diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities in a State, the Agency needs to carry out a comprehensive evaluation of all information available to it, which includes information provided by the State with regard to the design and operation of nuclear facilities and LOFs, the State's nuclear material accounting reports and the results of the Agency's in-field activities carried out to verify the State's declarations. In addition, the Agency evaluates the information acquired through the implementation of the State's additional protocol.

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<sup>6</sup> GOV/INF/276/Annex B.

<sup>7</sup> GOV/INF/276/Mod.1 and Corr.1.

<sup>8</sup> INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards.

13. To ascertain that there are no indications of undeclared nuclear material or activities in a State, the Agency needs to carry out an evaluation of the consistency of the State's declared nuclear programme with the results of the Agency's verification activities under the relevant safeguards agreements and additional protocols and with all other information available to the Agency. In particular, the Agency needs to have:

- conducted a comprehensive State evaluation based on all information available to the Agency about the State's nuclear and nuclear related activities (including design information on facilities and information on LOFs, declarations submitted under additional protocols, and information collected by the Agency through its verification activities and from other sources);
- performed complementary access, as necessary, in accordance with the State's additional protocol;
- addressed all anomalies, questions and inconsistencies identified in the course of its evaluation and verification activities.

14. When the evaluations described in paragraphs 12 and 13 above have been completed and no indication has been found by the Agency that, in its judgement, would give rise to a proliferation concern, the Secretariat can draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in a State has remained in peaceful activities. Subsequently, the Agency implements an integrated safeguards approach for that State whereby — due to increased assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole — the intensity of inspection activities at declared facilities and LOFs can be reduced.

15. In drawing safeguards conclusions, the Agency evaluates whether the safeguards activities carried out during the year have achieved certain performance targets. In those cases where integrated safeguards were not implemented for the whole year, the Agency's safeguards criteria function as performance targets<sup>9</sup>. Under integrated safeguards — an optimized combination of measures under comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols — the performance targets are those set out in the State-level approach approved for each State<sup>10</sup>.

### **Overall conclusions for 2011**

16. On the basis of the evaluations described in paragraphs 12 and 13, the Secretariat drew the conclusions referred to in paragraph 1(a) of the *Safeguards Statement* for 58 States<sup>2</sup> — Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark<sup>11</sup>, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands<sup>12</sup>, New Zealand<sup>13</sup>, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania,

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<sup>9</sup> For those States in which integrated safeguards have not been applied, the Agency's safeguards criteria specify the activities considered necessary by the Agency to provide a reasonable probability of detecting the diversion of a significant quantity of declared nuclear material from declared facilities or LOFs.

<sup>10</sup> A State-level approach, although based on safeguards verification objectives common to all States, takes into account the features of the individual State's nuclear fuel cycle and other relevant State-specific factors.

<sup>11</sup> This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of Denmark which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. Denmark and the Faroe Islands, which excludes Greenland. Denmark has concluded a separate comprehensive safeguards agreement for Greenland (INFCIRC/176), but has not yet concluded an additional protocol thereto. Denmark was encouraged to conclude an additional protocol in connection with INFCIRC/176 so that a broader conclusion can be drawn for the territory covered by that agreement.

<sup>12</sup> This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of the Netherlands which is covered by INFCIRC/193 and INFCIRC/193/Add.8, i.e. the Netherlands in Europe, which excludes the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. The Netherlands has concluded a separate comprehensive safeguards agreement that applies to its constituent parts mentioned above (INFCIRC/229), but has not yet concluded an additional protocol thereto. The Netherlands was encouraged to conclude an additional protocol in connection with INFCIRC/229 so that a broader conclusion can be drawn for the territories covered by that agreement.

Seychelles, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Uruguay and Uzbekistan. For The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the conclusion in paragraph 1(a) of the *Safeguards Statement* was drawn for the first time.

17. Because the evaluation process described in paragraph 13 had not yet been completed for 51 States, the conclusion drawn for these States related only to declared nuclear material in peaceful activities. The conclusion in paragraph 1(b) of the *Safeguards Statement* was drawn for Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Haiti, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Malawi, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Swaziland, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates and United Republic of Tanzania.

### **1.1.2. States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force but no additional protocols in force**

#### **Status of implementation**

18. As of 31 December 2011, safeguards were implemented for 61 States in this category. Safeguards implementation involved activities in the field and at Headquarters, including the evaluation of States' accounting reports and other information required under comprehensive safeguards agreements and the evaluation of safeguards relevant information from other sources.

#### **Deriving conclusions**

19. For a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement alone, the Agency's right and obligation are as described in paragraph 4 above. Although safeguards strengthening measures under such an agreement<sup>14</sup> have increased the Agency's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities, the activities that the Agency may conduct in this regard are limited for a State without an additional protocol. Thus, the conclusion in the *Safeguards Statement* for a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement alone relates only to the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from peaceful activities.

20. In the course of its evaluation, the Agency also seeks to determine whether there is any indication of undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State which would need to be reflected in the *Safeguards Statement*. However, without the measures provided for in the *Model Additional Protocol* being implemented, the Agency is not able to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the State as a whole.

#### **Islamic Republic of Iran**

21. During 2011, the Director General submitted four reports to the Board of Governors entitled Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran (GOV/2011/7, GOV/2011/29, GOV/2011/54 and GOV/2011/65).

22. In 2011, contrary to the relevant binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, Iran did not: implement the provisions of its Additional Protocol; implement the modified

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<sup>13</sup> This conclusion is drawn with regard only to that part of New Zealand which is covered by INFCIRC/185 and INFCIRC/185/Add.1; it is not drawn for the Cook Islands and Niue, which are covered by INFCIRC/185, but not by INFCIRC/185/Add.1.

<sup>14</sup> Such measures include the early provision of design information, environmental sampling and the use of satellite imagery.

Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to its Safeguards Agreement; suspend its enrichment related activities; suspend its heavy water related activities; or address the Agency's serious concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, in order to establish international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

23. While the Agency continued throughout 2011 to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, as Iran did not provide the necessary cooperation, including not implementing its Additional Protocol, as required in the binding resolutions of the Board of Governors and the United Nations Security Council, the Agency was unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran and, therefore, was unable to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran was in peaceful activities.

24. In his November 2011 report to the Board of Governors, the Director General provided an analysis of the information available to the Agency which had given rise to concerns about possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme. The analysis indicates that Iran has carried out activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. It also indicates that prior to the end of 2003, these activities took place under a structured programme and that some activities may still be ongoing.

25. On 18 November 2011, the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2011/69 in which, inter alia, the Board expressed deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear programme, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions and stressed that it is essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aiming at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material, and personnel in Iran<sup>15</sup>.

### **Syrian Arab Republic**

26. During 2011, the Director General submitted two reports to the Board of Governors entitled *Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic* (GOV/2011/8 and GOV/2011/30).

27. On 6 June 2011, the Director General reported to the Board of Governors the Agency's conclusion that, on the basis of all the information available to the Agency and its technical evaluation of that information, a building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was very likely to have been a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency by Syria.

28. On 9 June 2011, the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2011/41 in which it, inter alia, decided to report, as provided for in Article XII.C of the Statute, through the Director General, Syria's non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.

29. In May 2011, Syria indicated its readiness to fully cooperate with the Agency to resolve issues related to the Dair Alzour site (GOV/INF/2011/10). In August 2011, Syria informed the Agency of its readiness to have a meeting with the Agency in order to agree on an action plan to resolve the outstanding issues regarding the Dair Alzour site. In October 2011, a delegation from the Agency visited Damascus with the aim of advancing the Agency's verification mission in Syria. A number of questions, in particular concerning other locations that may be functionally related to Dair Alzour, remain to be resolved.

30. In 2011, Syria cooperated with the Agency in addressing the Agency's concerns in relation to previously unreported conversion activities at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor and the origin of anthropogenic

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<sup>15</sup> In January and February 2012, the Agency held talks in Tehran with Iran aimed at resolving all outstanding issues in connection with Iran's nuclear programme (GOV/2012/9).

material found there. The Agency decided that the matter would henceforth be addressed in the routine implementation of safeguards.

31. For 2011, the Agency was able to conclude for Syria that declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.

### **Overall conclusions for 2011**

32. On the basis of the evaluation performed and as reflected in paragraph 2 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat concluded that for the 61 States<sup>16</sup>, declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities. This conclusion was drawn for Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominica, Egypt, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guyana, Honduras, Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, Kiribati, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Republic of Moldova, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Tuvalu, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

#### **1.2. States with no safeguards agreements in force**

33. As of 31 December 2011, 14 non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had yet to bring comprehensive safeguards agreements into force pursuant to the Treaty.

### **Overall conclusions for 2011**

34. As indicated in paragraph 3 of the *Safeguards Statement*, the Secretariat could not draw any safeguards conclusions for the following States: Benin, Cape Verde, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Federated States of Micronesia, São Tome and Príncipe, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Togo and Vanuatu.

#### **1.3. States with safeguards agreements in force based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2**

35. Under safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2, the Agency applies safeguards in order to ensure that nuclear material, facilities and other items specified under the safeguards agreement are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any military purpose, and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and are not used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.

### **Status of implementation**

36. As of 31 December 2011, safeguards were implemented at facilities in India, Israel and Pakistan pursuant to safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2. None of these States had an additional protocol in force with the Agency.

### **Deriving conclusions**

37. The conclusion described in paragraph 4 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for these three States, and relates to the nuclear material, facilities and other items to which safeguards were applied. To draw such a conclusion in respect of these States, the Agency evaluates all safeguards relevant information available, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

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<sup>16</sup> In addition, this conclusion is drawn for those territories of Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand referred to in footnotes 11, 12 and 13 for which the broader conclusion is not drawn – i.e. Greenland; the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten; and the Cook Islands and Niue respectively.



## **Overall conclusions for 2011**

38. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded that the nuclear material, facilities or other items to which safeguards were applied in India, Israel and Pakistan remained in peaceful activities.

### **1.4. States with both voluntary offer agreements and additional protocols in force**

39. Under a voluntary offer agreement, the Agency applies safeguards to nuclear material in those facilities that have been selected by the Agency from the State's list of eligible facilities in order to verify that the material is not withdrawn from peaceful activities except as provided for in the agreement. In selecting facilities under voluntary offer agreements for the application of safeguards, the Agency takes into consideration factors such as: (i) whether the selection of a facility would satisfy legal obligations arising from other agreements concluded by the State; (ii) whether useful experience may be gained in implementing new safeguards approaches or in using advanced equipment and technology; and (iii) whether the cost efficiency of Agency safeguards may be enhanced by applying safeguards, in the exporting State, to nuclear material being shipped to States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force. By implementing measures under the additional protocol in these five States with voluntary offer agreements, the Agency also seeks to obtain and verify information that could enhance the safeguards conclusions in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements in force.

### **Status of implementation**

40. During 2011, safeguards were implemented at facilities selected by the Agency in the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force: China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (United Kingdom) and the United States of America.

### **Deriving conclusions**

41. The conclusion contained in paragraph 5 of the *Safeguards Statement* is reported for the five States with voluntary offer agreements in force in which safeguards were applied to nuclear material in selected facilities. To draw the safeguards conclusion, the Agency evaluates all relevant information, including verification results and information about facility design features and operations.

## **Overall conclusions for 2011**

42. On the basis of the results of its verification and evaluation activities, the Secretariat concluded for China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America that nuclear material to which safeguards had been applied in selected facilities remained in peaceful activities or had been withdrawn as provided for in the agreements. In two of these States, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom, there were no such withdrawals from the selected facilities.

## **2. Democratic People's Republic of Korea**

43. In September 2011, the Director General submitted a report to the Board of Governors and General Conference on the application of safeguards in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), which provided a historical overview and update on those recent developments of direct relevance to the Agency, along with information on the DPRK's nuclear programme (GOV/2011/53-GC(55)/24).

44. Since 1994, the Agency has not been able to conduct all necessary safeguards activities provided for in the DPRK's NPT Safeguards Agreement. From the end of 2002 until July 2007, the Agency was not able, and since

April 2009 has not been able, to implement any verification measures in the DPRK and, therefore, could not draw any safeguards conclusion regarding the DPRK.

45. Since April 2009, the Agency has not implemented any measures under the ad hoc monitoring and verification arrangement agreed between the Agency and the DPRK and foreseen in the Initial Actions agreed at the Six-Party Talks. Reports received about the construction of a new uranium enrichment facility and of a light water reactor in the DPRK are deeply troubling.

46. Although not implementing any verification activities in the field, the Agency continued to monitor the DPRK's nuclear activities by using open source information, satellite imagery and trade information. The Agency also continued to further consolidate its knowledge of the DPRK's nuclear programme with the objective of maintaining operational readiness to resume safeguards implementation in the DPRK.

### **3. Areas of difficulty in safeguards implementation**

47. Although progress was made during 2011 in addressing some of the areas of difficulty in implementing safeguards, further work remains to be done.

48. The performance and effectiveness of State and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material have significant impacts upon the effectiveness and efficiency of Agency safeguards implementation. In 2011, some States still had not established systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, which are required under comprehensive safeguards agreements. Moreover, not all State and regional authorities have the necessary authority, independence from operators, resources or technical capabilities to implement the requirements of safeguards agreements and additional protocols. In particular, some State authorities do not provide sufficient oversight of nuclear material accounting and control systems at nuclear facilities and LOFs to ensure the required accuracy and precision of the data transmitted to the Agency.

49. In accordance with the decision of the Board of Governors in September 2005, States which have not amended or rescinded their small quantities protocols should do so as soon as possible. At the end of 2011, 48 States had operative small quantities protocols that had yet to be amended. Forty-five States had amended their small quantities protocols, ten of which were amended in 2011 (see Tables 1 and 2).

50. Significant delays in the receipt, distribution, and analysis of environmental samples continued in 2011. Delays in the destructive analysis of nuclear material samples also affected the timely attainment of safeguards objectives. The opening of the Clean Laboratory Extension of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratories and ongoing work to qualify additional laboratories capable of carrying out analyses in the Agency's Network of Analytical Laboratories are expected to reduce these delays over the next few years.

### **4. Strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of safeguards**

51. The Agency has continued to improve the efficiency of safeguards implementation while maintaining or strengthening its effectiveness. During the past five years, the number of States<sup>2</sup> with safeguards agreements in force increased by 9%, the number of States with nuclear facilities increased by 6%, the number of facilities and LOFs under Agency safeguards increased by approximately 7%, and the quantities of nuclear material under safeguards increased by 17%. During this period, the Agency's total safeguards financial expenditures<sup>17</sup> increased by 6% and the number of regular staff in the Department of Safeguards did not change significantly.

52. The Agency put greater resources into the collection, analysis and evaluation of all available safeguards relevant information. This has significantly increased the Agency's knowledge of the nuclear activities being

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<sup>17</sup> See Figure 1.

conducted in States, which results in an increased effectiveness of safeguards, notwithstanding that the number of calendar-days in the field for verification has decreased by 21%.

53. During 2011, comprehensive safeguards agreements entered into force for the Republic of the Congo, Montenegro and Mozambique. Additional protocols entered into force for ten States with comprehensive safeguards agreements: Andorra, Bahrain, the Republic of the Congo, Costa Rica, Gambia, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco and Mozambique. At the end of the year, 114 of the 178 States<sup>2</sup> where safeguards were applied had additional protocols in force. Sixty-one States with comprehensive safeguards agreements where safeguards were applied<sup>1</sup> and three States with safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 did not have additional protocols in force.

54. In 2011, progress continued in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of Agency safeguards through strategic planning, further developing and implementing the State-level concept, introducing integrated safeguards in additional States, developing safeguards approaches, strengthening the Agency's technical and analytical capabilities, and increasing cooperation with State and regional authorities. Significant developments were as follows:

- The Agency prepared to implement the Agency's *Medium-Term Strategy 2012–2017* and the Department of Safeguards' *Long-Term Strategic Plan 2012–2023* and prepared the Department of Safeguards' *Long-Term Research and Development Plan 2012–2023*.
- The Agency initiated a structured and coordinated 'change project' which focused on ways to better integrate verification activities in the field and at Headquarters with State evaluation activities.
- Integrated safeguards were implemented for the whole of 2011 in 49 States<sup>2,18</sup>, and for part of 2011 in Iceland and Singapore.
- The development and implementation of more effective and efficient safeguards approaches included those: (a) for new types of facilities (such as geological repositories, spent fuel encapsulation plants, laser enrichment facilities and pyroprocessing facilities); (b) involving unattended monitoring and surveillance systems; and (c) using short notice or unannounced inspections to verify declarations of facility data and operational plans.
- The Agency continued modernization of technologies used for attended measurements and unattended monitoring and for the operation of such systems in the remote monitoring mode.
- The development of information analysis capabilities continued, supported by the collection of open source information (including satellite imagery) and information on nuclear related trade, consolidation of State declarations, and advanced evaluation of verification data.
- The new Clean Laboratory Extension of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratories was completed and the large-geometry secondary ion mass spectrometer was installed, tested and began analysing samples. Design of the new Nuclear Material Laboratory was completed and excavations began.
- Work continued with State and regional authorities on safeguards implementation issues. To support States in implementing their safeguards obligations, the Agency prepared a document entitled *Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols*, held training courses at the national, regional and interregional levels, and conducted two safeguards advisory service<sup>19</sup> missions.
- The quality management system continued to be implemented with a focus on document management, knowledge management, training, the cost calculation methodology, and tools to help improve processes, such as internal audits and corrective action reports.

55. Member State Support Programmes and the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) continued to make substantial contributions to Agency safeguards through the provision of assistance and advice, respectively.

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<sup>18</sup> Armenia, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Uruguay and Uzbekistan.

<sup>19</sup> IAEA State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material Advisory Service (ISSAS) missions.

## 5. Safeguards expenditures and resources

56. In 2011, safeguards expenditure from the Safeguards Regular Budget amounted to €116.9 million at the United Nations exchange rates in 2011, which is equivalent to €124.3 million at the budget exchange rate of €1.00 to \$1.00<sup>20</sup>. Regular Budget implementation for Major Programme 4 — Nuclear Verification — was 99.1% such that €1.1 million remained unspent at the end of 2011. The budget implementation of the 2010 carry over was 47.5% such that €2.3 million remained unspent at the end of 2011 due to delays in some projects. In addition, €14.3 million was spent from voluntary contributions received from Member States and the European Commission<sup>21</sup>. Significant additional resources are still required to address urgent needs, including the replacement of equipment and upgrading of infrastructure of the Safeguards Analytical Laboratories at Seibersdorf.

57. Figure 1 shows the expenditures of the Safeguards Programme since 2007.




Figure 1. Safeguards Programme expenditures, 2007–2011

## 6. Further activities supporting the nuclear non-proliferation regime

58. During 2011, the monitoring scheme approved by the Board of Governors in 1999 regarding separated neptunium and americium continued. The Agency received information from five States<sup>22</sup> about separated neptunium or americium. Flow sheet verification also continued to be implemented. By the end of 2011, evaluation of the information that had been obtained under the monitoring scheme and from open and other sources had not indicated any issue of proliferation concern.

59. In 2011, the Agency, the Russian Federation and the United States of America continued to develop a draft text of an agreement that provides for Agency verification of the disposition of plutonium designated by the Russian Federation and the United States of America as no longer required for their respective defence

<sup>20</sup> In January 2006, the euro was adopted as the functional currency for the Agency's Regular Budget Fund. The exchange rate of 1 euro to 1 dollar is used for comparison purposes only.

<sup>21</sup> The format of expenditure presented in this paragraph does not follow the standard reporting provided in the Agency's Financial Statements and is calculated by deducting prior year adjusted unliquidated obligations against the total cumulative disbursements and unliquidated obligations for 2011. This approach differs from the one applied in the previous Safeguards Implementation Reports, when only the year related disbursements and unliquidated obligations were taken into account in the total extra budgetary expenditure for the respective year.

<sup>22</sup> Australia, France, Japan, Norway and the United Kingdom.

programmes. Once completed, the draft agreement will require consideration and approval by the Governments of the Russian Federation and the United States of America and by the Board of Governors.

## 7. Status of safeguards agreements (as of 31 December 2011)

60. This section contains information — presented in the five tables below that conform with the structure of the *Safeguards Statement* — on safeguards agreements that provide the basis for the Agency's safeguards implementation in 2011. It does not include agreements under which the application of safeguards has been suspended in the light of implementation of safeguards pursuant to another agreement. For full details see the Agency's website:

[http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sir\\_table.pdf](http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/sir_table.pdf).

**Table 1 – States with comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols in force**

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
<b>Afghanistan</b>	X	257	19 July 2005		
<b>Albania</b>		359	03 November 2010		
<b>Andorra</b>	X	808	19 December 2011		
<b>Angola</b>	X(A)	800	28 April 2010		
<b>Armenia</b>		455	28 June 2004	X	X
<b>Australia</b>		217	12 December 1997	X	X
<b>Austria</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Azerbaijan</b>	X(A)	580	29 November 2000		
<b>Bangladesh</b>		301	30 March 2001	X	X
<b>Bahrain</b>	X(A)	767	20 July 2011		
<b>Belgium</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Botswana</b>		694	24 August 2006	X	
<b>Bulgaria<sup>(1)</sup></b>		193	01 May 2009	X	X
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	X(A)	618	17 April 2003	X	X
<b>Burundi</b>	X(A)	719	27 September 2007		
<b>Canada</b>		164	08 September 2000	X	X
<b>Central African Republic</b>	X(A)	777	07 September 2009		
<b>Chad</b>	X(A)	802	13 May 2010		
<b>Chile</b>		476	03 November 2003	X	X
<b>Colombia</b>		306	05 March 2009		
<b>Comoros</b>	X(A)	752	20 January 2009		
<b>Congo, Republic of the</b>	X(A)	831	28 October 2011		
<b>Costa Rica</b>	X(A)	278	17 June 2011		
<b>Croatia</b>	X(A)	463	06 July 2000	X	X
<b>Cuba</b>		633	03 June 2004	X	X
<b>Cyprus</b>		193	01 May 2008		
<b>Czech Republic<sup>(1)</sup></b>		193	01 October 2009	X	X
<b>Dem. Republic of the Congo</b>		183	09 April 2003		
<b>Denmark<sup>(2)</sup></b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Dominican Republic</b>	X(A)	201	05 May 2010		
<b>Ecuador</b>	X(A)	231	24 October 2001	X	X
<b>El Salvador</b>	X(A)	232	24 May 2004		

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
<b>Estonia</b>		193	01 December 2005	X	X
<b>Fiji</b>	X	192	14 July 2006		
<b>Finland</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Gabon</b>	X	792	25 March 2010		
<b>Gambia</b>	X(A)	277	18 October 2011		
<b>Georgia</b>		617	03 June 2003		
<b>Germany</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Ghana</b>		226	11 June 2004	X	X
<b>Greece</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Guatemala</b>	X(A)	299	28 May 2008		
<b>Haiti</b>	X	681	09 March 2006		
<b>Holy See</b>	X(A)	187	24 September 1998	X	X
<b>Hungary<sup>(1)</sup></b>		193	01 July 2007	X	X
<b>Iceland</b>	X(A)	215	12 September 2003	X	X*
<b>Indonesia</b>		283	29 September 1999	X	X
<b>Ireland</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Italy</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Jamaica</b>		265	19 March 2003	X	X
<b>Japan</b>		255	16 December 1999	X	X
<b>Jordan</b>	X	258	28 July 1998	X	
<b>Kazakhstan</b>		504	09 May 2007		
<b>Kenya</b>	X(A)	778	18 September 2009		
<b>Korea, Republic of</b>		236	19 February 2004	X	X
<b>Kuwait</b>	X	607	02 June 2003	X	
<b>Kyrgyzstan</b>	X	629	10 November 2011		
<b>Latvia<sup>(1)</sup></b>		193	01 October 2008	X	X
<b>Lesotho</b>	X(A)	199	26 April 2010		
<b>Libya</b>		282	11 August 2006	X	X
<b>Lithuania<sup>(1)</sup></b>		193	01 January 2008	X	X
<b>Luxembourg</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Madagascar</b>	X(A)	200	18 September 2003	X	X
<b>Malawi</b>	X(A)	409	26 July 2007		
<b>Mali</b>	X(A)	615	12 September 2002	X	X
<b>Malta<sup>(1)</sup></b>		193	01 July 2007	X	X
<b>Marshall Islands</b>		653	03 May 2005		
<b>Mauritania</b>	X	788	10 December 2009		
<b>Mauritius</b>	X(A)	190	17 December 2007		
<b>Mexico</b>		197	04 March 2011		
<b>Monaco</b>	X(A)	524	30 September 1999	X	X
<b>Mongolia</b>	X	188	12 May 2003		
<b>Montenegro</b>	X(A)	814	04 March 2011		
<b>Morocco</b>		228	21 April 2011		
<b>Mozambique</b>	X(A)	813	01 March 2011		
<b>Netherlands<sup>(3)</sup></b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>New Zealand<sup>(4)</sup></b>	X	185	24 September 1998	X	
<b>Nicaragua</b>	X(A)	246	18 February 2005		
<b>Niger</b>		664	02 May 2007		
<b>Nigeria</b>		358	04 April 2007		
<b>Norway</b>		177	16 May 2000	X	X
<b>Palau</b>	X(A)	650	13 May 2005	X	X

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol (date of entry into force)	Broader conclusion drawn	Integrated safeguards implemented
<b>Panama</b>	X(A)	316	11 December 2001		
<b>Paraguay</b>	X	279	15 September 2004		
<b>Peru</b>		273	23 July 2001	X	X
<b>Philippines</b>		216	26 February 2010		
<b>Poland<sup>(1)</sup></b>		193	01 March 2007	X	X
<b>Portugal</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Romania<sup>(1)</sup></b>		193	01 May 2010	X	X
<b>Rwanda</b>	X(A)	801	17 May 2010		
<b>Seychelles</b>	X(A)	635	13 October 2004	X	X
<b>Singapore</b>	X(A)	259	31 March 2008	X	X*
<b>Slovakia<sup>(1)</sup></b>		193	01 December 2005	X	X
<b>Slovenia<sup>(1)</sup></b>		193	01 September 2006	X	X
<b>South Africa</b>		394	13 September 2002	X	
<b>Spain</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Swaziland</b>	X(A)	227	08 September 2010		
<b>Sweden</b>		193	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Switzerland</b>		264	01 February 2005		
<b>Tajikistan</b>		639	14 December 2004		
<b>The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</b>	X(A)	610	11 May 2007	X	
<b>Turkey</b>		295	17 July 2001		
<b>Turkmenistan</b>		673	03 January 2006		
<b>Uganda</b>	X(A)	674	14 February 2006		
<b>Ukraine</b>		550	24 January 2006	X	
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>	X	622	20 December 2010		
<b>United Republic of Tanzania</b>	X(A)	643	07 February 2005		
<b>Uruguay</b>		157	30 April 2004	X	X
<b>Uzbekistan</b>		508	21 December 1998	X	X

**General Notes:**

- In addition, safeguards, including the measures of the Model Additional Protocol, were applied in Taiwan, China. The broader conclusion was drawn for Taiwan, China, in 2006 and integrated safeguards were implemented from 1 January 2008.
- The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/193 is that concluded between the non-nuclear-weapon States of the European Atomic Energy Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the Agency.
- 'X' in the 'SQP' (small quantities protocol) column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standardized text (see Section B, paragraph 7).
- 'X' in the 'broader conclusion drawn' column indicates that the broader conclusion has been drawn as described in Section B, paragraph 13.
- 'X' in the 'integrated safeguards implemented' column indicates that integrated safeguards were implemented for the whole of the year. X\* in this column indicates that integrated safeguards were initiated during the course of the year.

**Footnotes:**

- (1): The date refers to accession to INFCIRC/193/Add.8.
- (2): The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/176 is applicable to Greenland as of 31 January 1985. No additional protocol is in force for Greenland.
- (3): The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/229 with regard to the Caribbean part of the Netherlands (the islands of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba), Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten is pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is an SQP to this agreement. No additional protocol is in force for that agreement.
- (4): The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/185 is applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue. The additional protocol reproduced in INFCIRC/185/Add. 1, however, is not applicable to the Cook Islands and Niue.

Table 2 – States with comprehensive safeguards agreements but no additional protocols in force

State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
Algeria		531	Approved: 14 September 2004
Antigua and Barbuda	X	528	
Argentina		435	
Bahamas	X(A)	544	
Barbados	X	527	
Belarus		495	Signed: 15 November 2005
Belize	X	532	
Bhutan	X	371	
Bolivia	X	465	
Bosnia and Herzegovina		204	
Brazil		435	
Brunei Darussalam	X	365	
Cambodia	X	586	
Cameroon	X	641	Signed: 16 December 2004
Côte d'Ivoire		309	Signed: 22 October 2008
Democratic People's Republic of Korea <sup>(1)</sup>		403	
Dominica	X	513	
Egypt		302	
Ethiopia	X	261	
Grenada	X	525	
Guyana	X	543	
Honduras	X(A)	235	Signed: 07 July 2005
Iran, Islamic Republic of <sup>(2)</sup>		214	Signed: 18 December 2003
Iraq <sup>(3)</sup>		172	Signed: 09 October 2008
Kiribati	X	390	Signed: 09 November 2004
Lao People's Democratic Republic	X	599	
Lebanon	X(A)	191	
Liechtenstein		275	Signed: 14 July 2006
Malaysia		182	Signed: 22 November 2005
Maldives	X	253	
Moldova, Republic of	X(A)	690	Signed: 14 December 2011
Myanmar	X	477	
Namibia	X	551	Signed: 22 March 2000
Nauru	X	317	
Nepal	X	186	
Oman	X	691	
Papua New Guinea	X	312	
Qatar	X(A)	747	
Saint Kitts and Nevis	X	514	
Saint Lucia	X	379	
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	X	400	
Samoa	X	268	
San Marino	X(A)	575	
Saudi Arabia	X	746	
Senegal	X(A)	276	Signed: 15 December 2006
Serbia		204	Signed: 03 July 2009
Sierra Leone	X	787	
Solomon Islands	X	420	
Sri Lanka		320	



State	SQP	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
<b>Sudan</b>	X	245	
<b>Suriname</b>	X	269	
<b>Syrian Arab Republic</b>		407	
<b>Thailand</b>		241	Signed: 22 September 2005
<b>Tonga</b>	X	426	
<b>Trinidad and Tobago</b>	X	414	
<b>Tunisia</b>		381	Signed: 24 May 2005
<b>Tuvalu</b>	X	391	
<b>Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of</b>		300	
<b>Vietnam</b>		376	Signed: 10 August 2007
<b>Yemen, Republic of</b>	X	614	
<b>Zambia</b>	X	456	Signed: 13 May 2009
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	X(A)	483	

**General Notes:**

- The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/435 is that concluded between Argentina, Brazil, the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material, and the Agency.
- 'X' in the 'SQP' (small quantities protocol) column indicates that the State has an operative SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP in force is based on the revised SQP standardized text (see Section B, paragraph 7).

**Footnotes:**

- In a letter to the Director General dated 10 January 2003, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea stated that the Government had "decided to lift the moratorium on the effectiveness of its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" and that "its decision to withdraw from the Treaty will come into effect from 11 January 2003 onwards."
- Iran implemented provisionally its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.
- Iraq notified the Agency that it would, pending entry into force, apply the Additional Protocol provisionally as of 17 February 2010. Consequently, since that date, the Additional Protocol is being applied provisionally.

**Table 3 – States party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons without safeguards agreements in force**

State	SQP	Safeguards agreement	Additional protocol
<b>Benin</b>	X(A)	Signed: 07 June 2005	Signed: 07 June 2005
<b>Cape Verde</b>	X(A)	Signed: 28 June 2005	Signed: 28 June 2005
<b>Djibouti</b>	X(A)	Signed: 27 May 2010	Signed: 27 May 2010
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	X	Approved: 13 June 1986	
<b>Eritrea</b>			
<b>Guinea</b>	X(A)	Signed: 13 December 2011	Signed: 13 December 2011
<b>Guinea-Bissau</b>			
<b>Liberia</b>			
<b>Micronesia, Federated States of</b>			
<b>Sao Tome and Principe</b>			
<b>Somalia</b>			
<b>Timor-Leste</b>	X(A)	Signed: 06 October 2009	Signed: 06 October 2009
<b>Togo</b>	X	Signed: 29 November 1990	Signed: 26 September 2003
<b>Vanuatu</b>	X(A)	Approved: 08 September 2009	Approved: 08 September 2009

**General Note:**

- 'X' in the 'SQP' (small quantities protocol) column indicates that the State has an SQP. 'X(A)' indicates that the SQP is based on the revised SQP standardized text (see Section B, paragraph 7). In both cases the SQP will come into force at the same time as the safeguards agreement.

**Table 4 – States with INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type agreements**

State	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
<b>India</b>	211	Signed: 15 May 2009
	260	
	360	
	374	
	433	
	754	
<b>Israel</b>	249/Add.1	—
<b>Pakistan</b>	34	—
	116	
	135	
	239	
	248	
	393	
	418	
	705	
816		

**Table 5 – States with voluntary offer agreements**

State	INFCIRC	Additional protocol
<b>China</b>	369	In force: 28 March 2002
<b>France</b> <sup>(1)</sup>	290	In force: 30 April 2004
<b>Russian Federation</b>	327	In force: 16 October 2007
<b>United Kingdom</b> <sup>(2),(3)</sup>	263	In force: 30 April 2004
<b>United States of America</b> <sup>(4)</sup>	288	In force: 06 January 2009

## Footnotes:

- (1): The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/718 between France, the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is a small quantities protocol to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.
- (2): The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/175, which remains in force, is an INFCIRC/66/Rev.2-type safeguards agreement, concluded between the United Kingdom and the Agency.
- (3): The Safeguards Agreement between the United Kingdom, Euratom, and the Agency pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco was signed but has not entered into force. There is a small quantities protocol to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.
- (4): The Safeguards Agreement reproduced in INFCIRC/366 between the United States of America and the Agency is pursuant to Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. There is a small quantities protocol to this agreement. No additional protocol to that agreement has been concluded.